The Fractured Landscape of Post-Tang China

In the turbulent decades following the Tang Dynasty’s collapse (907 AD), China fragmented into the “Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms” period—a chaotic era where regional warlords carved out independent fiefdoms. By 960 AD, when Zhao Kuangyin founded the Song Dynasty as Emperor Taizu, the south remained divided among several defiant regimes. Two such territories—the warlord-controlled Hunan region (ruled by the Zhou family) and the diminutive but strategic Jingnan (Nanping) kingdom—would become the first dominoes in Zhao’s ambitious reunification campaign.

The geopolitical chessboard was complex:
– Hunan (Wu Ping Jiedushi): Controlled by Zhou Xingfeng since 956 after years of civil war, this de facto independent state centered around Changde. Though nominally accepting Song titles, Zhou ruled autonomously.
– Jingnan (Nanping): A tiny but critical transport hub controlling the Yangtze-Han River confluence, ruled by the Gao family since 907. Their survival strategy? Relentless submission to stronger neighbors.

The Spark: A Dying Warlord’s Warning

The crisis began in September 962 AD when Zhou Xingfeng, sensing his impending death, gathered his generals at his sickbed. His warning was prophetic:

“I rose from poverty alongside ten sworn brothers—nine are dead by my hand. The last survivor, Zhang Wenbiao in Hengzhou, will rebel when I die. If General Yang Shifan cannot crush him, retreat to Langzhou and beg the Song for help.”

True to Zhou’s prediction, 11-year-old heir Zhou Baoquan faced rebellion within weeks. Zhang Wenbiao—furious at serving a “snot-nosed child”—exploited a superstitious soldier’s dream (“a dragon emerged from your collar!”) to justify his coup. After massacring drunken defenders in Changsha, Zhang declared himself ruler while pleading innocence to the Song court.

Meanwhile, Zhou Baoquan followed his father’s advice too literally—dispatching panicked pleas for Song assistance before testing Yang Shifan’s forces. Worse, he separately begged Jingnan’s ruler Gao Jichong for aid. These overlapping requests gave Zhao Kuangyin the pretext he needed.

Jingnan: The Art of Survival in a Shark Tank

Sandwiched between powerful states, the Gao family’s Jingnan had survived 40+ years through shameless pragmatism:
– The “High No-Gangster” Playbook: Founding ruler Gao Jixing (d.929) perfected the art of robbing tribute convoys, then groveling when caught—earning the nickname “Gao the Shameless.”
– Strategic Neutrality: Neighbors tolerated Jingnan as a buffer zone. As Song envoy Lu Huaizhong reported: “Their army is tidy but tiny (30,000), their people groan under taxes. Taking them would be like flipping a palm.”

By 962, Jingnan was ruled by Gao Jichong—a figurehead overshadowed by his debauched uncle Gao Baoxu, whose orgiastic court parties (featuring soldier-prostitute performances) earned him the moniker “Lord Everything’s Ruined.” When Gao Baoxu died that November, Zhao Kuangyin saw his moment.

Zhao Kuangyin’s “Borrowed Path” Gambit

In January 963, Zhao launched Operation Helping Hand:
1. The Bait: Citing Zhou Baoquan’s plea, 11 Song envoys mobilized troops from 10 prefectures to “suppress Zhang Wenbiao.”
2. The Hook: Commander Li Chuyun demanded Jingnan supply 3,000 naval troops (10% of its army!) and grant passage—a thinly veiled takeover blueprint.

Jingnan’s court split:
– Hawks: Deputy commander Li Jingwei urged ambushing Song forces at Jingmen Pass before committing suicide when overruled.
– Doves: Chancellor Sun Guangxian argued: “The Song crushes rebels like mountains crush eggs. After Hunan, will they really ‘return’ our road?”

The doves prevailed. As Gao Jichong sent envoys bearing oxen and wine to “inspect” Song camps, Li Chuyun deployed cavalry to seize Jingnan’s capital. By the time Gao met Song general Murong Yanzhao, his kingdom had already fallen—14 counties and 142,300 households absorbed without battle.

The Bitter Aftermath in Hunan

Meanwhile in Hunan:
– Zhang Wenbiao’s Fate: After initial victories, Zhang was captured by Yang Shifan’s forces. Before Song mediator Zhao Sui could intervene, commander Gao Chao butchered Zhang, serving his flesh to troops—”Lest he slander us at court!”
– Zhou Baoquan’s Folly: With Zhang dead, Song armies marched on anyway. Despite advisor Li Guanxiang’s plea to surrender, hardliner Zhang Congfu destroyed bridges and sank ships to resist. The result?
– Song troops cannibalized POWs to terrorize Langzhou’s defenders
– 11-year-old Zhou was captured hiding in a riverside temple

By April 963, both territories were Song possessions:
– Jingnan: 3 prefectures, 17 counties
– Hunan: 14 prefectures, 66 counties, 97,388 households

Legacy: The Domino Effect of 963

Zhao Kuangyin’s “rescue mission” established critical precedents:
1. Strategic Deception: The “borrowed path” ruse became a template for later campaigns against Shu and Southern Tang.
2. Psychological Warfare: Brutal tactics (cannibalism, face-branding) crushed morale before battles even began.
3. Geopolitical Bridgehead: Controlling the central Yangtze split remaining southern kingdoms, enabling piecemeal conquest.

As the Xu Zizhi Tongjian Changbian noted: “With Jingnan as our dagger pointed at Shu’s ribs, unification is inevitable.” Indeed, within 15 years, the Song would swallow all southern kingdoms—proving that in the game of thrones, sometimes the kindest-looking offers carry the sharpest blades.

The 963 campaign reveals a timeless truth: When weak states invite stronger neighbors to “help,” they often trade temporary crises for permanent occupation. For modern analysts, it remains a masterclass in how great powers turn regional instability into expansion—all while maintaining plausible deniability.