The Paradox of Democratic Expansion

The late 19th century witnessed an irreversible march toward democratic politics across the Western world, yet this expansion came with profound contradictions. As Italian political theorist Gaetano Mosca observed in 1895, all ruling classes—whether through wealth, education, or cunning—were forced to submit to universal suffrage once established, often resorting to manipulation and deception when necessary. This tension between democratic ideals and elite control defined the political landscape from 1870 to the outbreak of World War I.

The Paris Commune of 1871 had sent shockwaves through European ruling classes, revealing both the potential power and dangers of mass political participation. The brutal suppression of the Commune—with massacres that seemed inconceivable in “civilized” 19th century nations—highlighted the fundamental dilemma facing liberal bourgeois politics. As Aristotle had noted centuries earlier, democracy meant rule by the poor majority, whose interests rarely aligned with those of the propertied classes.

The Inevitable Tide of Democratization

Despite elite reservations, democratic reforms advanced relentlessly during this period. By the 1870s, France, Germany (for national elections), Switzerland and Denmark had established systems based on broad male suffrage, sometimes approaching theoretical universal male suffrage. Britain’s Reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 nearly quadrupled the electorate from 8% to 29% of adult males. Belgium expanded its electorate from 3.9% to 37.3% after a general strike in 1894, while Norway doubled its voters from 16.6% to 34.8% by 1898. Finland’s 1905 revolution led to an astonishing 76% of adults gaining voting rights.

This democratic wave extended beyond Europe. The United States, Australia and New Zealand already functioned as democracies, joined by Argentina in 1912. While these systems remained incomplete by later standards—typically enfranchising 30-40% of adults—they represented a seismic shift from earlier restricted systems. Notably, women’s suffrage began appearing on the political horizon, first in Wyoming (1869), New Zealand (1893) and Australia (1902), then in Finland and Norway between 1905-1913.

The Art of Controlling Democracy

Governments and elites developed sophisticated methods to manage this democratic expansion. Bismarck’s Germany demonstrated one approach: granting universal suffrage for the Reichstag while severely limiting its constitutional powers. Other nations used weighted voting systems, upper houses (often aristocratic), or property/education qualifications to temper democratic impulses. Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands granted extra votes to the educated, while Britain maintained university constituencies.

More subtle controls included:
– Gerrymandering (“electoral geometry” as Austrians called it)
– Public voting to enable landlord pressure (maintained in Denmark until 1901, Prussia until 1918)
– Complex registration processes that disenfranchised half of Britain’s working class by 1914
– Variable voting ages (from Switzerland’s 20 to Denmark’s 30)

As economist John Maynard Keynes noted in 1904, democracy remained “on trial”—its full power constrained both by the disproportionate influence of wealth and by the still-disorganized nature of newly enfranchised classes.

The Birth of Mass Politics

Democratic expansion inevitably led to new forms of political mobilization. National politics increasingly required mass party organizations, popular campaigning techniques, and the strategic use of emerging mass media—particularly the sensational “yellow press.” The era saw the decline of traditional elite politics and the rise of professional political operators who understood how to appeal to broader electorates.

This transformation produced what historian Eric Hobsbawm called “the age of public political hypocrisy.” As politicians increasingly needed to court mass electorates, frank discussions of democracy’s challenges retreated to private gatherings of intellectuals and elites. The period became a golden age for political sociology, producing thinkers like Mosca, Pareto, Michels and Weber who analyzed these new dynamics with clear-eyed realism.

The New Political Actors

Democratic politics empowered previously excluded groups to organize on an unprecedented scale:

1. The Working Class: Emerging socialist parties became the most formidable new political force, though they often struggled between revolutionary rhetoric and practical reformism.

2. The Petty Bourgeoisie: Artisans, small shopkeepers and white-collar workers formed unstable alliances, often torn between fear of big capital and fear of the proletariat. Their politics frequently featured anti-Semitism, blending economic resentment with cultural anxiety.

3. Peasants: While farmers organized powerful cooperatives and pressure groups, they rarely mobilized as a coherent electoral bloc, instead aligning with urban-based parties.

4. Religious Groups: Catholic political movements grew increasingly significant, though the Church hierarchy often distrusted democratic politics. Christian socialist parties began emerging, most successfully in Austria under Karl Lueger.

5. Nationalists: In multi-ethnic empires like Austria-Hungary, nationalist parties often paralyzed parliamentary systems by refusing cooperation across ethnic lines.

The Machinery of Mobilization

Successful mass movements developed sophisticated organizational structures. The Irish nationalist movement, for example, created an intricate network including:
– The United Irish League (electoral organization)
– Trade unions and guilds
– Land and labor associations
– Cultural groups like the Gaelic Athletic Association
– Mutual aid societies like the Ancient Order of Hibernians

By 1913, this apparatus had enrolled 130,000 members from Ireland’s 3 million Catholic population—a remarkable penetration for the era.

Ideology as Political Cement

Unlike single-issue pressure groups, successful mass movements offered comprehensive worldviews that functioned as secular religions. Whether rooted in socialism, nationalism, Catholicism or radical democracy, these ideologies provided cohesion that transcended specific policy demands. Even movements with revolutionary traditions like French republicanism or British liberalism adapted their historic ideologies to incorporate newly mobilized voters.

The Centralization of Politics

Democratic politics tended to erode local and regional political systems, creating truly national political arenas. Even in federal states like Germany or Italy, purely regional parties struggled to maintain significance. The era saw the decline of traditional “notable” politics based on local elites, replaced by professional party organizations that could manufacture celebrity politicians.

The Dilemmas of Governance

Democratic expansion created profound challenges for governing elites:
1. National Unity: Multi-ethnic states like Austria-Hungary faced existential crises as nationalist movements gained democratic legitimacy.
2. Policy Continuity: Business elites feared democracy would disrupt sound economic policies like free trade or the gold standard.
3. System Legitimacy: Traditional methods of securing loyalty (especially religious ones) were weakening just as mass politics required new forms of legitimacy.

Parliamentary systems proved particularly unstable—France saw 52 governments between 1875-1914, with only 11 lasting over a year. Effective governance increasingly depended on non-elected bureaucracies rather than transient parliamentary majorities.

The Search for New Loyalties

Recognizing that traditional mechanisms of social cohesion were failing, governments actively cultivated new forms of political symbolism and ritual. This included:
– Invented traditions like France’s Bastille Day (established 1880)
– Elaborate royal ceremonials in Britain
– Monumental architecture celebrating national achievements
– The proliferation of flags, anthems and other national symbols

As sociologist Graham Wallas noted in 1908, politics increasingly appealed to non-rational impulses—a stark departure from 19th century liberal rationalism. Governments competed with opposition movements to control potent symbols, whether the socialist Internationale versus the Marseillaise or rival national flags in Germany.

The Success of Integration

Despite these challenges, Western European governments proved remarkably successful at integrating mass movements into existing systems by 1914. Socialist parties, while rhetorically revolutionary, became increasingly pragmatic. Nationalist movements were often co-opted or contained. When World War I began, most socialist parties supported their national governments—a stark contrast to their internationalist rhetoric.

Only in truly multi-national states like Austria did the system appear fundamentally unworkable. Elsewhere, the combination of social reforms, political symbolism and careful co-option of moderate opposition created surprisingly stable democratic capitalist systems.

The Fragility of Democratic Capitalism

This stability, however, proved historically contingent rather than inevitable. As Lenin noted in 1917, bourgeois democracies had demonstrated unexpected resilience—but this resilience depended on specific economic and social conditions. The interwar period would show how quickly democratic systems could collapse under pressure. The democratic wave of 1870-1914 represented neither the inevitable triumph of democracy nor its permanent establishment, but rather one phase in democracy’s ongoing, contested global history.

The “long nineteenth century” ended with democratic politics firmly established in the capitalist core—but its future beyond that core, and even within it, remained profoundly uncertain as Europe marched toward the cataclysm of World War I.