The Rise of the Anti-Russian Comrades Association

In the autumn of 1903, Japan stood at a crossroads. The Anti-Russian Comrades Association (対露同志会), a nationalist pressure group, emerged as a formidable political force advocating for war against Russia. Their first major move came on November 5, when representatives confronted Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and elder statesman Itō Hirobumi—the latter perceived as an obstacle to military confrontation—with a stern warning letter. Though initially kept confidential, the document was later published on November 8 to clarify their stance.

The Association accused Itō of obstructing negotiations by participating in cabinet discussions, creating hesitation in Japan’s diplomatic strategy. Their rhetoric was uncompromising:

“Should Marquis Itō, relying on imperial favor, interfere and hinder decisive national policy, thereby jeopardizing Japan’s century-long interests, his guilt shall be unforgivable. We issue this warning as an expression of public outrage—and as an act of deep respect for Itō himself.”

Prime Minister Katsura, caught between the hawks and moderates, summoned three Association leaders—Sassa Tomofusa, Jinbē Chikatsune, and Tōyama Mitsuru—to his private residence on November 10. He assured them of unity among Japan’s leadership, but tensions continued to escalate.

Business and Media Enter the Fray

The same day, over 200 influential figures—politicians, journalists, and industrialists—gathered at the Imperial Hotel for an emergency meeting on the Russo-Japanese crisis. Attendees included banking magnate Shibusawa Eiichi and Mitsui executive Masuda Takashi. The assembly, chaired by politician Minoura Katsundo, passed a resolution urging the government to act decisively:

“The current diplomatic stagnation benefits neither Japan nor East Asia. We demand swift, resolute measures.”

Notably, Shimada Saburō, president of the Mainichi Shimbun, delivered a keynote speech. Once a pacifist, Shimada had recently published Japan and Russia (1901), signaling his shift toward militarism. His transformation mirrored broader media trends; most major newspapers now championed war. Even dissent carried risks—Shimada had survived an assassination attempt by ultranationalists weeks earlier.

The Anti-Russian Campaign Intensifies

By November 24, the Association targeted Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonnohyōe, accusing him of advocating “reckless compromise.” Their warning underscored the growing impatience with diplomatic delays. Meanwhile, Russia’s failure to respond to Japan’s proposals by November 28 prompted the Association to declare:

“Russia shows no sincerity for peace. Japan must abandon negotiations and act independently.”

Public sentiment hardened. The Tokyo Asahi Shimbun echoed this on December 1, arguing that further delays only emboldened Russia. Even business leaders, traditionally wary of war, now preferred conflict over indefinite uncertainty.

Political Parties Demand Action

With the Imperial Diet session approaching on December 10, opposition parties seized the moment. The Progressive Party (進歩党), led by Ōkuma Shigenobu, passed a resolution condemning the government’s “failure to secure Japan’s interests in Manchuria and Korea.” The Imperial Party and Rikken Seiyūkai followed suit, with newly appointed president Saionji Kinmochi vowing to challenge the cabinet’s cautious stance.

Yet political theater soon collapsed. The Diet dissolved on December 11 after deadlocking over a reply to the Emperor’s address—a pretext to silence dissent.

A Novel Predicts War

Amid the crisis, a fictionalized account of the coming conflict appeared: The Russo-Japanese War: Hanekawa Rokurō (November 1903) by Shiba Shirō (pen name Tōkai Sanshi). A former politician and ally of Miura Gorō (architect of the 1895 assassination of Korean Empress Myeongseong), Shiba wove nationalist propaganda into his narrative.

The novel’s protagonist, Hanekawa Rokurō, embodies Japan’s revenge against Russia—avenging ancestral grievances in Sakhalin and Korea. The plot mirrors real-life tensions: Russian “duplicity,” Korean “duplicity,” and Japan’s technological ingenuity (including early submarines and aerial bombing). Crucially, it ends with Japan’s victory and a punitive peace treaty:

– Russian withdrawal from Manchuria
– Japanese control of Korea as a protectorate
– Annexation of Sakhalin and war reparations

Though fictional, the book likely stoked public fervor for war.

The Path to War

Behind closed doors, Japan’s leaders edged toward conflict. On December 16, a secret meeting between cabinet members and elder statesmen debated Russia’s latest reply. While Yamagata Aritomo suggested a final diplomatic push, Prime Minister Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō insisted on preparing for war—using Korea as the casus belli.

Komura’s December 21 ultimatum demanded Russia recognize Japan’s “military assistance” rights in Korea while dropping neutrality demands. Russia’s Viceroy of the Far East, Alekseyev, rejected it outright on December 26, calling Japan’s terms “greedy and unreasonable.”

By year’s end, Japan’s mobilization was underway. A 50-million-yen war budget was approved, and troops readied for deployment. Russian envoy Roman Rosen warned St. Petersburg:

“Japan is resolved to occupy Korea. War is inevitable.”

Legacy and Reflection

The 1903 crisis reveals how nationalist groups, media, and elites shaped Japan’s path to war. The Anti-Russian Comrades Association’s pressure tactics, combined with fictionalized propaganda like Hanekawa Rokurō, created an unstoppable momentum. Diplomacy became a performative prelude to conflict—one that would redefine East Asia’s balance of power in 1904–1905.

Today, this episode underscores the dangers of militarized public opinion and the fragility of diplomacy when nationalism takes hold. The Russo-Japanese War, often overshadowed by World Wars, remains a pivotal study in how societies march toward confrontation.