The Scramble for Chinese Ports in the Late 19th Century

The final years of the 19th century witnessed a dramatic European power grab along China’s coastline, with Germany’s seizure of Jiaozhou Bay in November 1897 serving as the catalyst for a series of imperial land grabs. This event triggered what historians would later call the “scramble for concessions” in China, as rival European powers moved quickly to secure their own strategic footholds along the vulnerable Qing coastline.

Russia had maintained a long-standing interest in securing an ice-free port in the Pacific, with various options considered including ports in Korea. The Russian leadership closely monitored German movements in Shandong province, viewing them both as a threat and an opportunity. Foreign Minister Mikhail Nikolayevich Muravyov and other key advisors saw Germany’s bold move as justification for Russia to pursue its own territorial ambitions under the guise of maintaining regional stability.

The Fateful Decision to Seize Port Arthur

According to Count Sergei Witte’s memoirs, Tsar Nicholas II made the crucial decision to occupy Port Arthur (Lüshun) and Dalian just days after initial discussions had concluded against such action. The Tsar reportedly told Witte: “I have decided to take Port Arthur and Dalian, and have dispatched army units along with our fleet to go there.” His reasoning? The foreign minister had warned that British ships were nearby, and “if we don’t take them, the British will.”

This abrupt policy reversal occurred within a remarkably short timeframe. Muravyov later explained to incoming War Minister Alexei Kuropatkin that he had asked the Tsar during a subsequent audience: “What if the Chinese themselves request that we occupy Port Arthur?” to which Nicholas agreed. This clever framing provided political cover for what was essentially a unilateral land grab.

Diplomatic Maneuvering and Military Movements

Russian diplomats worked feverishly to create a veneer of legitimacy for their actions. On December 5, 1897, acting minister Pavlov reported that the Qing government had agreed to allow Russian warships to dock in previously closed ports. This concession, extracted from a weakened China still reeling from its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, became the diplomatic foundation for Russia’s next moves.

Meanwhile, British naval movements near Yantai (Chefoo) created additional urgency. Reports that British ships might sail toward Port Arthur prompted Muravyov to act decisively. On December 8, he informed the Tsar that China had not only agreed to port access but also to the use of warehouses and armories. He suggested framing any Russian occupation as a protective measure for China’s benefit.

The Fleet Sets Sail

On December 10, Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, the General-Admiral of the Russian Navy, requested and received imperial permission to dispatch a fleet to Port Arthur. The following day, Admiral Fyodor Dubasov in Nagasaki received orders to send Rear Admiral Reunov’s squadron to the strategic harbor.

Interestingly, Dubasov had been advocating for an alternative plan – the occupation of Korea’s Masanpo and Geojedo Island – which he considered more strategically viable. However, with orders already issued for Port Arthur, his proposal died without consideration. The Russian squadron departed Nagasaki on December 13 and entered Port Arthur on December 15, 1897 – finding no sign of the rumored British fleet.

Imperial Justifications and International Reactions

Tsar Nicholas II’s private journal reveals his excitement about these developments. On December 19 he wrote: “These days have been tense. Important things are gradually being accomplished in the East. Our Pacific Fleet has occupied Port Arthur and should enter Dalian…What forced us to act was the Germans taking Jiaozhou Bay, which was unforgivable.”

Russia carefully crafted its public explanation, claiming the move was temporary and undertaken with Chinese consent. When Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenobu Ōkuma inquired, Russian Minister Rosen assured him this was merely a temporary measure due to the German occupation of Jiaozhou. The Qing government similarly told Japanese diplomats this wasn’t a territorial concession but merely friendly permission for Russian use.

Japanese newspapers proved more perceptive than their government. By December 20, headlines like “Russian Ships Weigh Anchor,” “Major Diplomatic Issue,” and “The Second Step in China’s Partition” accurately predicted Russia’s long-term intentions to establish a naval base at Port Arthur.

The Witte Opportunity

Simultaneous with these military moves, Finance Minister Sergei Witte saw an opportunity to expand Russian economic influence. On December 16, 1897 – one day after the Russian fleet entered Port Arthur – Witte instructed Pokotilov to present Li Hongzhang with three demands in exchange for loan guarantees:

1. Monopoly rights on railroads and industries throughout Manchuria and Mongolia
2. Privileges for the Chinese Eastern Railway Company to build a branch line to a Yellow Sea port
3. Recognition of Russia’s right to use said port for its fleet

This revealed the comprehensive nature of Russian ambitions – combining territorial, military and economic expansion into a coordinated imperial strategy.

The Kuropatkin Factor

The political landscape in St. Petersburg shifted significantly with the appointment of Alexei Kuropatkin as War Minister in January 1898. The 50-year-old general brought fresh energy to the position, though his private diaries reveal deep concerns about the Port Arthur adventure.

During his orientation meetings, Kuropatkin received strikingly different perspectives from key officials. Witte criticized the occupation as poorly conceived and warned about deteriorating relations with China. Foreign Minister Muravyov defended the move as necessary to counterbalance Germany. Naval Minister Tyrtov expressed dissatisfaction with Port Arthur’s strategic limitations. Outgoing War Minister Vannovsky simply advised holding onto what had been taken.

Kuropatkin’s cautious suggestion to avoid confrontation until military readiness improved met with the Tsar’s optimistic assurance that “everything is going well.” The new war minister ultimately fell in line with the imperial will, supporting the aggressive policy while privately documenting the decision-making flaws.

The Legacy of Port Arthur

Russia’s occupation of Port Arthur marked a pivotal moment in the imperial scramble for China. The move:

1. Established Russia as a major naval power in East Asia
2. Accelerated the partitioning of China into spheres of influence
3. Heightened tensions with Japan, contributing to the Russo-Japanese War
4. Demonstrated the erratic nature of Nicholas II’s foreign policy
5. Revealed the competing visions within Russia’s imperial bureaucracy

The Japanese press proved prescient in recognizing this as more than a temporary measure. By 1898, Russia had secured a 25-year lease on the Liaodong Peninsula, transforming Port Arthur into its primary Pacific naval base. This expansion came at tremendous cost – alienating Japan, overextending Russian resources, and ultimately leading to the disastrous war of 1904-1905.

The Port Arthur episode illustrates how imperial powers used perceived threats (real or imagined) from competitors to justify their own expansions. It also reveals the complex interplay between military, diplomatic and economic considerations in great power politics at the fin de siècle. Most importantly, it shows how seemingly localized decisions could have far-reaching consequences, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of East Asia for decades to come.