The Fragile Foundation of the Southern Ming

When the Ming Dynasty collapsed in 1644 following the fall of Beijing to rebel forces, the remnants of the imperial court fled south to establish the Southern Ming regime in Nanjing. This new government faced an immediate crisis: how to stabilize its rule and reclaim lost territory. The Southern Ming’s fatal weakness lay in its dependence on military strongmen—the so-called “Four Guardian Generals”—whose ambitions and rivalries would ultimately tear the regime apart.

At the heart of this crisis was the question of legitimacy. Unlike earlier dynasties such as the Eastern Jin or Southern Song, which had managed to regroup and survive after losing northern China, the Southern Ming lacked a strong central authority. The Chongzhen Emperor had perished in Beijing, leaving no clear successor. The court’s inability to decisively choose a new ruler created an opening for military commanders to manipulate imperial politics for their own gain.

The Making of the Four Guardian Generals

The four generals—Huang Degong, Gao Jie, Liu Liangzuo, and Liu Zeqing—were not distinguished by loyalty or battlefield triumphs, but by their role in placing the Hongguang Emperor on the throne. Each had questionable backgrounds:

– Huang Degong, though a capable veteran of campaigns against peasant rebels, owed his position more to political maneuvering than military merit.
– Gao Jie, a former rebel who had defected from Li Zicheng’s forces, led troops that had fled hundreds of miles rather than confront the enemy.
– Liu Liangzuo’s brother had already surrendered to the Qing, foreshadowing his own later betrayal.
– Liu Zeqing had refused orders to defend Beijing against the rebel advance, choosing instead to preserve his forces.

These men became kingmakers in May 1644 when they backed Zhu Yousong’s claim to the throne. In return, they demanded noble titles, autonomous control over territories, and the right to collect taxes—effectively creating independent warlord fiefdoms within the Southern Ming state.

The Fatal Compromises of Shi Kefa

Shi Kefa, the respected scholar-official appointed as Supreme Commander of the Southern Ming armies, recognized the danger but proved unable to control the generals. His proposal to establish four military districts along the Yangtze reflected short-term thinking—prioritizing immediate defense over long-term recovery of northern China.

Contemporary critics like Liang Yizhang argued forcefully that the regime should focus on retaking Henan and Shandong to secure a strategic buffer zone. But Shi Kefa, politically weakened after opposing the Hongguang Emperor’s enthronement, lacked the authority to impose this vision. The generals refused to campaign northward, preferring to extort wealth from Jiangnan’s prosperous cities.

A telling incident occurred when Gao Jie demanded to garrison his troops inside Yangzhou. When citizens resisted, his soldiers looted the countryside, culminating in the murder of a local official who tried to mediate. Shi Kefa’s month-long negotiations achieved only a face-saving compromise—demonstrating the court’s helplessness against military extortion.

The Culture of Military Arrogance

With their “merit” in establishing the emperor, the generals treated the court with shocking contempt:

– Gao Jie openly mocked imperial edicts, sneering: “Edicts? What edicts? Have you ever seen people galloping through the Imperial Palace?”
– Huang Degong once interrupted a royal messenger mid-proclamation, shouting: “Enough! Get out! I don’t care what this edict says!”
– Liu Zeqing declared that scholar-officials had “ruined the empire” and should be “locked away” until the generals finished fighting.

This erosion of civil authority had dire consequences. As historian Huang Zongxi later observed: “When military men are rewarded not for serving the state but for controlling the throne, their inevitable betrayal is only a matter of time.”

The Collapse and Legacy

The Southern Ming’s military-centered power structure proved disastrous when the Qing invasion came in 1645. The generals, more concerned with personal rivalries than national defense, offered little coordinated resistance. Gao Jie was assassinated by a rival Ming commander; Liu Liangzuo and Liu Zeqing promptly surrendered to the Qing; only Huang Degong died fighting.

This episode offers enduring lessons about civil-military relations. The Ming had traditionally maintained civilian control over the military, but the Southern Ming’s dependence on warlords inverted this principle. As scholar Yang Tinglin lamented in verse: “The imperial capital—when will it be restored? They only seek royal favors… With the royal house in crisis, these scholars debate merit.”

The tragedy of Shi Kefa—an upright man outmaneuvered by circumstances—highlights how even the most principled leaders can enable dysfunction when they prioritize short-term stability over institutional integrity. The Southern Ming’s failure to recreate the Eastern Jin or Southern Song’s longevity stemmed directly from its original sin: allowing soldiers to become kingmakers.

In the end, the Four Guardian Generals guarded nothing but their own interests, ensuring the Southern Ming’s place in history as a cautionary tale of military power unchecked by political wisdom.