A Confucian Scholar Turned Military Commander

On October 16, 1860, in the rugged mountains of Anhui, a weary 49-year-old general struggled to rise from his bed. The previous night’s violent vomiting had left Zeng Guofan—broad-chested, with a distinctive goatee—physically drained and emotionally despondent. Though not yet old, the relentless pressures of war had aged him prematurely. In his diary that morning, he recorded receiving devastating news: the Xianfeng Emperor had fled Beijing as Anglo-French forces advanced upon the capital. Tears streamed down the scholar-general’s face at this symbol of imperial impotence.

Zeng’s despair stemmed from his frustrating position. Nominally commander of Qing forces against the Taiping rebels, he found himself trapped in a protracted campaign at Qimen, Anhui—650 kilometers from both the Taiping stronghold at Suzhou and the foreign-threatened capital. The man who had never aspired to military leadership now commanded the empire’s last hope: the Hunan Army (Xiang Army), a unique fighting force he had personally created from Confucian principles and local militia.

From Humble Scholar to Imperial Servant

Born in 1811 to a modest Hunan farming family, Zeng’s early life followed the classical path of Chinese scholar-officials. His father had failed the civil service examinations sixteen times before finally achieving the lowest degree (xiucai) in 1832—the same year 21-year-old Zeng passed. Through relentless determination (requiring seven attempts for his xiucai), Zeng ascended the examination ladder, earning the prestigious jinshi degree in 1838 and appointment to the Hanlin Academy—the pinnacle of scholarly achievement.

Unlike Hong Xiuquan (the Taiping leader whose examination failures precipitated his messianic rebellion), Zeng’s success bred loyalty to the Qing. His first provincial examination commission in Sichuan brought wealth through customary gifts from grateful candidates—allowing him to repay family debts—but also disillusionment with official corruption. Influenced by Neo-Confucian mentors in Beijing, he adopted rigorous self-cultivation practices: rising early, meditating, keeping diaries, and walking 1,000 steps after meals.

The Reluctant Warrior

When Zeng’s mother died in 1852, tradition required his resignation to observe mourning—fortuitously returning him to Hunan as the Taiping Rebellion erupted. With imperial forces crumbling, the desperate Xianfeng Emperor ordered Zeng to organize local militia (tuanlian). Initially refusing (citing filial obligations), Zeng reluctantly accepted after Taiping forces captured Wuhan in January 1853.

Recognizing the Green Standard Army’s corruption and incompetence (“They flee at the rebel’s approach, then kill civilians to claim victories”), Zeng envisioned a new force modeled after Ming dynasty general Qi Jiguang’s anti-pirate militia. His Xiang Army would embody Confucian ethics through:

1. Personal Recruitment: Officers personally selected subordinates, creating familial bonds from commander to private.
2. Rural Conscription: Preferring “rustic honesty” over urban “frivolity,” Zeng recruited Hunan peasants.
3. Moral Discipline: Officers were to treat soldiers “as fathers treat sons”—strict but caring.
4. Severe Punishments: Deserters faced execution; their families suffered collective punishment.
5. Generous Incentives: Soldiers earned triple Green Standard pay, plus bounties (20 taels per captured Taiping).

Trial by Fire

The Xiang Army’s 1854 baptism at Xiangtan demonstrated both its potential and Zeng’s military inexperience. After initial victories expelled Taiping forces from Hunan, Zeng’s poorly coordinated naval assault at Jinggang failed spectacularly—he attempted suicide by drowning before aides intervened. Yet concurrent victories at Xiangtan (reportedly killing 10,000 rebels) proved the army’s worth.

Over six grueling years, Zeng refined his strategy:

– Riverine Warfare: Innovative gunboats (like the 16-oared “Fast Crabs”) controlled the Yangtze.
– Patient Encirclement: “First sever the branches, then uproot the trunk” became his mantra against Nanjing.
– Psychological Warfare: “Love the People Songs” taught soldiers to avoid pillaging—though later discipline deteriorated.

The Anhui Crucible

By 1860, with imperial forces shattered east and north, Zeng’s promotion as Viceroy of Liangjiang marked his ascendancy. His controversial decisions—defying orders to reinforce Beijing against Anglo-French forces, prioritizing the Anhui campaign—reflected hard-won strategic insight. As he wrote:

“Everywhere the rebels hold advantage—only at Anqing do we have the upper hand. How can we abandon this?”

The siege of Anqing (1860-61) exemplified his methods: concentric trenches, naval blockades, and provoking the Taiping into costly attacks. When his brother Zeng Guoquan finally took the city in September 1861, it marked the rebellion’s turning point.

Legacy of the Scholar-General

Zeng’s creation of the Hunan Army revolutionized Qing military affairs:

1. Regional Armies: Decentralized forces replaced ineffective national troops, empowering Han officials.
2. Confucian Militarism: Blending ethics with warfare influenced later Chinese military thought.
3. Modernization Prelude: Though conservative, Zeng’s pragmatism paved way for the Self-Strengthening Movement.

Yet contradictions endured. The man who wept for Confucian values presided over horrific casualties (600,000 died at Nanjing’s recapture). His regional army model ultimately weakened central authority, contributing to late Qing warlordism.

As foreign threats mounted in 1860, Zeng’s dilemma encapsulated China’s crisis: preserve Confucian order or confront modernity? His answer—a traditionalist adapting to save tradition—would define China’s tumultuous century ahead. The scholar who never wanted to fight had become the empire’s indispensable general, his Hunan Army both the Qing’s salvation and a harbinger of its eventual fragmentation.