The Unstable Ground of Bakumatsu Politics

The political landscape of late Edo-period Japan presented a complex chessboard where ambitious men maneuvered for power and influence. Saigō Takamori emerged from this turbulent environment as a formidable strategist whose career would become characterized by alternating victories and defeats. His early political involvement centered on the movement to support Tokugawa Yoshinobu as shogunal heir in 1858, an effort that collapsed when Ii Naosuke initiated the Ansei Purge. This first political defeat nevertheless contained the seeds of Saigō’s emerging philosophy: his “alliance and coordination theory” that called for powerful domains to unite in pressuring the shogunate toward reform.

This approach represented a significant departure from conventional political thinking. Rather than seeking complete overthrow of the Tokugawa system or unconditional surrender to it, Saigō advocated for a middle path where collective regional power could force modernization from within the existing structure. His vision would eventually contribute to the 1868 Meiji Restoration, though the path would prove anything but straightforward.

The Delicate Balance of Opening and Isolation

One of Saigō’s most nuanced positions concerned Japan’s relationship with foreign powers. His “open country-isolation postponement theory” sought to navigate between extreme positions that dominated political discourse. Contrary to popular understanding, the Ansei Purge was not simply open-country advocates suppressing isolationists—the debate was far more complex, with factions divided on timing, conditions, and methods of engagement with Western powers.

This delicate balancing act faced its greatest test in 1862 when Shimazu Hisamitsu marched troops to Kyoto and then eastward. Hisamitsu’s campaign against “revere the emperor, expel the barbarians” radicals effectively destroyed any possibility of implementing Saigō’s moderate approach. The subsequent failure of collective domain action and the collapse of his alliance strategy led to Saigō’s two-year exile to Okinoerabujima—a personal defeat despite the theoretical soundness of his position.

Return to Power and Shifting Fortunes

Saigō’s 1864 return to Satsuma marked a dramatic reversal of fortunes. He quickly established himself as the domain’s powerful leader and appeared to enter a period of uninterrupted success. Yet even during this phase of apparent triumph, his career continued its pattern of alternating victories and defeats. The 1867 Satsuma-Tosa Agreement established a two-house legislature concept that ultimately failed to materialize as envisioned—a conceptual defeat. However, the military overthrow of the shogunate the following year represented a practical victory, however temporary.

This pattern continued through the early Meiji years. The dissolution of government forces after the capture of Aizu in 1868 represented another setback, but Saigō rebounded with the establishment of the Imperial Guard in late 1870. The nearly 7,000 troops provided by Satsuma, Chōshū, and Tosa domains significantly strengthened the new government’s military capacity, enabling the forced acceptance of the abolition of domains and establishment of prefectures—a major political victory built on military power.

The Revolutionary Army’s Identity Crisis

Following the successful consolidation of power through the haihan-chiken , the new Meiji government faced an unexpected challenge: what to do with the revolutionary army that had accomplished this great transformation? These battle-hardened troops, particularly those from Satsuma who had experienced the power of Western weaponry during the 1863 Anglo-Satsuma War, found themselves without purpose in peacetime.

Saigō himself expressed concern about this situation, famously comparing it to “taking a nap on a barrel of gunpowder.” The revolutionary army, having achieved domestic victory, now looked outward for new purpose. Their expectations centered on foreign wars—not against the Western powers whose representatives were currently visiting Japan, but against neighboring nations with whom Japan had territorial disputes and diplomatic issues: Russia, China, and Korea.

Contrary to popular understanding, neither Saigō nor his Satsuma followers were the most ardent advocates of military expansion. That distinction belonged to Itagaki Taisuke, leader of former Tosa forces. Historical records, including Itagaki’s own supervised History of the Freedom Party published in the final years of Meiji, clearly identify him as the primary proponent of the “conquer Korea debate.”

The Korean Question and Internal Divisions

The debate over Korea policy revealed significant divisions within the Meiji government. Kuroda Kiyotaka, responsible for Hokkaido development, and Kirino Toshiaki, former imperial guard battalion commander stationed in Kyushu, both advocated for different military priorities. Kuroda sought to address the killing of Japanese fishermen by Russian soldiers on Sakhalin, while Kirino pushed for action against Taiwanese aboriginals who had murdered Ryukyuan sailors.

When these men came to Tokyo and discovered the government’s focus on Korea instead, they reportedly expressed frustration and sometimes even obstructed the Korea initiative. Accounts from Tosa commander Tani Tateki confirm that Saigō’s close associates opposed the Korea expedition, preferring alternative military objectives that aligned with their regional responsibilities and strategic concerns.

This internal disagreement reflected broader tensions within the new government between different regional factions and competing visions for Japan’s future. The Korea debate became a proxy for larger questions about Japan’s direction: how aggressively to pursue expansion, how to manage relations with Western powers, and how to balance military ambitions with domestic consolidation.

The Seventh Fall: Resignation and Aftermath

The ultimate failure of the Korean expedition proposal represented Saigō’s seventh major defeat. His successful transformation of revolutionary army demands into a diplomatic mission proposal marked a theoretical victory, but his subsequent resignation as councillor and imperial guard commander constituted a clear practical defeat. This pattern of conceptual success followed by implementation failure had characterized much of his career.

Saigō’s resignation in 1873 over the Korea debate marked a turning point in his relationship with the Meiji government he helped create. His departure from central politics reflected not only policy disagreements but also the changing nature of Japanese governance, which was increasingly moving away from the domain-based power structure that had brought about the Restoration.

The final chapter in Saigō’s pattern of victories and defeats would come with the 1877 Satsuma Rebellion, a catastrophic failure that ended his life and cemented his historical record as seven victories and eight defeats—a numerical imbalance that nevertheless fails to capture the profound impact of his victories on Japanese history.

Legacy of a Contradictory Revolutionary

Saigō Takamori’s complex legacy continues to resonate in modern Japan. His pattern of alternating successes and failures reflects the turbulent nature of Japan’s transition from feudal state to modern nation. The political strategies he developed—particularly his “alliance and coordination theory”—influenced subsequent approaches to collective action and regional cooperation.

His nuanced position on foreign policy, seeking a middle path between complete isolation and unconditional opening, prefigured Japan’s eventual approach to international relations. Even his ultimate failure in the Satsuma Rebellion contributed to the consolidation of Meiji power and the establishment of a centralized state.

Perhaps most importantly, Saigō’s career demonstrates the complex relationship between theoretical vision and practical implementation in times of revolutionary change. His conceptual victories often outstripped his ability to implement them, while his practical successes sometimes contradicted his stated principles. This tension between ideal and reality remains relevant for understanding political transformation in any era.

The story of Saigō’s seven falls and rises offers more than historical interest—it provides a framework for understanding how revolutionary change actually occurs, through alternating advances and retreats, conceptual breakthroughs and practical compromises. His career reminds us that political transformation is rarely linear, and that even failed initiatives can plant seeds for future success.