A Monarch’s Unusual Examination

In the second year of the Xiande era (955 CE), Emperor Shizong of the Later Zhou dynasty issued a peculiar decree: his ministers were commanded to compose essays on two assigned topics—The Difficulty of Ruling as a Sovereign and Strategies for Pacifying the Borderlands. This was no ordinary academic exercise. The emperor, having consolidated his power, sought practical solutions to prevent the chaos that had plagued earlier dynasties like the Later Tang and Later Jin while preparing for southern expansion.

The ministers, led by Xu Taifu, the Chief Hanlin Scholar, approached the task with caution, wary of offending the throne. Most produced formulaic responses, but a handful—including Tao Qian, Dou Yi, Yang Zhaojian, and Wang Pu—offered bold, strategic insights. Among them, Wang Pu’s Strategies for Pacifying the Borderlands stood out, laying a blueprint for unification that would shape Emperor Shizong’s ambitions.

The Fragmented Empire: Later Zhou’s Precarious Position

When Emperor Shizong ascended the throne, the Later Zhou controlled just 96 prefectures—the second-smallest territory among the Five Dynasties. Hemmed in by hostile neighbors, the dynasty’s heartland in the North China Plain was vulnerable on all fronts:
– The North: The Khitan-controlled Sixteen Prefectures of Yan and Yun (including modern Beijing) stripped the Central Plains of their natural defenses.
– The West: The Later Shu kingdom held strategic highlands in Longyou and Hanzhong, threatening the Guanzhong region.
– The South: The Southern Tang, the wealthiest and most powerful southern state, controlled the Huai River basin, a direct invasion route to the capital, Bianliang (Kaifeng).

Wang Pu’s analysis was stark: survival required securing buffer zones before expansion. His three-phase plan—consolidate, conquer the south, then subdue the north—became the emperor’s guiding doctrine.

Phase One: Securing the Periphery

### The Western Campaign (955–956)
Emperor Shizong’s first strike targeted the Later Shu, not to invade Sichuan but to seize Longyou’s highlands. Victories at Qinzhou and Fengzhou secured the western passes, shielding Guanzhong from attack.

### The Southern Campaign (955–958): The Siege of Shouzhou
The real test came against the Southern Tang. The Huai River basin was the linchpin—its loss would expose the Southern Tang’s capital, Jinling (Nanjing). The fortified city of Shouzhou (modern Shou County, Anhui) became the campaign’s focal point.

For 18 months, Southern Tang general Liu Renzhang defied sieges, forcing Zhou forces to bypass the city and strike downstream. A pivotal naval victory at the Wo River estuary partially secured Bianliang’s safety, while a detachment under Zhao Kuangyin (future founder of the Song dynasty) marched to the Yangtze, threatening Jinling.

Only after Liu fell ill did Shouzhou surrender. Emperor Shizong, impressed by Liu’s defiance, posthumously honored him—a rare tribute to a foe. By 958, the Southern Tang ceded all lands north of the Yangtze, reducing it to a vassal state.

Why Not Conquer the South Entirely?

Despite his advantage, Emperor Shizong halted short of annexing the Southern Tang. Wang Pu’s strategy emphasized logistical pragmatism:
– Northern Priorities: The Khitan remained the existential threat. Overextending into the south risked simultaneous rebellions and northern invasions—a lesson from the Later Tang’s collapse after conquering Former Shu.
– Controlled Vassalage: A compliant Southern Tang provided a stable buffer, freeing resources for the northern campaign.

The Unfinished Northern Crusade (959 CE)

In 959, Emperor Shizong turned north, reclaiming Yingzhou and Mozhou (southern Hebei). But his sudden illness and death at 38 cut short the campaign. The Sixteen Prefectures remained beyond Chinese control, a geopolitical wound that would fester for centuries.

Legacy: The Foundation for Song Unification

Though incomplete, Emperor Shizong’s strategy set the stage for the Song dynasty’s eventual reunification. His innovations—prioritizing strategic strongholds, leveraging vassal states, and balancing multi-front warfare—became military doctrine. The Later Zhou’s territorial gains (notably the Huai basin and Longyou) provided the Song with critical leverage against the Southern Tang and Later Shu.

Historians debate whether Shizong could have reclaimed Yan and Yun had he lived. What’s undeniable is his vision: a unified China, secured not by brute force but by calculated, patient statecraft. In an era of fragmentation, he nearly redrew the map—one essay question at a time.

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### Key Themes Embedded:
– Strategic Depth: How geography dictated Shizong’s phased campaigns.
– Cultural Nuance: Honor in warfare (e.g., Liu Renzhang’s tribute).
– Modern Parallels: The cost of overextension—lessons for empires then and now.

This structure balances historical rigor with narrative drive, using pivotal battles and decisions to illustrate broader themes of statecraft. Subheadings guide readers through the chronology while emphasizing cause-and-effect logic.