The Shifting Sands of Alliances in a Multipolar World

The Warring States period presented a complex geopolitical landscape where alliances shifted like desert sands. States maintained factions favoring different foreign policies – some ministers advocated cooperation with Qin, while others pushed for resistance. Even within Qin itself, competing strategies emerged: allying with Qi and Chu against Jin, joining with Qi and Jin against Chu, or uniting with Jin and Chu to attack Qi. Ministers crafted policies based on their foreign connections, while rulers remained above factional disputes, selecting strategies according to changing circumstances.

King Zhaoxiang of Qin’s disagreement with his uncle was not personal but stemmed from differing assessments of the strategic situation. The king remained wary of Chu’s gradual recovery after years of recuperation. Since King Qingxiang of Chu ascended the throne five years prior, Chu had largely restored its pre-Chuisha War strength through its substantial resources.

The Strategic Prize: Wanye and the Southern Campaign

The Wanye region that Bai Qi prepared to attack formed the core of Chu’s Wan Commandery. Located near Han and Wei territories, this area had long been contested. After Chu’s devastating defeat at Chuisha, Han and Wei had seized lands north of Wanye. However, the Yique battles left Han and Wei exhausted, and with Qin focusing its attacks east of the Yellow River’s northern banks, Chu saw an opportunity to reclaim lost territory. King Qingxiang undoubtedly harbored ambitions to recover lands north of Wanye and perhaps even establish a new commandery in the Yi River valley.

Wei Ran advocated allying with Chu to attack Jin through diplomacy, while King Zhaoxiang preferred military action to eliminate the Chu threat to Qin’s operations east of the Yellow River. Bai Qi’s lack of opposition (unlike his later stance during the Handan campaign) suggested he agreed with the king’s assessment.

From a military perspective, securing Wanye first would eliminate a potential threat, allowing Qin to focus on pacifying Hedong and Henei without concern for its flank. The Nanyang Basin where Wan was located served as a crucial grain-producing area between the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, while Ye County’s salt mines were nationally famous. Most valuable was Wan’s advanced iron smelting and weapons manufacturing industry. As Xunzi’s “Discussion on Military Affairs” noted: “Chu armor made from shark skin and rhinoceros hide is as hard as metal and stone; the iron spears of Wan sting like wasps, light and swift as the wind.” Capturing Wanye would significantly boost Qin’s grain, salt, iron, and weapons production while further weakening Chu.

Diplomatic Maneuvers and Military Campaigns

King Zhaoxiang adopted Du Cang’s advice to stabilize Wei by returning Wangyuan, allowing Qin to concentrate on attacking Chu. Wei, surprised both by Qin’s attack on Wangyuan and subsequent peace offer, reinforced the city’s defenses after learning of Qin’s southern campaign against Chu.

Sima Cuo remained on the border to monitor Han and Wei, preventing interference with Bai Qi’s Chu campaign. Promoted to Zuogeng for his Wangyuan campaign, Sima’s attention remained fixed on the Yellow River’s northern banks, confident in Bai Qi’s abilities while anticipating Qin’s eventual return to attacking Wei.

The Wanye campaign lasted from late in King Zhaoxiang’s 15th year through his 16th year, with Bai Qi achieving another decisive victory. Though Wei Ran had not yet returned as chancellor, Sima Cuo’s request to campaign was approved, with additional troops and supplies allocated from Guanzhong. Sima targeted Zhi and Deng in western Henei – crucial transportation hubs connecting Hedong and Henei, near southern exits from Han’s Shangdang Commandery. Deng guarded vital Yellow River crossings, while Zhi served as a fortress blocking the Zhi Route. Notably, Zhi was also the hometown of the famous assassin Nie Zheng.

The Struggle for Control of the Zhi Route

The three Jin states had long contested the Zhi Route, which ran from Xinjian in Wei (modern Houma, Shanxi) through Wangyuan and Gaoluo to Zhi. Wei had previously fought Han and Zhao in the Hui River valley to secure control of the route’s terminus. Western Henei bordered Han’s Shangdang to the east, connected to Han’s Wusui to the west, and faced Zhou territory across the Yellow River to the south – all transportation lines to Daliang and Anyi vulnerable to Han blockade. Thus Wei fortified multiple border towns along the Zhi Route, with Wen and Zhi counties as key strongholds.

Though Zhi’s administrative area was smaller than Bai Qi’s Xincheng, its city was far larger. Archaeological surveys show the ancient Zhi city (modern Jiyuan’s Zhicheng village) covered approximately 3.26 million square meters, compared to Xincheng’s 2.1 million. Combined with adjacent Deng, Sima’s targets matched Wan in scale.

Capturing Zhi and Deng would give Qin initial control of land and water routes between Hedong/Hanai and Henei, making other western Henei cities increasingly vulnerable, especially if Han turned to support Qin.

The Battle of Zhi and Deng

The Wanye campaign created perfect conditions for Sima Cuo’s operation. With Wanye bordering southern Han and Wei, Qin troops could pivot north at any moment. Chu, Han and Wei all remained vigilant against Bai Qi stationed at Wan, fearing sudden attacks. As other states speculated about Bai Qi’s next move, Sima Cuo secretly launched a surprise attack on Henei.

Deng and Zhi were connected by roads but separated by mountainous terrain. After crossing the river, Sima quickly surrounded the unprepared Deng, securing vital Yellow River crossings. Henei Wei forces mobilized to repel the invaders before they could consolidate – their only fleeting chance to prevent Qin’s advance into the open Henei plains. A fierce battle loomed, with the initial engagement determining the campaign’s outcome: a Wei victory would force Qin back across the river, while Qin success would break Wei’s fighting spirit.

Military Reforms and Tactical Evolution

The elite Wei troops created by military strategist Wu Qi had once been the finest in the realm. But from Duke Xian of Qin’s eastern campaigns through Yique, Qin had thoroughly studied Wei’s heavy infantry tactics.

Wei troops wore three-piece armor protecting upper body, thighs and shins, using powerful crossbows at range and long dagger-axes and short swords in close combat, offering both strong offense and defense. Qin forces included lightly-armored infantry (mostly crossbowmen) and heavily-armored soldiers (using both long/short weapons and crossbows). Qin heavy armor only extended to the abdomen, with lower body protection similar to light infantry – no thigh or shin guards. This reflected Qin’s emphasis on offense and mobility, with heavy troops far more agile than their opponents. Qin countered Han/Wei heavy armor with powerful crossbows and long weapons. By mid-Warring States, “strong crossbows forward, long dagger-axes behind” was widely recognized as Qin’s tactical signature, continuing through Qin Shi Huang’s unification.

The Decisive Engagement

Typically dividing forces into three, Warring States armies positioned assault vanguards and reserve units in each formation, all following strict command. In battle, one-third forces engaged while two-thirds held position. Only after enemy routs would generals commit reserves to exploit success. Qin rear formations arrayed chariots with shields as makeshift fortifications, while assault units adopted aggressive formations rather than defensive circles.

As the two armies arrayed, their vanguards sought decisive advantage. Eager Wei troops advanced first, their drums pounding as they entered crossbow range and loosed volleys. Qin troops raised large shields, weathering the barrage before unleashing more devastating counterfire. With shields minimizing casualties, both sides maintained formations. At fifty paces, elite troops from both sides charged.

Qin’s lightly-armored vanguard crossbowmen rapidly dispersed to flanks as command chariots led ranks of armored soldiers with long pi halberds in a coordinated assault. Officers on chariots directed troops while firing arrows. The halberdiers maintained tight formation, followed by mixed units of spearmen, halberdiers, swordsmen and crossbowmen, all coordinated by command chariots. The halberd charge disrupted Wei formations, creating gaps for follow-on troops to exploit, fighting in coordinated hundred-man units further divided into mixed weapon squads.

The Psychology of Combat

Qin military law stipulated: if one in a five-man squad fell, the other four were culpable unless each killed an enemy. Wei law stated: equal casualties and kills canceled out; kills without losses earned rewards; losses without kills meant death and family punishment; if squad or platoon leaders died, only killing enemy equivalents could absolve subordinates. Both systems were harsh, but Qin consistently enforced rewards and punishments while Wei did not, producing vastly different results. Combined with disparities in morale, training, leadership and logistics, Wei struggled to match Qin in brutal engagements.

The fierce fighting saw many Wei soldiers beheaded. No discipline could stem spreading panic as one breach was plugged while others opened. After prolonged combat with mounting casualties, Wei formations grew ragged. Seizing the moment, Sima committed his cavalry to flank the Wei formation while light chariots smashed into the rear, attempting to encircle and annihilate the Wei vanguard. Though Wei commanders dispatched chariots and cavalry to rescue, Qin forces blocked them effectively.

As the Wei vanguard neared collapse, both armies showed signs of wavering. The Wei general ordered troops to adopt a “sitting formation” – kneeling to maintain cohesion and halt routs. But it was too late. The vanguard fled in disarray, panic infecting the reserves beyond any command control.

With the situation hopeless, the Wei general ordered retreat. Soldiers discarded armor and weapons in their frantic flight, abandoning banners as they ran…

Recognizing the opportunity, Sima ordered a general assault. Light crossbowmen in chariots fanned out in goose-wing formations to pursue, while heavy infantry pressed the rearguard and fast chariots and cavalry outflanked the fleeing enemy. Under this coordinated attack, Wei suffered massive casualties as their army disintegrated. Sima pressed the advantage to capture Zhi.

The Changing Strategic Landscape

While Qin’s two great generals demonstrated their prowess, the strategic situation shifted dramatically. Former anti-Qin alliance leader Lord Xue, now thoroughly estranged from King Min of Qi, became Wei chancellor and actively courted states against his homeland. Observing this, King Zhaoxiang abandoned further attacks on Chu, readopting Wei Ran’s diplomatic approach. Qin and Chu maintained peace for years afterward, allowing Qin to focus on campaigns against Han and Wei.

In King Zhaoxiang’s 16th year, Qin enfeoffed princes at Wan and Deng (near modern Mengzhou, Henan, close to the Yellow River), while Wei Ran received the new fief of Tao (modern Dingtao, Shandong), all becoming major lords. The princes at Wan and Deng, both Qin royalty with close ties to the Chu-affiliated Wei Ran faction, saw the Chu faction’s influence expand dramatically. Though Du Cang remained chancellor, Wei Ran lost little real power. Beyond Chu faction support, his friendly relations with military leaders like Bai Qi and Sima Cuo provided significant political capital.

The Iron Triangle’s Campaigns

Bai Qi and Sima Cuo’s three campaigns against Han and Wei captured numerous strategic points, creating favorable conditions in Hedong. Wei Ran prepared another stunning diplomatic maneuver to facilitate his return as chancellor and advance Qin’s hegemony.

Wei Ran employed Shang Yang’s classic tactic – forced surrender. Though Shang Yang’s military reward system encouraged headcounts, he himself often sought enemy surrenders, as when he surrounded and received the surrender of Wei’s Anyi in Duke Xiao of Qin’s 10th year, or captured the new Guyang fortress the following year. King Huiwen of Qin further developed this strategy, using sieges combined with diplomatic pressure to compel King Hui of Wei to cede fifteen counties of Shang Commandery.

The surrender tactic emphasized psychological warfare – military deterrence coupled with diplomatic pressure to break enemy morale. During these psychological operations, besieging commanders and defenders exchanged envoys in a battle of wits and rhetoric. Without diplomatic skill, a commander might be persuaded to withdraw by enemy envoys, as when Zheng minister Zhu Zhiwu famously persuaded Duke Mu of Qin to lift a siege during Spring and Autumn period. Due to talent structure and external war conditions, King Wu and early King Zhaoxiang of Qin saw few successful surrender cases, mostly relying on direct assaults. Now Wei Ran revived this ancient Qin tradition.

The Fall of Wangyuan

Wei had reinforced Wangyuan, but still reeled from previous losses. Moreover, Wangyuan’s inherent geographical vulnerability remained. This time, matters worsened as Henei and Daliang forces were blocked by Qin troops at Zhi and Deng, while Hedong reinforcements couldn’t arrive in time. Bai Qi and Sima Cuo’s earlier victories had cleared peripheral obstacles for Wei Ran. Under Qin’s fierce assault, Wangyuan fell again.

Wangyuan’s second collapse alarmed Han and Wei leadership. With Qin controlling all major Zhi Route points except Han’s Wusui, Wei faced threats from multiple directions after Qin crossed at Jimin Ford – east to Henei from Zhi or west into Hedong from Wangyuan. For Han, Wusui was now surrounded by Qin territory, effectively an exclave. If Qin used Wangyuan to attack Hedong, Han’s Shangdang cities along the Fen River valley might be next.

Diplomatic Countermoves

Waiting passively was unacceptable – capable ministers had to be dispatched…to Qin. King Xi of Han decided to employ the ultimate diplomatic maneuver generations of Han rulers had used successfully – formal submission. He chose Lord Chengyang as envoy to King Zhaoxiang.

Han diplomacy was notoriously inconsistent, sometimes joining anti-Qin alliances, other times assisting Qin against rivals. Since King Zhaoxiang’s accession, Han and Wei had alternately submitted to Qin and joined Qi in attacking Hangu Pass, forcing the bellicose king to experience the humiliation of territorial concessions. Han’s opportunistic diplomacy stemmed from its precarious position amidst powerful neighbors (except Zhou). Frequent warfare required passage through central Han and Wei territory. To survive, Han constantly shifted allegiances without principle, attaching to whichever power seemed strongest. Thus even when joining anti-Qin alliances, Han court maintained pro-Qin ministers to facilitate rapid realignment when needed. As a leading pro-Qin factionalist advocating Han and Wei submission, Lord Chengyang was entrusted with the mission.

Lord Chengyang’s approach offered Han short-term benefits. Allying with powerful Qin might involve Han troops assisting campaigns, with spoils shared afterward. This could help offset losses from Qin invasions.

Wei’s geographical position closely resembled Han’s, leading to similar vacillation between pro- and anti-Qin stances. In this context, Lord Chengyang’s proposal for Han and Wei joint submission to Qin rather than Han joining Qin against Wei showed rare principle. Unfortunately, since Yique, Han and Wei had grown deeply suspicious of each other. King Zhao of Wei considered the plan disadvantageous and attempted unsuccessfully to dissuade Lord Chengyang from going to Qin.

The Zhou Factor

As Lord Chengyang went to Qin, the Eastern Zhou ruler also paid court to King Zhaoxiang. Why would Qin receive this minor state? Geography held the answer.

Zhou faced Wei’s Henei across the river and lay on the essential route from Guanzhong to Daliang. If Qin could use Zhou roads and resources to attack Wei, eastern campaigns would gain significant advantage. But Zhou was a minnow among whales, especially after King Nan’s division of Eastern and Western Zhou (with the king at Luoyang and Eastern Zhou at Gongyi). The tiny twin Zhous constantly conflicted over resources and shifted allegiances among major powers.

Given proximity, Qin, Han and Wei most directly influenced the two Zhous. When Western and Eastern Zhou fought, Han had supported Western Zhou with troops, while also “requisitioning armor and grain from Eastern Zhou” when fighting Chu. Qin’s eastern expeditions often passed through Zhou (like attacks on Han), while anti-Qin alliances traversed the area en route to Hangu Pass. As Records of the Grand Historian states: “When Qin sought passage between the two Zhous to attack Han, Zhou feared that granting passage would anger Han while refusal would anger Qin.” Both Zhous sought to avoid offense, ingratiating themselves with major powers while dispatching lobbyists to prevent battles near Zhou territory.

Without exaggeration, only with Zhou’s support could Qin attack Henei unreservedly. Thus King Zhaoxiang had summoned the Western Zhou ruler, who feared detention (given King Zhaoxiang’s record detaining Lord Xue and King Huai of Chu). A lobbyist persuaded King Zhao of Wei to mass troops on the border, allowing Western Zhou to decline the Qin summons citing defense needs. With Western Zhou refusing, Qin turned to Eastern Zhou, whose ruler hated his Western counterpart and chose to align with Qin.

The Settlement

With Han and Eastern Zhou submitting, the situation turned dire for defeated Wei. Even chancellor Lord Xue hoped King Zhao would make peace with Qin, wanting to ally with Zhao, Yan and Qin against Qi. That year, Qi appointed Han Nie (also called Han Min or Han Yin) as chancellor, who advocated Qi-Qin cooperation against Wei to isolate Lord Xue. Whether Lord Xue’s or Han Nie’s plan prevailed, both benefited Qin. With no options – unable to rely on King Min of Qi, facing Zhao and Chu unable to resist Qin – Wei could only sue for peace. King Zhao of Wei dispatched envoy Mang Mao to negotiate with Qin.

Seeing the time ripe, Wei Ran demanded territorial concessions from Han and Wei as tokens of alliance sincerity. This mirrored Zhang Yi’s tactic after capturing Puyang from Wei, using diplomacy to compel King Hui of Wei to cede Shang Commandery.

Lord Chengyang pledged to cede 200 li of Wusui territory to Qin, knowing King Zhaoxiang remained bitter over personally ceding Wusui. Qin generals had conspicuously avoided Wusui, as if preserving a casus belli. Now surrounded by Qin territory, just five cities (Mianchi, Yanghu, Gaoluo, Zhi and Deng) could completely isolate Wusui. Rather than wait for Qin attack, proactively ceding the territory pleased King Zhaoxiang.

This proved crucial for consolidating the Qin-Han alliance, as Han then faced joint Zhao-Qi invasion reaching as far as Luguan. The Zhao-Qi forces had swept through Han’s Yingchuan region, nearly surrounding the capital Xinzheng. Besides powerful Qin, no state gave Qi and Zhao pause. To Han, ceding 200 li for powerful protection against partition by Qi and Zhao seemed reasonable.

Wei fared worse. To redeem Wangyuan – guardian of the Zhi Route’s western exit – envoy Mang Mao had to exchange two key Hedong cities, Pukou and Pishi, ceding 400 li of Hedong territory including these cities. Fengling