The Collapsing Ming Dynasty and Rising Peasant Armies

By the autumn of 1640, the Ming Dynasty found itself in a state of accelerating decline. Emperor Chongzhen’s reign had become defined by natural disasters, economic collapse, and widespread peasant uprisings. Among the most formidable rebel leaders were Zhang Xianzhong and Luo Rucai, whose combined forces would soon embark on one of the most remarkable military campaigns of the late Ming period.

The Sichuan campaign emerged from this perfect storm of governmental weakness and popular discontent. Years of excessive taxation, crop failures, and official corruption had turned the peasantry against their rulers. Zhang Xianzhong, known for his tactical brilliance and ruthless efficiency, joined forces with Luo Rucai’s army when both found themselves pressed by Ming forces in Hubei and Shaanxi provinces.

The Mobile War Begins: September 1640

On the ninth day of the ninth lunar month (October 3, 1640), the combined rebel armies arrived at Dachang, where they encountered forces led by Sichuan Provincial Governor Shao Jiechun. Demonstrating their characteristic flexibility, the rebels bypassed the fortified position rather than engage in a costly siege.

This decision marked the beginning of what would become a masterclass in mobile warfare. The rebel armies moved southwest toward Kaixian, Xinning (modern Kaijiang County), and Liangshan (modern Liangping County). Their initial attempts in the Daxian region on the 17th and 18th proved unsuccessful, forcing a temporary retreat back to Dachang and Daning (modern Wuxi County).

Turning the Tide: Late October Battles

The campaign’s momentum shifted dramatically at month’s end when Zhang and Luo scored a decisive victory at Youxikou in Daxian County. There they defeated pursuing Ming forces led by Regional Commander Fang Guo’an and Lieutenant Colonel Luo Yuxin. This victory opened the path northward toward Bazhou (modern Bazhong County).

Early in the tenth month (November), the rebels engaged Deputy Regional Commander Zhang Zouka’s forces at Bazhou before continuing their march northwest. By the 11th, they had crossed the Jialing River at Guangyuan County. Two days later, they captured Jianzhou (modern Jiange County), executing the acting magistrate in the process.

The Strategic Dilemma: Attempted Return to Shaanxi

Following their capture of Jianzhou, the rebel leaders contemplated moving north through Guangyuan and Ningqiang into Shaanxi’s Hanzhong region. However, Shaanxi officials, fearing the rebels’ return, had stationed substantial forces under Regional Commanders Zhao Guangyuan and He Renlong at the strategic Chaotian Pass on the Sichuan-Shaanxi border.

Faced with this formidable obstacle, Zhang and Luo made another characteristic pivot on the 16th, turning south to capture Zitong County. Three days later, at Miaoya, they killed several Ming officers including Deputy Commander Luo Wanxiang, Han Guangrong, Liu Gui, and Tan Yi. On the 21st, they defeated Shaanxi forces under He Renlong and Li Guoqi, capturing and executing the turncoat Zhang Yichuan (known as “King Sweeper”) before advancing to Mianzhou (modern Mianyang).

Ming Leadership in Disarray

The rebel successes at Jianzhou and Zitong sent shockwaves through the Ming establishment. Grand Secretary Yang Sichang, the official overseeing suppression campaigns, submitted a remarkable memorial to the throne acknowledging failure:

“Your servant entered Sichuan to supervise the suppression campaign… Never did I expect Sichuanese troops to be so fragile, their commanders so foolish beyond description… How can these two villains be so fierce and cunning while our forces cannot achieve their aims?”

Yang’s scathing report blamed Sichuan’s poor defenses and Shaanxi troops’ refusal to fight without pay. The consequences were immediate – Sichuan Governor Shao Jiechun was arrested, convicted, and executed, replaced by Liao Daheng. Shaanxi Governor Zheng Chongjian was also dismissed in favor of Ding Qirui.

The “Walking Down” Strategy: November-December Campaigns

Through November, the rebel armies adopted what would become their signature “walking down” (以走致敌) strategy – keeping constantly mobile to exhaust pursuing forces. They captured Zhongjiang, Shifang County, and advanced to Hanzhou (modern Guanghan County), then moved through Mianzhu, Jintang, Jianzhou, Ziyang, arriving in the Anyue-Lezhi region.

Frustrated by his forces’ disorganization, Yang Sichang appointed Regional Commander Meng Ruhu as overall commander with Zhang Yingyuan as deputy. Yet the Ming response remained ineffective, with troops reportedly complaining: “We long for Zuo Liangyu’s inaction but are run to death by Meng Ruhu’s pursuit.”

Closing the Campaign: December Triumphs

The rebels began December by capturing Longchang County on the 1st, then Luzhou on the 5th, killing newly-appointed Circuit Intendant Huang Jianqing and Prefect Su Qiong. After taking Nanxi County on the 7th and Rong County on the 11th, they besieged Jingyan before capturing Renshou County and executing Magistrate Liu Sance on the 14th.

By the 16th, they appeared at Chengdu’s eastern gates but, finding defenses strong, circled north to retake Deyang. Their final moves saw them cross the Jialing River at Zhaohua County before using captured uniforms to trick their way into Bazhou on the 29th.

Cultural Impact and Psychological Warfare

Beyond military achievements, the campaign demonstrated sophisticated psychological operations. The rebels composed mocking songs that spread through the ranks and civilian populations alike:

“First came Governor Shao, dancing all around; Then came Adjutant Liao, following without a fight; What a Grand Secretary Yang, always three days behind!”

This musical taunting reflected both the rebels’ morale and their understanding of propaganda’s power in peasant uprisings.

Strategic Legacy and Historical Significance

The four-month Sichuan campaign represented a military masterpiece of mobility and deception. By covering approximately 1,000 li (300 miles) while avoiding decisive engagements, Zhang and Luo:

1. Exhausted Ming pursuit forces
2. Exposed governmental weaknesses
3. Gained valuable combat experience
4. Positioned themselves for future expansion into Huguang

Most importantly, they successfully diverted Yang Sichang’s attention and resources to Sichuan, creating opportunities elsewhere. This campaign would directly enable Zhang Xianzhong’s later establishment of the short-lived Xi dynasty in Sichuan.

Modern Perspectives on Mobile Rebellion

Historians continue to debate the campaign’s significance in the Ming-Qing transition. Some view it as:

– A precursor to modern guerrilla warfare
– An example of center-periphery tensions in collapsing empires
– A case study in how logistical constraints affect military outcomes

The “walking down” strategy particularly fascinates military historians, anticipating principles later formalized in unconventional warfare doctrines. Meanwhile, the songs and poems composed during the march offer rare glimpses into peasant rebel culture during this turbulent period.

The 1640 Sichuan campaign ultimately demonstrated how mobility and local knowledge could counter superior imperial resources – a lesson that would resonate through subsequent Chinese revolutionary movements.