The Political Landscape of Early Tang Dynasty

The mid-7th century Tang Dynasty was a period of remarkable political intrigue, particularly within the imperial court. Emperor Gaozong, weakened by chronic illness, increasingly relied on his ambitious wife, Empress Wu Zetian, to manage state affairs. This power-sharing arrangement, known as the “Two Sages” (二圣), set the stage for a dramatic struggle over succession after the sudden death of Crown Prince Li Hong in 675 AD.

Li Hong’s demise created both grief and opportunity. While Wu mourned her eldest son, his death removed a potential obstacle to her political ambitions. The crown prince position passed to her second son, Li Xian—a charismatic, intelligent young man whose vigor made him a far more formidable challenge than his frail elder brother.

The Proposal That Shook the Court

Just three months after Li Xian’s ascension as crown prince, Emperor Gaozong made a startling proposal: he wanted Wu Zetian to assume full regency powers. This would grant her authority comparable to the infamous Qing Dynasty regent Dorgon—effectively making her ruler in all but name.

Historians debate Gaozong’s motives. His debilitating “wind illness” (likely a stroke or hypertension) left him unable to govern, yet he refused to abdicate to his son. Several factors explain this:
– Fear of becoming a powerless “Retired Emperor” (太上皇), recalling how his grandfather Emperor Gaozu had been sidelined after the Xuanwu Gate Incident
– Distrust of his sons’ capabilities, despite Li Xian’s apparent competence
– Overconfidence in Wu’s loyalty, as no woman had ever seized the throne in Chinese history

The proposal met fierce resistance. Chancellor Hao Chujun famously protested: “How can Your Majesty hand over the empire founded by Emperors Gaozu and Taizong not to your descendants but to the Empress?” This three-pronged argument—challenging Wu’s gender, the sanctity of dynastic succession, and the proper role of empresses—forced Gaozong to withdraw the idea.

Wu Zetian’s Counterstrategies

The regency debate marked a turning point. Wu realized that both the crown prince and chancellor bloc opposed her ambitions. Her response was characteristically systematic:

### 1. Creating the “North Gate Scholars”

Modeled after Emperor Taizong’s “Eighteen Scholars of Qin Palace,” Wu assembled her own intellectual taskforce. These low-ranking literati entered the palace through the northern gate (hence their name), bypassing traditional southern gate protocols. Officially, they compiled texts like the Essentials for Rulers (臣轨) and Biographies of Notable Women (列女传)—over 1,000 volumes in total. In reality, they:
– Pre-screened memorials before they reached chancellors
– Provided alternative policy advice
– Gradually eroded the chancellor’s monopoly on governance

### 2. Reshaping the Chancellor Corps

Wu methodically replaced senior ministers with junior officials indebted to her. This generational shift created a more pliable bureaucracy. As historian Denis Twitchett notes, “She mastered the art of promoting obscure officials who owed everything to her patronage.”

The Deteriorating Mother-Son Relationship

Meanwhile, Crown Prince Li Xian proved alarmingly capable. Unlike his sickly brother, he actively governed during imperial tours, earning praise for his administrative skills. His cultural achievements included annotating the Book of Later Han—a project that doubled as his own talent recruitment platform.

Wu responded with psychological warfare:
– Sent him Models for the Crown Prince (少阳正范) and Biographies of Filial Sons (孝子传)—implied criticisms of his conduct
– Allowed rumors to spread that Li Xian wasn’t her biological son, but the offspring of her sister Lady Korea

Four historical clues support the paternity rumor:
1. Unusual birth circumstances: Born en route to Zhaoling Mausoleum in winter
2. Lack of maternal bonding records compared to other sons
3. Exceptional harshness in later punishment
4. Timing: Conceived when Lady Korea was Gaozong’s favorite

The Breaking Point: The Ming Chongyan Affair

The crisis escalated with the murder of Ming Chongyan, a mystic favored by the imperial couple. This “diviner who communed with spirits” had repeatedly disparaged Li Xian to Gaozong, suggesting younger princes were better suited for succession.

When assassins killed Ming in 679 AD, Wu launched an investigation that “coincidentally” uncovered:
– Li Xian’s homosexual relationship with servant Zhao Daosheng
– 500 sets of armor hidden in the Eastern Palace stables

While private armories weren’t uncommon (bureaucratic red tape made weapon returns impractical), Wu framed this as treason. Despite Gaozong’s reluctance, she invoked the doctrine of “No pardon for a son plotting rebellion—one must sacrifice kin for righteousness.”

The Aftermath and Historical Legacy

Li Xian’s 680 AD deposition triggered waves of purges:
– Pro-Li Xian chancellors like Zhang Da’an were exiled
– Loyalists like Gao Zheng were forced into familial executions—his own father beheading him to prove loyalty
– The Eastern Palace staff was decimated

Wu’s triumph demonstrated her mastery of political theater. By allowing the Gao family’s grotesque display of “righteous punishment,” she reinforced terror as a governance tool. As Cambridge historian Howard Wechsler observes, “She turned Confucian familial piety into a weapon that destroyed families.”

The case also reveals Tang legal flexibility. Despite strict weapons laws, enforcement was often pretextual—armories became “treason” only when politically convenient. Modern parallels exist in how legal systems treat dissenters versus loyalists.

Ultimately, Li Xian’s fall removed the last major obstacle before Wu’s eventual usurpation. His tragic story—whether as victim of court politics or legitimate threat—highlights the brutal calculus of imperial succession. The armor incident particularly endures as a cautionary tale about how material evidence can be weaponized in power struggles.

For contemporary readers, this episode offers timeless insights into gender politics, the weaponization of morality, and how institutions bend when personal ambition reshapes governance norms. Wu’s methods—creating parallel power structures, manipulating information ecosystems, and strategic patience—remain studied in political science curricula worldwide.