The Collapse of the Beiyang Warlords’ Anti-Revolutionary Plan

The dramatic victories of the National Revolutionary Army in southern China and the resurgence of the National Army in northwestern regions during 1926 marked the complete failure of the Beiyang warlords’ counter-revolutionary strategy to eliminate the “Two Reds of North and South.” Far from being destroyed, these revolutionary forces achieved unprecedented unity under the common goal of national revolution, launching powerful offensives against various Beiyang warlord factions from both southern and northwestern directions. This development signaled the impending doom of the Beiyang warlord regime.

Among the remaining Beiyang forces north of the Yangtze River, only Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian Clique possessed sufficient strength to confront the Northern Expedition forces. Confident in his 300,000-strong army and backed by Japanese, British, and American imperialists, Zhang Zuolin planned to consolidate his northern base for determined resistance.

Zhang Zuolin’s Ascension as Ankuo Army Commander-in-Chief

On September 8, 1926, just one day after Wu Peifu fled Hankou, Zhang Zuolin convened a critical military conference in Shenyang to address the deteriorating southern front. The meeting resolved to dispatch troops southward under the pretext of “assisting Wu,” with the true intention of seizing control of Zhili and Henan provinces from Wu Peifu before expanding Fengtian influence into Hunan and Hubei. Zhang’s strategy was clear: exploit Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang’s weakened state after their defeats by the Northern Expedition forces, first eliminating Wu under the guise of assistance, then turning against Sun, thereby consolidating complete control over northern China before confronting the revolutionary forces.

Despite Wu Peifu’s immediate recognition of Zhang’s “assistance in name, plunder in reality” scheme and his attempts to dissuade Fengtian intervention, Zhang Zuolin proceeded relentlessly. Through September, Fengtian forces gradually encroached on Wu’s territories, replacing Wu’s officers in key Beijing positions and undermining the provisional Beijing government. By November, having secured both political and military advantages, Zhang Zuolin entered Tianjin on November 11, preparing to assume complete control of the Beijing government while organizing resistance against revolutionary forces from both north and south.

The pivotal Tianjin Conference at the Cai Family Garden on November 14-15 brought together Fengtian, Zhili-Shandong Allied Army commanders, and representatives of Wu Peifu, Sun Chuanfang, and Yan Xishan. The conference established four key resolutions regarding military coordination against the Northern Expedition and Feng Yuxiang’s National Army. Sun Chuanfang, recently defeated in Jiangxi, personally traveled to Tianjin in disguise, dramatically reversing his previous anti-Fengtian stance and proposing Zhang Zuolin’s leadership as commander of a unified “Anti-Red Army” (later renamed “Ankuo Army” or “Pacification Army”).

On December 1, 1926, after elaborate ceremonies and fifteen provincial endorsements, Zhang Zuolin formally assumed the title of Ankuo Army Commander-in-Chief in Tianjin. In his inauguration proclamation, he declared his mission to “protect the nation” against those threatening its security. The Ankuo Army received substantial foreign support, including three million yen from Japan’s South Manchuria Railway Company, five million pounds from British merchants in Hong Kong and Shanghai, and American provisions of one hundred aircraft and ten million dollars worth of military supplies.

The Ankuo Army’s Strategic Deployment and Overconfidence

Following the Ankuo Army’s establishment, Zhang Zuolin and strategist Yang Yuting devised an ambitious military plan: Sun Chuanfang’s forces would hold the Yangtze front with Zhili-Shandong Allied Army support; Fengtian troops would enter Henan to “assist” Wu Peifu’s hypothetical counteroffensive; other units would attack Feng Yuxiang’s forces in the northwest while securing Beijing-Tianjin and rear areas. Zhang envisioned letting Wu, Sun, and allied forces bear the initial brunt before committing fresh Fengtian troops for decisive victory, confidently predicting complete triumph within a month and eventual national unification.

However, Zhang’s grandiose ambitions soon collided with harsh realities. Military setbacks, diplomatic isolation (particularly the foreign powers’ refusal to endorse his planned New Year’s Day assumption of national leadership), and internal challenges rapidly diminished his optimism. The once-boastful “King of the Northeast” became increasingly despondent, his physical appearance reflecting the strain of impending defeat.

The Anti-Communist Campaign and Li Dazhao’s Execution

Parallel to military efforts, Zhang Zuolin engaged in political maneuvers against communism, coordinating with imperialist powers and mirroring Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-communist actions in the south. The most notorious episode was the April 6, 1927 raid on the Soviet Embassy compound in Beijing’s Legation Quarter – a blatant violation of diplomatic immunity that resulted in the arrest of Communist Party founder Li Dazhao and thirty-four others.

Despite widespread condemnation and attempted interventions, including from the Soviet government and domestic sympathizers, Zhang proceeded with a sham trial. On April 28, after a predetermined verdict, Li Dazhao and nineteen others were executed by hanging at the Beijing Municipal Detention Center. This brutal act, carried out with Chiang Kai-shek’s explicit encouragement, exemplified the collaboration between old and new warlords in suppressing revolutionary elements.

The National Revolution’s Second Phase and Warlord Realignments

As Wuhan’s National Government launched its second Northern Expedition against Zhang Zuolin in April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nanjing faction simultaneously initiated its own “Northern Expedition,” primarily as political theater against Wuhan. Both campaigns unfolded against the backdrop of escalating anti-communist purges, with Wuhan’s leadership gradually aligning with Nanjing’s counter-revolutionary stance.

The critical Zhengzhou Conference (June 1927) between Wuhan leaders and Feng Yuxiang, followed by the Xuzhou Conference (June 19-20) between Feng and Nanjing representatives, sealed the fate of the Wuhan government’s leftist pretensions. Feng’s mediation accelerated the Wuhan leadership’s final betrayal of the communist alliance, culminating in Wang Jingwei’s July 15 declaration of anti-communist measures and widespread purge.

The Ankuo Army’s Demise and Historical Legacy

Zhang Zuolin’s Ankuo Army represented the last major stand of old warlordism against the revolutionary tide. Its formation reflected both the desperation of traditional militarists and the imperialist powers’ attempts to maintain influence through proxy forces. The elaborate political-military structure, including various advisory committees and a shadow government apparatus, demonstrated Zhang’s aspirations for national legitimacy beyond mere warlord rule.

However, the Ankuo Army’s rapid disintegration exposed the fundamental weakness of warlord politics in the face of organized revolutionary movements and shifting great power interests. Zhang’s eventual assassination by Japanese officers in the 1928 Huanggutun Incident symbolized how even the most formidable warlords remained pawns in larger geopolitical games.

The Ankuo Army episode holds enduring relevance for understanding China’s transition from warlord fragmentation to nationalist unification, illustrating both the persistent appeal of militarist solutions and their ultimate inadequacy in addressing China’s twentieth-century challenges. The collaboration between Zhang Zuolin and Chiang Kai-shek in anti-communist suppression, despite their rivalry, foreshadowed recurring patterns in modern Chinese politics where ideological enemies temporarily unite against common revolutionary threats.