The Fragmented Landscape of Southern Ming Resistance

In the autumn of 1645, as the Qing dynasty consolidated its grip on northern China, the remnants of the Ming loyalists scrambled to organize resistance in the south. The fall of the Hongguang Emperor’s regime in Nanjing had left a power vacuum, but the Southern Ming still controlled vast territories—Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and parts of Zhejiang and Jiangxi. These regions possessed considerable resources and manpower, offering a viable foundation for sustained resistance.

Yet the Southern Ming was plagued by internal divisions. Two rival claimants emerged: Zhu Yujian, who ascended the throne as the Longwu Emperor in Fujian, and Zhu Yihai, who declared himself Regent of the Lu regime in eastern Zhejiang. While both figures symbolized the anti-Qing aspirations of the southern gentry and populace, their rivalry fractured the resistance. The Qing, having defeated the Shun and Hongguang regimes, underestimated the resilience of the Ming loyalists. Believing a swift pacification was possible, they withdrew their main forces—Prince Aji’s troops in June 1645 and Prince Dodo’s in September—leaving only a young Beile, Lekdehun, to garrison Nanjing with a modest contingent of Manchu banners.

The Longwu Emperor’s Struggle Against Internal Strife

Zhu Yujian, the Longwu Emperor, was a ruler of genuine ambition and strategic acumen. His policies aimed at unifying the resistance and driving the Qing out of China. However, his authority was constantly undermined by regional warlords and self-serving officials. In Fujian, he was effectively held hostage by the Zheng family—Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Hongkui—who controlled the province’s military and resources. Meanwhile, in Hunan, Governor He Tengjiao treated the region as his personal fiefdom, paying lip service to Longwu while pursuing his own agenda.

The emperor’s plan to relocate his court to Jiangxi or Hunan—where he could better coordinate resistance efforts—was thwarted by Zheng Zhilong’s opposition and He Tengjiao’s indifference. This failure highlighted a critical weakness of the Southern Ming: the erosion of central authority. Unlike the early Ming or even the Hongguang period, the Longwu regime could not enforce its decrees beyond a limited sphere. Regional commanders and governors acted as de facto warlords, prioritizing local interests over the broader anti-Qing struggle.

Missed Opportunities and Military Stagnation

The Qing withdrawal of their main forces presented a golden opportunity for the Southern Ming. With Lekdehun’s garrison in Nanjing stretched thin, loyalist forces could have launched coordinated attacks to reclaim lost territory. Instead, the resistance was marked by disunity and hesitation.

In Zhejiang, the Lu regime’s forces clashed with Qing troops along the Qiantang River, while in Huguang, remnants of the Shun rebels—now allied with the Ming under the “Loyal and True Battalion”—besieged Jingzhou. Yet the two most powerful Ming commanders, Zheng Zhilong and He Tengjiao, remained passive. Zheng, despite commanding a formidable navy, made no move to challenge Qing control of the Yangtze. He Tengjiao, whose forces were bolstered by former Shun rebels, refused to advance beyond Hunan.

The Qing, though numerically inferior, exploited these divisions. Lekdehun’s decisive victory at Jingzhou in early 1646 shattered the Loyal and True Battalion’s momentum, while Qing forces in Jiangxi systematically dismantled Ming strongholds. The Southern Ming’s inability to act in concert allowed the Qing to neutralize threats piecemeal.

The Collapse of the Longwu Regime

By mid-1646, the Qing high command recognized the need for a decisive strike. Prince Bolo was dispatched to invade Fujian, targeting the heart of the Longwu regime. Zheng Zhilong, whose loyalty had always been questionable, opened secret negotiations with the Qing. His defection in October 1646 left the Longwu Emperor defenseless. Zhu Yujian was captured and executed, marking the end of his short-lived reign.

The fall of Fujian was followed by the rapid collapse of the Lu regime in Zhejiang. By the end of 1646, the Qing had extinguished the two most prominent Southern Ming courts, though resistance would persist in other regions under the Yongli and Shaowu regimes.

Legacy and Historical Reflections

The Longwu regime’s failure was not inevitable. Its downfall stemmed from structural weaknesses—regionalism, warlordism, and a lack of centralized leadership—rather than sheer military inferiority. The Qing, by contrast, maintained a cohesive command structure and the ability to concentrate forces where needed.

Historians have often contrasted the Ming’s disunity with the Qing’s discipline. As the Ming chronicles exaggerated victories and obscured defeats, Qing archival materials reveal a more nuanced picture: a regime that, despite limited resources, outmaneuvered its divided adversaries.

The Longwu era remains a poignant reminder of how internal fragmentation can doom even the most righteous cause. Its lessons resonate beyond the 17th century, offering insights into the dynamics of resistance, loyalty, and the challenges of sustaining a coalition against a determined foe.