The Collapse of the Later Tang and the Rise of Opportunists

The fall of the Later Tang dynasty (923-936) created a power vacuum that unleashed a scramble for legitimacy across fractured China. As the dust settled from the dynasty’s collapse, southern warlord Xu Zhigao (later Li Bian) performed an astonishing political rebranding—declaring his Wu kingdom the new “Tang” while fabricating a royal pedigree connecting himself to the executed Tang prince Li Ke. This audacious claim, initially dismissed as farcical, gained unexpected traction after Shi Jingtang’s infamous betrayal.

Shi, a son-in-law of the Later Tang imperial family, committed what contemporaries viewed as the ultimate treason: ceding the strategic Sixteen Prefectures to the Khitan Liao dynasty, declaring himself a vassal, and addressing the Khitan ruler as “father emperor.” This 936 AD deal—exchanging territory for military support to overthrow his own dynasty—reshaped China’s geopolitical landscape and moral compass.

The “Strongest Army Makes the Emperor” Doctrine

The chaos birthed a brutal political philosophy best articulated by general An Chongrong: “The Son of Heaven is whoever commands the strongest cavalry—since when did it require noble blood?” This cynical worldview permeated the era’s power struggles. An, a Shatuo Turkic officer who joined Shi’s rebellion, later turned against him, condemning the “humiliation of Han people” under Khitan domination. His 941 AD revolt, though crushed, exposed the fragility of Shi’s regime.

Meanwhile, military governors like Fan Yanguang of Weizhou—a perennial rebel stronghold—dreamt of imperial glory after a soothsayer interpreted his snake-omen dream as a divine mandate. When Fan rebelled in 937 AD, Shi Jingtang’s regime nearly collapsed, saved only by:
– Strategic fortification of Bianzhou (later Kaifeng)
– Ruthless suppression of dissent through state-sanctioned vigilantism
– Critical interventions by loyalists like Liu Zhiyuan

The Cultural Schism: Southern Defiance and Northern Insecurity

The Southern Tang’s (Xu Zhigao’s successor state) cultural renaissance under Li Yu—the poet-king who famously wrote “How much sorrow can one man bear?”—masked a fierce martial pride. Their 975 AD resistance against Song conquest involved street-by-street fighting, a defiance rooted in belief of cultural superiority. This bred lasting Northern suspicion; early Song emperors systematically excluded Southern scholars from high office, propagating myths about a “No Southern Chancellors” rule.

The psychological scars ran deep. Northern elites, having accommodated Khitan overlords, resented Southerners who preserved Tang aristocratic traditions. Meanwhile, commoners embraced Xu Zhigao’s fabricated lineage as emotional salvage from Shi’s betrayal—proof that the Tang’s cultural flame still flickered.

The Making of Kaifeng’s Destiny

Shi’s desperate 937 AD relocation to Bianzhou (modern Kaifeng) proved epochal. His chancellor Sang Weihan advocated the city’s logistical advantages:
– Control over Grand Canal networks
– Proximity to rebel hotspots
– Access to Yangtze River basin resources

This began Kaifeng’s transformation into the Song dynasty’s “Eastern Capital”—a metropolis immortalized in The Eastern Capital: A Dream of Splendor. Ironically, the reviled Shi Jingtang inadvertently laid groundwork for China’s next golden age.

The Rise of Future Dynasts

The rebellion’s chaos became a proving ground for emerging leaders. Notably:
– Liu Zhiyuan: Shi’s general whose stabilization efforts paved his path to founding the Later Han dynasty
– Guo Wei: A low-ranking officer who correctly bet on Liu’s rise, later founding the Later Zhou dynasty
– Zhao Kuangyin: The future Song founder absorbed these lessons about military governance

When Guo Wei—then a minor officer—refused to join the incompetent Yang Guangyuan’s campaign, declaring “Only Liu Zhiyuan has heroic spirit,” he demonstrated the era’s shrewd political calculus. His trajectory from rebel to emperor encapsulated the period’s volatility.

Legacy of the Broken Covenant

Shi Jingtang’s reign (936-942) became synonymous with national humiliation, yet his decisions had unintended consequences:
1. Strategic Shift: Made Kaifeng the political center for two centuries
2. Military Culture: Normalized coups as succession method until Song reforms
3. North-South Divide: Institutionalized regional prejudices lasting centuries
4. Khitan Relations: Set template for “tribute diplomacy” with steppe powers

The 10th century’s chaos birthed a hard truth: in the absence of unifying principles, raw power filled the vacuum. Yet from this crucible emerged the Song dynasty’s civil bureaucracy—a conscious rejection of the “strongest army makes the emperor” ethos that Shi Jingtang’s betrayal had come to represent.

The poet Li Yu’s lament thus resonates beyond personal tragedy—it voices a civilization’s grief over its fractured identity, and the uneasy compromises required to stitch it back together.