The Strategic Chessboard of the Warring States

In the turbulent final century of China’s Warring States period (475–221 BCE), the western state of Qin emerged as the dominant power under the visionary leadership of King Ying Zheng—later known as Qin Shi Huang, the First Emperor. The Qin-Zhao conflict of 236–232 BCE, often overshadowed by the climactic wars of unification, was in fact a meticulously orchestrated maneuver by Ying Zheng and his chancellor Li Si to weaken potential rivals while concealing Qin’s ultimate ambition: the conquest of all six eastern states.

This campaign unfolded against a backdrop of Qin’s “Five-Year Plan for Internal Reform” (五年积微), a policy spearheaded by Li Si to strengthen Qin’s administrative and economic foundations. Conventional wisdom dictated that Qin should avoid major military engagements during this consolidation phase. However, Ying Zheng’s inner circle recognized that prolonged inaction could embolden the eastern states—particularly the militarily formidable Zhao—to revive anti-Qin alliances like the defunct “Vertical Alliance” (合纵). Moreover, Qin’s legalist system thrived on a culture of “rewarding farming and warfare” (奖励耕战); five years without military action risked dulling the martial spirit that had propelled Qin’s rise.

The Unconventional Military Reorganization

To reconcile reform with strategic deterrence, Ying Zheng approved an unprecedented military structure: three “Acting Supreme Commanders” (假上将军) simultaneously leading separate forces—a radical departure from the traditional principle of unified command. Veteran general Huan Yi (桓龁) commanded the “Beyond-the-Pass Army” (关外大军) to maintain pressure on Zhao; the brilliant tactician Wang Jian (王翦) oversaw troop training at the Lantian Camp (蓝田大营); and the young prodigy Meng Tian (蒙恬) managed recruitment and equipment modernization.

This division served four key purposes:
1. Projecting an image of Qin’s military weakness to lull eastern states into complacency
2. Keeping eastern states preoccupied with border conflicts, masking Qin’s internal reforms
3. Maintaining Qin’s warrior ethos through continuous low-intensity warfare
4. Providing plausible justification for massive troop expansions

As Li Si summarized: “This is ‘crossing the sea by hiding under the sky’ (瞒天过海)—by the time the six states awaken, it will be too late.”

The Opening Gambit: Battle of Pingyang

In spring 236 BCE, the 70-year-old Huan Yi launched Qin’s first strike against Zhao’s Pingyang garrison—a strategically chosen target. Two years earlier, Qin had captured Pingyang during a drought-induced crisis, beheading 100,000 Zhao troops. Now, Zhao’s new king had stationed 50,000 elite frontier cavalry (commanded by the legendary Li Mu 李牧) at Pingyang to deter Qin.

Huan Yi’s battle plan was sophisticated:
– General Fan Yuqi (樊於期) led 50,000 troops in a frontal assault
– Cavalry commanders Biao Gong (麃公) and Tu Sui (屠雎) flanked with 10,000 riders each
– Huan Yi personally led 50,000 cavalry on a deep raid toward Wucheng (武城), creating strategic confusion

Initial results were promising—Pingyang fell quickly with 20,000 Zhao casualties. However, Fan Yuqi’s subsequent decision to push deeper into Zhao territory against orders would prove disastrous.

The Disaster at Feixia: Li Mu’s Masterstroke

Flush with victory, Fan Yuqi’s 50,000 cavalry penetrated Zhao’s heartland via the undefended Fen River valley, capturing Chili (赤丽) and Yi’an (宜安). During their retreat through the open plains of Feixia (肥下), Li Mu’s hidden cavalry emerged like “a forest of red horsemen under the setting sun,” ambushing the Qin forces with devastating effect.

The battle revealed Li Mu’s signature tactics honed against nomadic Xiongnu:
– Mastery of concealing large cavalry formations in open terrain
– Perfect timing for open-field encirclements
– Psychological warfare through sudden, overwhelming appearances

Qin suffered 30,000 casualties—including the disappearance of Fan Yuqi—while Biao Gong died from arrow wounds after a heroic last stand. This marked Qin’s first major defeat under Ying Zheng’s reign and introduced the king to his most formidable military opponent.

Ying Zheng’s Leadership Under Fire

Rushing to the front, the 23-year-old king delivered a masterclass in crisis leadership:

1. Normalizing Failure: “Victory and defeat are common in war,” he declared, citing Qin’s recovery from the 270 BCE defeat at Yanyu (阏与) to win the epic Battle of Changping (长平之战) 15 years later.

2. Turning Defeat into Lesson: “Having a worthy adversary is excellent! Li Mu’s army attacked without our detection—they deserve to be our teachers!”

3. Reaffirming Strategy: The division between external and internal armies would continue, with one crucial adjustment—no more than one additional defeat would be tolerated to prevent revival of anti-Qin alliances.

The Geopolitical Calculus

The post-defeat council grappled with fundamental questions:

Wang Jian’s Military Insight:
“Feixia was unsuitable for ambush by conventional standards—gentle hills with no choke points. That Li Mu succeeded here reveals his unconventional thinking from fighting nomads. We must study his methods.”

Li Si’s Political Warning:
“More than two defeats could rekindle the Vertical Alliance. We must limit further engagements.”

Huan Yi’s Veteran Perspective:
“Feixia was no special terrain—just bad luck! Li Mu happened to be passing through like a madman!”

Ultimately, Ying Zheng ruled:
– Continue probing attacks against Zhao to study Li Mu
– Accept no more than one additional defeat
– Maintain the five-year reform timeline

The Legacy of a Pivotal Campaign

Though tactically inconclusive, this campaign proved strategically vital:

1. Military Innovation: Qin adapted to Li Mu’s nomadic-style warfare, foreshadowing later victories against Xiongnu under Meng Tian.

2. Strategic Deception: The “weak Qin” facade worked—eastern states remained divided even after Feixia.

3. Leadership Test: Ying Zheng demonstrated crucial qualities—resilience after defeat, ability to learn from adversaries, and balance between military and political priorities.

As the king departed for the capital, his final words resonated: “Where you fall, there you shall rise again!” This ethos would carry Qin through subsequent campaigns, culminating in Zhao’s eventual conquest in 228 BCE—a prelude to the final unification of China in 221 BCE. The Qin-Zhao clashes of 236–232 BCE thus stand as a critical turning point where battlefield lessons, strategic patience, and visionary leadership converged to shape history’s course.