The Historical Context of the Peninsular War
Following the signing of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1808, the French Empire under Napoleon reached unprecedented heights of power, with the Emperor controlling most of continental Europe. As Napoleon famously declared in a letter: “I am not the successor of Louis XIV, but of Charlemagne.” With Germany and Italy subdued and Russia temporarily pacified, only Britain remained as a significant opponent in the anti-French coalition. This geopolitical situation led Napoleon to turn his attention to the Iberian Peninsula, initiating what would become one of the most protracted and brutal conflicts of the Napoleonic Wars.
The Peninsular War began when General Junot led the “Army of Observation of the Gironde” into Portugal, marking the start of a conflict that would last over six years – only ending days after Napoleon’s abdication in 1814. While the initial pretext was to punish Portugal for violating the Continental System, the war quickly escalated when Napoleon took advantage of a Spanish court coup to depose Ferdinand VII and install his elder brother Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain. This act of imperial overreach sparked a massive popular resistance movement across Iberia, while Britain seized the opportunity to open a new front against France on land.
The Catalan Theater: A Forgotten Front
Among the military campaigns of the Napoleonic era, the Peninsular War in Catalonia has received relatively little attention compared to the Russian campaign or Waterloo. This is partly because Napoleon himself only participated in a small portion of the fighting here. While the war tarnished the reputations of many French marshals, it made the reputation of Arthur Wellesley, later the Duke of Wellington. The Catalan front presented unique challenges due to its geography and the nature of the conflict, with the northeastern region around Barcelona developing into a particularly representative battleground.
At the center of this story stands Marshal Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr, an often-overlooked but highly capable commander who was given the difficult task of restoring French fortunes in Catalonia. Despite his eventual promotion to Marshal during the 1812 Russian campaign for his outstanding independent command abilities, Saint-Cyr remains one of the least recognized of Napoleon’s marshals, with scant information available about his remarkable career.
The Early Campaigns: French Overextension and Spanish Resistance
In February 1808, under Napoleon’s orders, French General Guillaume Philibert Duhesme entered Catalonia with 13,000 men of the “Army of Observation of the Eastern Pyrenees,” quickly occupying key positions including Figueres and Barcelona (Catalonia’s capital). Duhesme’s force consisted of over 7,000 French troops and about 5,000 Italians. He left a battalion to guard the crucial fortress of Figueres to protect communication lines with France while stationing the rest in Barcelona.
The situation for Catalan resistance appeared dire. The entire region had only 6,000 Spanish regular troops, a third of whom were Swiss mercenaries scattered across various locations. Those in Barcelona were under close French surveillance. The nearest concentration of Spanish regulars was in the Balearic Islands, but with Spain and Britain technically still at war, these forces couldn’t be quickly recalled.
Despite these disadvantages, the Catalans quickly organized a vigorous resistance movement. Drawing on their medieval martial traditions, they raised numerous militia units. These forces, called “miqueletes” in Catalan (though paid by local governments), along with true militia forces known as “somaten” (named for the church bells that summoned them), would play a crucial role in the coming conflict. The determination and patriotic fervor of these Catalan fighters would make an indelible contribution to the Peninsular War, producing several outstanding guerrilla leaders in the process.
Geography as Destiny: The Strategic Landscape
Catalonia can be broadly divided into coastal plains and inland mountainous regions. The main route from French Perpignan to Barcelona passed through two critical fortresses: Figueres and Girona. From Barcelona, forces could continue along coastal roads to Tarragona and Tortosa, or head inland through mountainous terrain to Lleida and then onto the plains of Aragon. This geography meant that events in Catalonia indirectly influenced the situation in Aragon.
In 1803, Catalonia had a population of 858,000, with Barcelona alone accounting for 180,000. The coastal plain was narrow, crisscrossed by numerous rivers flowing into the Mediterranean. The inland mountains featured rugged valleys with poor roads that hindered artillery and supply movements but proved ideal for guerrilla warfare. From the outset, Duhesme found it impossible to secure all major cities and communication lines with just 13,000 men against determined Catalan resistance.
The Outbreak of Popular Resistance
News of the May 2 uprising in Madrid quickly reached Catalonia, where resistance committees (juntas) began forming – first in Lleida on May 29, then in Manresa on June 2, with the movement spreading rapidly to Tortosa and the Llobregat River valley. However, Barcelona remained firmly in French hands with 12,000 troops. About 2,500 Spanish regulars in the city were either sent away by Duhesme or began deserting in small groups, which the French commander initially ignored. These deserters either joined local militia or fled to Aragon and Valencia.
Soon, Spanish militia guerrilla actions severed Barcelona’s communications with both France and other Spanish regions. Napoleon’s final orders to Duhesme were daunting: hold Barcelona, suppress revolts throughout the region, protect communication lines with France, and detach forces to support Marshal Moncey’s expedition against Valencia and General Lefebvre-Desnouettes’ siege of Zaragoza. Clearly, Napoleon had underestimated the severity of the situation in Iberia – Duhesme’s forces were barely sufficient for self-defense, let alone supporting operations in other provinces.
Initial French Failures and the Siege of Girona
Following orders, Duhesme divided his forces dangerously. General Joseph Chabran took 2,500 infantry and 600 cavalry toward Valencia, while Brigade Commander François Xavier de Schwarz led 3,200 men toward Lleida to suppress rebels and link up with forces besieging Zaragoza by June 19. Duhesme remained in Barcelona with just 5,000 men, attempting to reopen communications with Perpignan.
Both expeditions met with disaster. Schwarz’s force was ambushed at Bruch Pass on June 6 by local militia. After an exchange of fire, Schwarz – perhaps overly cautious – ordered a retreat. His Italian troops showed little fighting spirit, abandoning a cannon during their withdrawal. Seeing one column return unsuccessful, Duhesme recalled Chabran’s force, which had already reached Tarragona. Without northern support, Marshal Moncey’s Valencian campaign collapsed.
Desperate to reopen communications, Duhesme personally led 5,900 men along the coastal road toward Girona on June 14, brushing aside armed peasants and guerrillas to reach the fortress by June 20. Girona, commanding the vital route between France and Barcelona, was defended weakly – just 350 men of the Irish Ultonia Regiment and about 2,000 armed citizens.
Lacking proper siege artillery and sufficient numbers to fully invest the fortress, Duhesme attempted a coup de main, using negotiations as cover for a surprise assault. When his light guns failed to breach the gates, French artillerymen attempted to blast an entry but were driven back by intense defensive fire. Undeterred, Duhesme tried again at dusk under guise of more negotiations. Italian troops with scaling ladders stealthily approached the Santa Clara bastion in the Mercadal district around 10 PM. Though initially surprised, the defenders rallied and drove back the disorganized attackers in brutal hand-to-hand combat. The failed assaults cost Duhesme 700 casualties.
Forced to lift the siege without proper siege guns, Duhesme withdrew to Barcelona, only to find the Llobregat River valley swarming with militia. Though lacking regular army support, these guerrillas posed a serious threat. A June 30 sortie against them achieved some success, but another attempt five days later failed. With his situation deteriorating, Duhesme sent word to France by small boat. Napoleon responded by ordering the formation of a new division at Perpignan under General Honoré Charles Reille, composed of 7,000-8,000 Piedmontese and Italian troops, to relieve the pressure on Figueres before linking with Duhesme.
The Second Siege of Girona and Continued French Struggles
Reille arrived at Perpignan on July 3 with only 1,600 men, growing to 4,000 by July 11. After an unsuccessful attempt against Roses fortress (hampered by British naval support), he decided to join Duhesme instead. Meanwhile, Spanish regulars from the Balearic Islands finally began returning to the mainland – some to reinforce Zaragoza, others (about 5,000) landing in Catalonia between July 19-23.
With his forces reunited (about 13,000 men), Duhesme decided to attack Girona again in early August. However, Spanish defenses had been strengthened by 1,300 light infantry from Barcelona’s 2nd Volunteers Regiment. This time with proper siege guns, Duhesme abandoned direct assaults for formal siege approaches. He positioned himself west of Girona to fix defenders’ attention while Reille prepared the main attack northeast against Montjuïc fortress.
French progress was painfully slow, taking 16 days just to establish siege batteries. When bombardment finally began on August 12, the French hadn’t fully cut off the city, allowing communication between defenders and outside guerrillas. The delay proved costly. First came news of General Dupont’s catastrophic surrender at Bailén (July 19), devastating French morale while boosting Spanish spirits. Then on August 23, Marquis del Palacio landed at Tarragona with Balearic reinforcements, establishing a proper government structure for Catalan resistance.
Palacio decided to relieve Girona by threatening Barcelona. He sent Count Caldagues with a small regular force and 2,000 militia north while blockading Barcelona by land and sea. By July 31, the French last outpost at Mongat castle had fallen, completely isolating Barcelona. When Duhesme received desperate messages from besieged Barcelona commander General Lechi, he hesitated but ultimately decided to lift the siege after Spanish forces successfully attacked Reille’s positions on August 16. Duhesme withdrew his forces to Barcelona by August 20 amid constant guerrilla harassment.
Saint-Cyr Takes Command: A Turning Point
These repeated failures forced Napoleon to reevaluate the Catalan situation. Even before news of Duhesme’s second withdrawal from Girona arrived, the Emperor had decided to replace him with Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr, who brought two strong divisions: General Joseph Souham’s Lombardy division (10 battalions) and General Domenico Pino’s division (13 battalions of Italy’s best troops). Saint-Cyr’s priorities were clear: reopen communications, then relieve Barcelona.
Saint-Cyr’s arrival marked a turning point in the Catalan campaign. His first major operation would be against the coastal fortress of Roses, which controlled access to the vital port and threatened French lines of communication. The siege, conducted amidst challenging circumstances, would demonstrate Saint-Cyr’s operational skill and set the stage for his brilliant campaign to relieve Barcelona – a masterpiece of maneuver warfare conducted under severe logistical constraints.
The subsequent campaign would see Saint-Cyr execute a daring march through mountainous terrain without artillery or adequate supplies to defeat Spanish forces at Cardedeu (December 16, 1808) and Molins de Rei (December 21), successfully relieving Barcelona. These victories, followed by further successes at Valls (February 25, 1809), temporarily restored French fortunes in Catalonia. However, the grueling siege of Girona (May-December 1809) would test Saint-Cyr’s abilities and patience to their limits, ultimately leading to his controversial departure from the theater.
The Legacy of the Catalan Campaign
The Peninsular War in Catalonia demonstrated several key aspects of Napoleonic warfare: the importance of logistics, the challenges of counterinsurgency, and the limitations of imperial overreach. Saint-Cyr’s campaigns showed what a capable independent commander could achieve even with limited resources, while the Spanish resistance highlighted the power of popular mobilization.
Ultimately, despite French tactical successes, they could never fully pacify Catalonia or eliminate guerrilla activity. The war became a draining quagmire that tied down thousands of French troops needed elsewhere. As Napoleon himself would later acknowledge, the Spanish ulcer contributed significantly to the Empire’s eventual downfall.
The campaign also revealed the changing nature of warfare, where national sentiment and popular participation began to outweigh the professional armies of the 18th century. In Catalonia, as elsewhere in Spain, the line between soldier and civilian blurred, creating challenges the French military system was ill-equipped to handle. This transition would continue throughout the 19th century, culminating in the total wars of the modern era.