The Meiji Restoration and Japan’s Expansionist Ambitions

The Meiji Restoration of 1868 marked Japan’s dramatic transformation from a feudal society into a modern imperial power. As the new government consolidated domestic control, its gaze turned outward toward unresolved territorial questions and potential spheres of influence. Two geographic preoccupations emerged simultaneously: the northern frontier with Russia and the Korean Peninsula to the west. This dual focus created a strategic dilemma that would shape East Asian geopolitics for decades.

Japan’s territorial negotiations with Russia culminated in the 1875 Treaty of Saint Petersburg, which exchanged Sakhalin Island for the Kuril archipelago. While this resolved immediate northern concerns, it paradoxically increased Japanese anxiety about Korea. As Foreign Minister Terajima Munenori noted, the treaty pushed Japan’s defensive perimeter southward, making Korean neutrality—or worse, Russian influence over Korea—unacceptable to Tokyo’s strategic planners.

The Korean Conundrum: Tradition Versus Imperial Diplomacy

Korea’s Joseon Dynasty maintained a centuries-old tributary relationship with Qing China that colored all foreign interactions. When Japan attempted to establish modern diplomatic ties through an 1870 missive referencing the Japanese emperor with terms like “imperial decree” (敕), Korean officials rejected it outright, recognizing only China’s right to such terminology. This cultural impasse revealed deeper challenges: Korea viewed Japan through the lens of historical invasions and saw Western-style diplomacy as threatening the Sinocentric world order.

Within Japan’s ruling circles, the “Seikanron” (Conquer Korea Debate) divided policymakers. In 1873, hardliners including Saigō Takamori advocated military action when diplomatic overtures failed, while moderates like Ōkubo Toshimichi—fresh from observing Western powers during the Iwakura Mission—argued for domestic consolidation first. The moderates’ victory temporarily shelved invasion plans but didn’t resolve Japan’s strategic imperative to prevent Korea from falling under Russian influence.

Manufacturing Crisis: The Russian Threat Narrative

Japanese diplomats actively cultivated fears of Russian expansionism to pressure Korea, despite scant evidence. Missionary-diplomat Moriyama Shigeru’s 1874 reports from Pusan warned Korean officials: “While you guard your coasts, have you forgotten your rear? Russia occupies Manchuria and eyes the Yalu River… If Russia harms you, Japan cannot remain secure.” This rhetoric, echoed in dispatches from Minister Enomoto Takeaki in St. Petersburg, framed Japanese intervention as protective rather than predatory.

The strategic calculus became explicit in internal documents. Enomoto’s 1875 memorandum argued that controlling Korean territory opposite Tsushima Island was essential to Japan’s maritime defense. With Sakhalin relinquished to Russia, Korea represented both a buffer and potential choke point for controlling the Tsushima Strait—Japan’s maritime gateway.

Gunboat Diplomacy: The Unyō Incident and Its Aftermath

In September 1875, Captain Inoue Yoshika of the warship Unyō deliberately provoked a confrontation near Ganghwa Island under the pretext of surveying. After drawing artillery fire from Korean coastal batteries—exactly as planned—Inoue destroyed fortifications on Ganghwa and Yeongjong Islands in a three-day demonstration of naval power. His subsequent report urged immediate military action: “The time is ripe.”

This manufactured crisis became the pretext for the 1876 Japan-Korea Treaty of Ganghwa, masterminded by Ambassador Kuroda Kiyotaka. Modeled on the unequal treaties Western powers imposed on Japan, it forced Korean ports open, granted extraterritoriality to Japanese citizens, and declared Korea “an independent state”—a deliberate undermining of its tributary relationship with China.

Russia’s Calculated Restraint

Contrary to Japanese fears, Russia showed little interest in countering Japan’s Korean gambit. Foreign Minister Gorchakov’s 1876 report to Tsar Alexander II explained this surprising restraint: Russia’s sparsely populated Maritime Province benefited more from Korean peasant immigration (6,500 settlers between 1869-1870) than from risky political entanglements. Unlike Japan’s resource-poor islands, Russia’s continental empire could absorb population flows without territorial expansion.

This revealed a fundamental asymmetry in imperial strategies: while Japan sought formal control over Korea as defensive perimeter, Russia prioritized economic penetration through migration—a distinction that would resurface in later Manchurian conflicts.

The Legacy of 1876: Blueprint for Imperial Expansion

The Ganghwa Treaty established patterns that reverberated through East Asian history:

1. The use of Western-style unequal treaties by Asian powers against neighbors
2. The weaponization of “independence” rhetoric to dismantle traditional alliances (here, Korea-China relations)
3. Russia’s preference for demographic over military expansion in Northeast Asia

For Japan, the 1870s marked a pivotal transition—from a nation coerced by Western imperialism to an imperial coercer itself. The techniques honed in Korea—manufactured crises, gunboat diplomacy, strategic treaties—would be refined in later interventions in Taiwan (1874) and Manchuria. Meanwhile, Russia’s apparent disinterest in 1876 proved temporary; within two decades, the two empires would clash directly over the spoils of a declining Qing China.

The complex interplay of Japanese initiative and Russian restraint during this period demonstrates how peripheral territories became testing grounds for imperial strategies that would eventually collide with catastrophic consequences in the 20th century. The shadows cast by these 1870s maneuvers stretched long—from the Sino-Japanese War to the Pacific War—making this obscure diplomatic history unexpectedly central to understanding modern East Asia.