From Pirate to Power Broker: Zheng Zhilong’s Ascent

The turbulent Ming-Qing transition period witnessed the extraordinary rise of Zheng Zhilong, a former pirate who became one of the most powerful figures in southern China. Beginning his career as a maritime outlaw, Zheng’s strategic decision to accept Ming imperial amnesty during the Chongzhen reign (1628-1644) marked the beginning of his transformation into a legitimate power broker. His official appointments – progressing from regional commander to provincial military commissioner – gave him both legitimacy and authority to suppress other pirate groups along the Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi coasts.

Zheng’s acceptance of Ming authority served multiple purposes. While ostensibly bringing stability to the southeastern coastal regions, his primary motivation was eliminating rival pirate factions and establishing a monopoly over the lucrative maritime trade routes. By the time the Ming dynasty collapsed in 1644, Zheng had amassed unprecedented military and economic control over Fujian province, commanding both land forces and a formidable private navy that dominated East Asian waters.

The Creation of the Longwu Regime

The establishment of the Longwu regime in 1645 represented both the zenith of Zheng’s political influence and the beginning of its unraveling. When Zheng’s younger brother Zheng Hongkui installed Prince Tang Zhu Yujian as the Longwu Emperor in Fuzhou, it was with Zheng Zhilong’s full approval and support. This marked the second major Southern Ming resistance government following the fall of Beijing, recognized across southern China except for the eastern Zhejiang region controlled by the rival Lu regime.

However, the alliance between the idealistic Longwu Emperor and the pragmatic Zheng brothers was fraught with tension from its inception. Zhu Yujian envisioned restoring Ming authority throughout China, beginning with recapturing the Jiangnan region centered on Nanjing (his “half achievement”) before moving northward (the “complete achievement”). In stark contrast, Zheng Zhilong saw the imperial court primarily as a vehicle to consolidate his personal dominion over Fujian and its lucrative trade networks.

Power Struggles Within the Court

The Longwu court quickly became an arena for political infighting between imperial loyalists and the Zheng faction. Zhu Yujian actively recruited respected scholar-officials to enhance the regime’s legitimacy, appointing more Grand Secretaries than any previous Ming administration. This directly challenged Zheng Zhilong’s authority, leading to several dramatic confrontations.

The “Court Ranking Incident” exemplified these tensions. Zheng Zhilong, believing his role in establishing the regime entitled him to precedence, demanded to lead the officials’ procession. Grand Secretary Huang Daozhou invoked imperial tradition to block this pretension, winning a symbolic victory with the emperor’s support. Another confrontation occurred when the Zheng brothers casually used fans during an audience – a breach of court etiquette that prompted Minister of Revenue He Kai to impeach them for lacking proper decorum. The emperor’s praise for He Kai’s courage led to violent retaliation, with Zheng’s men later ambushing the minister and cutting off one ear as a warning to other court officials.

Military Failures and Strategic Divisions

The Longwu Emperor’s attempts to mobilize Zheng’s forces against the advancing Qing armies met with consistent obstruction. When ordered to support anti-Qing forces in Jiangxi, Zheng Zhilong’s nephew Zheng Cai deliberately delayed his troops at Shan Pass before retreating at the first rumor of Qing approach. Similarly, Zheng Hongkui’s subordinate Huang Kehui abandoned his position in Zhejiang without authorization. These military failures prompted the emperor to strip both Zheng Cai of his noble rank and demote Zheng Hongkui from Grand Preceptor to Junior Preceptor.

By 1646, recognizing that meaningful resistance was impossible while under Zheng’s control, Zhu Yujian planned to relocate his court to Jiangxi’s Ganzhou. This strategic location offered connections to Hunan, Fujian, and Guangdong, allowing coordination with other Ming loyalist forces. Contemporary observers, including Qing commander Jin Shenghuan, recognized the threat this posed, noting that coordinated action between Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Hunan could potentially revive Ming fortunes across southern China.

The Collapse of the Longwu Regime

The failure of this strategic vision stemmed directly from Zheng Zhilong’s obstruction and the self-interest of other regional commanders. Without Fujianese troops moving west or Hunanese forces under He Tengjiao advancing east, the Longwu Emperor’s position became untenable. Qing reinforcements under Hong Chengchou captured key Jiangxi cities including Ganzhou, Nan’an, and Ji’an, severing the emperor’s planned escape routes.

The regime’s collapse in 1646 marked a turning point in the Southern Ming resistance. Zheng Zhilong’s subsequent defection to the Qing – though he would later be executed by them – and the death of the Longwu Emperor left a power vacuum that the Yongli regime would later attempt to fill. The Jiangxi campaign’s failure had lasting consequences, as seen in 1649 when former Qing generals Jin Shenghuan and Li Chengdong, after switching sides to the Ming, found themselves repeatedly thwarted at Ganzhou.

Legacy of the Zheng-Longwu Conflict

The Zheng Zhilong-Longwu Emperor dynamic represents a microcosm of the challenges facing the Southern Ming resistance: the tension between centralized imperial authority and regional warlordism, between ideological commitment and pragmatic survival. Zheng’s story illustrates how personal ambition and regional interests often undermined broader anti-Qing cooperation.

Yet Zheng’s legacy extended beyond his political maneuvers. His maritime network laid the foundation for his son Zheng Chenggong’s (Koxinga) more famous resistance, including the establishment of a Ming loyalist regime on Taiwan. The Zheng family’s dominance over East Asian trade routes persisted for decades, influencing regional geopolitics well into the Qing era.

The tragicomic episode of Minister He Kai’s severed ear, memorialized in contemporary doggerel (“The Commissioner without an ear alone survived; The Emperor with a mouth could only weep”), encapsulates the pathos of the Longwu regime – an emperor with vision but no power, served by officials with courage but no army, opposed by a warlord with forces but no loyalty. This dynamic would continue to plague subsequent Southern Ming regimes until their final collapse.