The Crossroads of Empire: Three Paths Before a Conqueror

In the smoke-filled aftermath of the Qin dynasty’s collapse, Xiang Yu stood triumphant at the gates of Hangu Pass, commander of the allied rebel forces and the most powerful man in China. History presented him with three distinct models of governance, each representing a different political tradition from China’s past.

The Zhou Dynasty’s royal system offered a feudal framework where the king ruled through regional lords bound by ritual obligation. The Qin’s imperial model centralized power under an all-powerful emperor administering through commanderies and counties. The third option, the hegemonic system of the Spring and Autumn period, allowed a dominant military leader to control lesser states through alliances rather than direct administration.

Xiang Yu’s choice would shape the course of Chinese history. The Zhou model, though prestigious, seemed antiquated after eight centuries. The real decision lay between Qin-style imperial centralization and the more familiar hegemonic system of recent memory. His selection of the hegemonic model – declaring himself “Overlord of Western Chu” while creating eighteen subordinate kingdoms – reflected both personal ambition and the expectations of his followers, but contained fatal flaws that would unravel his dominion.

The Psychology of Power: Why Xiang Yu Chune Hegemony

Several factors influenced Xiang Yu’s fateful decision to establish a hegemonic system rather than an empire. The most immediate was peer pressure from his coalition. Many commanders, including the brilliant strategist Han Xin, openly expected territorial rewards for their service. When Han Xin conquered five northern states, he demanded the title “Acting King of Qi” to stabilize the region. Liu Bang, though furious at this presumption during his desperate struggle against Xiang Yu, ultimately acquiesced through gritted teeth.

The mercenary attitude of commanders like Ying Bu (the former King of Jiujiang) further reinforced this expectation. As the advisor Zhang Liang astutely observed, most followers joined the rebellion hoping for land and titles. Any attempt to restore centralized rule would have triggered mass defections. Xiang Yu’s enfeoffments, while politically necessary, essentially revived the Warring States system that the Qin had supposedly abolished.

Personal psychology equally shaped Xiang Yu’s choice. The conqueror’s famous remark – “To be wealthy and honored and not return home is like wearing embroidered robes at night” – revealed his essentially provincial mindset. Unlike the First Emperor who sought to transform all under heaven, Xiang Yu dreamed of parading his success before hometown admirers. This “return in glory” mentality, shared by many Han dynasty figures like Zhu Maichen, prioritized personal prestige over state-building.

The Mechanics of Enfeoffment: Rewarding Merit or Courting Disaster?

Xiang Yu’s enfeoffment system theoretically represented progress over traditional hereditary rule by emphasizing merit over bloodline. In his address to commanders before the partition, he dismissed the puppet Chu emperor Yi as undeserving while praising the coalition’s battlefield achievements: “The true destroyers of Qin are you generals and myself.” His stated principle of “dividing land according to merit” aimed to create a new aristocracy of talent.

The implementation, however, proved disastrous. Xiang Yu made two critical errors: improper enfeoffments (granting titles either to unworthy recipients or with inappropriate territories) and failure to enfeoff deserving candidates. Both would have catastrophic consequences.

The Fatal Missteps: Liu Bang and the Three Qin Kings

Xiang Yu’s handling of Liu Bang demonstrated his political shortsightedness. Though the original rebel covenant promised the “King of Guanzhong” title to whoever first entered the Qin heartland (which Liu Bang accomplished two months before Xiang Yu), Xiang Yu manipulated geography to exile his rival to remote Ba-Shu, cynically claiming these mountainous regions “also counted” as Guanzhong territory.

This transparent slight created a permanent casus belli for Liu Bang, who later listed it first among Xiang Yu’s “Ten Great Crimes.” Even worse, Xiang Yu subsequently yielded to his uncle Xiang Bo’s lobbying (backed by Liu Bang’s bribes) and added the strategically vital Hanzhong region to Liu Bang’s domain. This gave the future Han founder a perfect base for his eventual counterattack – a blunder of historic proportions.

Equally disastrous was Xiang Yu’s arrangement for the Three Qin Kings – former Qin generals Zhang Han, Sima Xin, and Dong Yi tasked with containing Liu Bang. While Zhang Han was a capable commander, his troops (survivors of Xiang Yu’s massacre of 200,000 Qin prisoners) inspired only hatred among locals. Sima Xin, a mediocrity who owed his position to past favors for Xiang Yu’s uncle Xiang Liang, and the utterly undistinguished Dong Yi proved completely ineffective when Liu Bang struck. Within months of the partition, two surrendered without fight while Zhang Han’s desperate ten-month defense ended in suicide.

The Unrewarded and the Revolt That Followed

Xiang Yu’s exclusion of key figures from the enfeoffments proved equally damaging. His criteria – prioritizing those who joined the anti-Qin coalition early or participated in the final campaign – overlooked several important leaders.

Tian Rong, the de facto ruler of Qi, had spearheaded anti-Qin resistance in the east but earned Xiang Yu’s enmity by refusing to aid the critical Battle of Julu. Peng Yue, a brilliant guerrilla leader who had cooperated with Liu Bang against Qin forces, received no recognition. Chen Yu, a respected Zhao strategist who quarreled with his co-commander Zhang Er (whom Xiang Yu favored), felt slighted by receiving only three counties.

These resentments coalesced into immediate rebellion. In the fifth month after partition (summer 206 BCE), Tian Rong united with Peng Yue and Chen Yu to overthrow Xiang Yu’s appointed Qi kings, triggering widespread instability. This crisis fatally distracted Xiang Yu from Liu Bang’s simultaneous conquest of Guanzhong – the two-front war that would ultimately destroy him.

The Legacy of Misrule: Why the Hegemon Failed

Xiang Yu’s flawed enfeoffment system stemmed from contradictory impulses. His meritocratic rhetoric couldn’t overcome personal biases and political debts. The system satisfied immediate demands for reward but created unstable fiefdoms with neither traditional legitimacy nor adequate military capability.

The strategic consequences proved devastating. By mishandling Liu Bang, Xiang Yu created his most dangerous enemy. By installing unpopular Qin turncoats as regional governors, he surrendered the Guanzhong heartland. By excluding capable leaders like Peng Yue, he drove them into Liu Bang’s camp. Most crucially, his preoccupation with suppressing the Qi rebellion allowed Liu Bang to consolidate power unchallenged.

These errors reveal Xiang Yu’s fundamental limitations. Though peerless in battlefield tactics, he lacked the strategic vision to transform military victory into stable governance. His personal code – valuing honor among warriors over political pragmatism – made him a magnificent warlord but a failed statesman. In the end, the hegemon who could smash Qin armies with unmatched brilliance proved incapable of building a lasting order, paving the way for Liu Bang’s more pragmatic Han dynasty to reunify China.