The Succession Crisis After Nurhaci’s Death

In 1626, the founder of the Later Jin dynasty, Nurhaci, died under mysterious circumstances—some say from wounds sustained in battle, others from sheer frustration after his defeat at Ningyuan. His passing triggered a fierce succession struggle among his eight sons and nephews, known collectively as the “Four Great Beile” and “Four Lesser Beile.”

Contrary to popular dramatizations, the succession was not a free-for-all. Hong Taiji (later Emperor Taizong of Qing) emerged as the clear favorite. His elder brothers—Daišan, Amin, and Manggūltai—were either politically compromised, militarily inept, or lacked legitimacy. The younger contenders, including the famed Dorgon, were too inexperienced to challenge him.

Daišan, once a strong candidate, withdrew due to scandalous rumors involving Nurhaci’s consorts. With no credible opposition, Hong Taiji ascended to power on October 1, 1626, marking the beginning of a new era for the Later Jin.

Hong Taiji’s Diplomatic Gambit

Unlike his father, Hong Taiji understood the power of diplomacy. Just a month after his coronation, he received an unexpected delegation from Ming general Yuan Chonghuan, sent to “condole” Nurhaci’s death. This was a thinly veiled provocation, yet Hong Taiji responded with calculated restraint.

He hosted the Ming envoys lavishly, showcasing his military might while feigning goodwill. His message was clear: the Later Jin could wage war, but they could also negotiate. This display of political acumen stunned contemporaries. As Yuan Chonghuan himself noted, “The barbarian’s death and his son’s intentions are now known to us—what more do we need?”

The Prelude to War

By 1627, tensions escalated. Hong Taiji, facing food shortages, launched a punitive campaign against Korea to secure resources. Simultaneously, Yuan Chonghuan fortified Ningyuan and Jinzhou, rebuilding the Ning-Jin defensive line. Both sides engaged in a war of words—exchanging letters filled with threats and counter-threats—while preparing for inevitable conflict.

Hong Taiji’s patience wore thin. In May 1627, he marched 60,000 troops toward Jinzhou, initiating the Battle of Ning-Jin. His strategy was twofold: weaken Ming defenses and test Yuan Chonghuan’s resolve.

The Siege of Jinzhou and Tactical Stalemate

Jinzhou’s defender, Zhao Shujiao, played a masterful game of delay. He strung Hong Taiji along with fake negotiations, buying time for reinforcements. When the Later Jin forces finally assaulted the city, they were repelled by Ming artillery—a humiliating repeat of Nurhaci’s defeat at Ningyuan.

Frustrated, Hong Taiji shifted focus to Ningyuan, hoping to sever Ming supply lines. Yet Yuan Chonghuan had anticipated this. The Ming forces, bolstered by elite Guanning cavalry under Man Gui, stood ready.

The Legacy of the Ning-Jin Campaign

Though inconclusive, the battle revealed Hong Taiji’s strategic brilliance and limitations. He could not overcome Ming fortifications, but his ability to adapt—switching targets, leveraging diplomacy, and exploiting Ming weaknesses—foreshadowed his future successes.

For the Ming, Yuan Chonghuan’s defense was a tactical victory but a strategic omen. The reliance on static defenses and internal factionalism would eventually doom their hold on Liaodong.

Conclusion: The Making of a Dynasty

Hong Taiji’s early reign set the stage for the Qing conquest of China. His blend of military pragmatism and political cunning outshone his father’s brute force. Meanwhile, the Ming’s failure to capitalize on victories like Ning-Jin underscored their decline.

The Battle of Ning-Jin was more than a clash of armies—it was a contest of wits between two visionaries. Hong Taiji’s rise marked the dawn of a new imperial power, while Yuan Chonghuan’s defiance became a fleeting echo of Ming resilience.