The Fall of Beijing and Qing Ambitions

In the aftermath of the Shanhai Pass campaign in 1644, the Qing forces, led by the ambitious Prince-Regent Dorgon, swiftly occupied Beijing and its surrounding regions. Initially, the Manchu leadership was divided on their next steps. Some conservative nobles advocated for a brutal strategy—massacring resisters, leaving a few princes to oversee the capital, and withdrawing the main forces back to Shenyang or Shanhai Pass for security. However, Dorgon, recalling the words of his predecessor Hong Taiji—”If we take Beijing, we must move the capital there to secure further gains”—pushed for permanence.

Yet, the scope of Qing expansion remained uncertain. Dorgon’s early actions in Beijing were calculated: he ordered three days of mourning for the fallen Ming Emperor Chongzhen, then imposed the infamous “Queue Order,” mandating Han Chinese to adopt Manchu hairstyles and clothing. When objections arose—arguing that such policies would alienate southern Han populations—Dorgon reportedly dismissed concerns with a pragmatic, almost cynical remark: “We take what we can, inch by inch.”

The Delicate Dance of Diplomacy

By June 1644, Dorgon issued a proclamation aimed at legitimizing Qing rule while testing the waters with the Southern Ming. The edict, carefully worded by Han collaborators like Li Wen, struck a dual tone: it offered amnesty to Ming loyalists in the north while ambiguously tolerating the Southern Ming’s provisional regime in Nanjing—so long as they accepted Qing overlordship. The document hinted at future aggression, labeling any resistance as “treachery” to be crushed once the Qing stabilized the north.

This strategy reflected Qing uncertainty. With limited Manchu manpower and the Ming remnants still controlling vast territories—the Shun rebels in the west and the Southern Ming in the south—Dorgon initially entertained a “divide and rule” approach: ally with the Southern Ming to crush peasant rebellions, then partition China. The Southern Ming’s Hongguang regime, riddled with corruption and complacency, naively embraced this “ally with the barbarians to suppress bandits” policy, hoping to preserve their decadent southern enclave.

The Economic Imperative for Conquest

Three factors soon hardened Qing resolve against coexistence:

1. Economic Dependence: Post-Yuan dynasty, northern China relied heavily on southern grain shipments via the Grand Canal. Ming loyalist officials warned Dorgon: “Without Jiangnan, our grain supply collapses.” The Qing could not tolerate a divided China that choked their logistical lifeline.

2. Han Collaborators’ Influence: Southern-born officials in the Qing administration, fearing family separations under two regimes, lobbied aggressively for southern conquest, downplaying Jiangnan’s defenses.

3. Southern Ming Weakness: The Hongguang regime’s passivity—failing to reclaim Shandong or Henan after the Shun retreat—convinced Dorgon that unification was feasible.

The Ultimatum to Shi Kefa

On July 28, Dorgon sent a letter to Southern Ming commander Shi Kefa, revealing the Qing’s hardened stance. The message, dripping with menace and legalistic rhetoric, denied the Southern Ming’s legitimacy, equating them to “usurpers” and threatening joint action with the Shun remnants if resistance continued. Most chillingly, it declared: “China cannot have two suns.”

Shi Kefa’s reply, though eloquent, was fatally conciliatory. While defending the Southern Ming’s legitimacy as Ming successors, he clung to hopes of a joint anti-rebel campaign and “eternal friendship” with the Qing—ignoring Dorgon’s clear expansionist intent. The letter’s meek tone, edited to avoid “offending” the Qing, epitomized the Southern Ming’s fatal delusions.

The Legacy of Missed Opportunities

The 1644-45 exchanges exposed critical flaws:
– Southern Ming Paralysis: Hongguang’s regime prioritized internal squabbles over mobilization, wasting months when northern defenses were fragile.
– Qing Adaptability: Dorgon’s shift from tentative occupation to total conquest showcased Manchu strategic flexibility, aided by Han collaborators’ insider knowledge.
– The Cost of Compromise: Shi Kefa’s deference, though framed as Confucian loyalty, enabled Qing consolidation. His martyrdom later overshadowed this miscalculation.

Modern historians debate whether earlier Southern Ming aggression could have altered outcomes. Yet the episode’s enduring lesson lies in the perils of vacillation—and how swiftly power fills the voids left by indecision.

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