The Golden Age and Its Fiscal Demands

The Kaiyuan era (713-741) under Emperor Xuanzong of Tang represented both the zenith of Tang power and the beginning of its decline. As the empire reached unprecedented territorial expansion and cultural flourishing, the financial demands on the central government grew exponentially. The capital Chang’an, with its enormous bureaucracy and military establishment, required vast resources to maintain. This created opportunities for financial specialists who could devise innovative ways to fill the imperial coffers.

Into this environment stepped Yuwen Rong, the first in a series of financial administrators who would shape Tang fiscal policy. His rise reflected Xuanzong’s growing appetite for revenue to fund his ambitious projects and luxurious court life. The emperor, now in his fourth decade of rule, had transformed from the vigorous reformer of his youth into a ruler increasingly focused on pleasure and display.

Yuwen Rong: The First Financial Specialist

In June 729 (the 17th year of Kaiyuan), Yuwen Rong achieved the remarkable feat of being appointed Chancellor (黄门侍郎、同中书门下平章事) primarily due to his financial acumen. His career trajectory demonstrated Xuanzong’s willingness to elevate specialists over traditional scholar-officials when it served his purposes.

Yuwen had made his reputation by creating a nationwide system of state monopolies and tax collection offices that dramatically increased revenue. His methods were effective but heavy-handed, earning him both imperial favor and widespread resentment. The historical records describe him as “sharp and quick-witted in response, skilled at financial management which pleased the emperor,” but also note how his policies caused “officials to gradually lose their proper functions while the emperor’s extravagance grew, bringing suffering to the common people.”

His arrogance proved his undoing. Shortly after becoming chancellor, Yuwen boasted that given a few months in office, he could bring peace to the empire. More fatally, he attempted to undermine the military commander Li Yi, Prince of Xin’an, who had recently captured the strategic Stone Fortress City and secured the western frontier. Yuwen’s political miscalculation – leaking his plans to impeach Li Yi before acting – led to his rapid downfall. After less than one hundred days as chancellor, he was demoted to Prefect of Ruzhou.

The Fiscal Crisis After Yuwen’s Fall

Yuwen’s dismissal created immediate financial problems for the court. Emperor Xuanzong reportedly complained to his ministers: “You all said Yuwen Rong was no good, so I dismissed him. Now state finances are insufficient – what solutions do you propose?” The chancellor group had no answers, revealing their dependence on Yuwen’s financial expertise.

The court’s response was to investigate Yuwen for corruption, finding him guilty of embezzling massive sums in Bianzhou. He died in exile en route to his punishment. This pattern – reliance on financial specialists followed by their scapegoating – would recur throughout Xuanzong’s later reign.

Pei Yaoqing’s Transportation Reforms

By 733, grain shortages in the capital forced Xuanzong to consider moving the court to Luoyang, the eastern capital. This costly and disruptive measure was avoided thanks to the innovative proposals of Pei Yaoqing, the Metropolitan Governor of Chang’an.

Pei analyzed the grain transportation system, noting that current methods wasted enormous resources. Ships from the Yangtze region had to navigate the dangerous Yellow River, with frequent delays and theft. His solution involved establishing a series of granaries at key points along the route:

– At the river confluence (河口仓)
– East of Cangkou (河阴仓)
– West of Cangkou (柏崖仓)
– East of Three Gates Gorge (集津仓)
– West of Three Gates Gorge (盐仓)

He also constructed an 18-li canal to bypass the treacherous Three Gates Gorge section. This system allowed efficient transfer between river systems and storage during dangerous conditions. Within three years, Pei’s system transported 7 million hu of grain while saving 300,000 strings of cash in transportation costs.

When advised to present these savings to the emperor as a personal gift, Pei refused: “This is state profit – I cannot curry favor with the emperor!” His integrity and effectiveness earned him promotion to Chief Minister (侍中). Yet even this capable administrator would fall victim to court politics within two years.

The Rise of Li Linfu

The year 734 marked a watershed with the ascent of Li Linfu, who would dominate Tang politics for nearly two decades. A distant relative of the imperial family, Li Linfu lacked the literary qualifications prized in Tang officials but possessed extraordinary political skills.

His rise demonstrates the informal networks that increasingly influenced late Kaiyuan politics. Li Linfu cultivated connections through:

1. His uncle Jiang Jiao, a favorite of Xuanzong
2. An affair with Lady Wu, widow of Chancellor Pei Guangting and daughter of the notorious Wu Sansi
3. The powerful eunuch Gao Lishi
4. Most crucially, Consort Wu Huifei, Xuanzong’s favorite concubine

Li Linfu’s support for Consort Wu’s son (the future Emperor Suzong) against Crown Prince Li Ying aligned him with powerful palace interests. When Chancellor Xiao Song recommended Han Xiu as chief minister, Li Linfu – tipped off by Gao Lishi – informed Han in advance, earning his gratitude. Han later reciprocated by recommending Li Linfu for chancellorship.

The Fall of Zhang Jiuling

Li Linfu’s main rival was Zhang Jiuling, the last representative of the early Kaiyuan reformist chancellors. A renowned scholar from Guangdong, Zhang had risen through literary talent and the patronage of Zhang Yue. As chancellor, he maintained the tradition of frank remonstrance established by earlier ministers like Yao Chong and Song Jing.

The conflict between Li Linfu and Zhang Jiuling crystallized around several issues:

1. The proposed promotion of Niu Xianke, a militarily successful but culturally unrefined border commander
2. The timing of the court’s return to Chang’an from Luoyang
3. The proposed deposition of Crown Prince Li Ying

In each case, Zhang Jiuling opposed Xuanzong’s preferences on principle, while Li Linfu artfully supported the emperor. The final break came when Zhang’s protégé Yan Tingzhi intervened in a corruption case involving his ex-wife’s new husband. Li Linfu used this to paint Zhang as heading a faction.

In 736, Xuanzong dismissed both Zhang Jiuling and Pei Yaoqing, leaving Li Linfu as dominant chancellor. The emperor reportedly reflected: “Since my accession, the chancellors have each had their strengths… With Zhang Jiuling’s dismissal, court officials now merely preserve their positions – none dare speak frankly anymore.”

Li Linfu’s Authoritarian Rule

As chief minister, Li Linfu systematically eliminated dissent and centralized power:

– He warned censors against criticism, comparing them to ceremonial horses that would be removed if they “neighed” at the wrong time
– He cultivated Xuanzong’s trust while quietly removing potential rivals
– He avoided military appointments that might threaten his position
– He maintained the flow of revenue to fund Xuanzong’s pleasures

Most significantly, Li Linfu supported the military governance system that would later produce the An Lushan Rebellion. When Zhang Jiuling in 734 urged executing a captured border commander named An Lushan for his “rebellious appearance,” Xuanzong dismissed the warning. This decision would haunt the dynasty a decade later.

Conclusion: The End of an Era

The transitions from Yuwen Rong to Pei Yaoqing to Li Linfu marked the Tang Dynasty’s shift from open, reformist governance to authoritarian control. Xuanzong, now in his fifties, increasingly preferred ministers who facilitated his desires rather than challenged them. The financial innovations that sustained imperial extravagance came at the cost of bureaucratic integrity and balanced governance.

Li Linfu’s nearly twenty-year dominance created the conditions for the An Lushan Rebellion that would devastate the Tang in 755. The elimination of critical voices like Zhang Jiuling left the court unprepared for crisis. This period stands as a cautionary tale about the long-term consequences of sacrificing governance principles for short-term efficiency and imperial convenience.