The Precarious Balance of Power in the Mid-12th Century

The mid-12th century witnessed a complex geopolitical landscape in the Levant, where the Crusader states, Fatimid Egypt, and the rising Zengid dynasty under Nur ad-Din vied for dominance. By 1158, Frankish envoys were attempting to negotiate a truce with the Fatimid Caliphate, a Shia Muslim dynasty ruling Egypt from Cairo. These efforts proved futile, as the Fatimids—though momentarily willing to pay tribute to the Kingdom of Jerusalem—were merely buying time to strengthen their military for a major offensive. This period of apparent diplomacy masked underlying tensions, with each power maneuvering to exploit the others’ weaknesses. The Crusader states, particularly Jerusalem under Baldwin III and later his brother Amalric, sought to secure their southern flank against Egyptian threats while contending with Nur ad-Din’s expansion from the north. The Fatimids, internally fractured, struggled to maintain autonomy against both Crusader and Zengid pressures, setting the stage for a series of conflicts that would reshape the region.

The Assassination of Ibn Ruzzīk and Its Consequences

In 1161, the assassination of the powerful vizier Ibn Ruzzīk threw Fatimid Egypt into further disarray. As the de facto ruler, his death dismantled any coherent plan for a large-scale offensive against the Crusaders, and Egypt ceased its tribute payments to Jerusalem. This abrupt cessation provided King Amalric with a casus belli. In July 1163, he launched an invasion, targeting the strategic fortress city of Bilbais, a gateway to Cairo. However, the campaign ended in failure when the Egyptians cleverly exploited the annual Nile flood, breaching dikes to inundate the surrounding areas and halt the Frankish advance. This event underscored both the strategic importance of Bilbais and the environmental challenges foreign armies faced in Egypt.

Internal Strife and the Vizierate Power Struggle

The Fatimid court became a hotbed of factionalism following Ibn Ruzzīk’s death. In 1163, Shawar seized the vizierate, only to be almost immediately ousted by his rival Dirgham. Both contenders sought external backing, turning to Nur ad-Din of Syria for support. Nur ad-Din, perceiving an opportunity to extend his influence into Egypt, threw his weight behind Shawar. He dispatched forces under the command of his trusted Kurdish general, Asad ad-Din Shirkuh, who marched along the desert fringe east of the Kingdom of Jerusalem toward Egypt. With this military backing, Shawar regained the vizierate by late 1164. However, he soon reneged on his promises to Nur ad-Din, refusing to fulfill financial obligations or grant iqta (land grants) to the Syrian troops. This betrayal turned ally into adversary, and Shirkuh’s forces dug in, occupying Bilbais as a base of operations.

The Shifting Alliances of Shawar and Amalric

Facing Shirkuh’s hostility, Shawar pivoted to seek aid from King Amalric of Jerusalem. Dirgham had already attempted this, but Shirkuh’s rapid movements precluded an agreement. Shawar, however, succeeded, offering substantial incentives: resumed annual tribute, the release of Christian prisoners, and even a proposal of vassalage to Jerusalem. For Amalric, the strategic imperative was clear—preventing Nur ad-Din from establishing a foothold in Egypt was essential to avoid encirclement. Thus, an unlikely alliance between the Crusader king and the Fatimid vizier was forged. Their combined forces marched on Bilbais, besieging Shirkuh’s garrison. Shawar likely hoped to let the Franks and Syrians weaken each other, but after weeks of stalemate, a negotiated settlement was reached in October 1164. Shirkuh and Amalric agreed to withdraw from Egypt, probably in exchange for hefty payments from Shawar, handing the vizier a temporary victory.

Nur ad-Din’s Northern Offensives and Psychological Impact

While Amalric’s forces were tied down in Egypt, Nur ad-Din capitalized by attacking the Crusader states’ northern frontiers. In August 1164, he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Franks, recapturing Harim, which had been lost in 1158. He followed this by conquering Banias in October 1164. These victories forced Amalric to expedite his withdrawal from Egypt and avenged Nur ad-Din’s humiliating defeat in May 1163. During that earlier campaign against the County of Tripoli, as he besieged Krak des Chevaliers, betrayal within his own ranks had nearly cost him his life. This experience profoundly affected Nur ad-Din, who interpreted it as divine chastisement. He embraced an ascetic, pious lifestyle, intensifying his commitment to jihad against the Crusaders—a psychological transformation that would influence his subsequent policies and legacy.

Shirkuh’s Ambition and the Second Invasion of Egypt

Nur ad-Din’s initial foray into Egypt was not primarily aimed at encircling the Crusader states; rather, it was his ambitious general, Shirkuh, who saw greater opportunity in the Nile Valley. After the withdrawal in 1164, Shirkuh continued lobbying for another invasion, which Nur ad-Din eventually endorsed. By January 1167, Shirkuh had assembled a formidable force and marched into Egypt once more. Amalric attempted to intercept him but failed, leading to a renewal of the Frankish-vizier alliance with Shawar. In May 1167, the combined forces confronted Shirkuh after he crossed to the Nile’s west bank. In a hard-fought battle with significant casualties, Shirkuh emerged victorious. He then advanced through Cairo northward to Alexandria, where the populace welcomed him. Amalric and Shawar, though battered, besieged Alexandria to starve out the defenders. In response, Shirkuh led the bulk of his troops south into Upper Egypt to recruit Bedouin allies and maintain mobility, leaving his nephew, Salah ad-Din Yusuf—known to Europeans as Saladin—in command of Alexandria’s garrison.

Cultural and Social Impacts of the Conflict

The repeated military campaigns in Egypt exacerbated existing social and economic strains within the region. For the Egyptian populace, the constant warfare between Fatimid viziers, Crusaders, and Zengid forces brought devastation—crops destroyed, towns plundered, and trade disrupted. The shifting allegiances of local elites reflected the fragility of centralized authority, as viziers like Shawar and Dirgham prioritized personal power over stability. Meanwhile, the presence of Frankish and Syrian troops introduced foreign cultural elements, though these were often resisted. Religiously, the conflict heightened Sunni-Shia tensions, as Nur ad-Din’s Zengids represented orthodox Sunni Islam against the Fatimids’ Ismaili Shia rule. This sectarian dimension would later facilitate Saladin’s abolition of the Fatimid Caliphate. For the Crusader states, involvement in Egypt drained resources and attention from northern defenses, ultimately contributing to their long-term vulnerability.

Legacy and Modern Relevance

The events of 1163–1167 marked a critical phase in the decline of Fatimid Egypt and the rise of Saladin. Shirkuh’s campaigns, though initially inconclusive, established a Zengid presence that would culminate in Saladin’s takeover of Egypt in 1169. The power vacuum left by Fatimid weakness and vizierial infighting allowed external actors to intervene, reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East. Saladin’s subsequent unification of Egypt and Syria under Sunni rule enabled him to confront and eventually defeat the Crusader states at the Battle of Hattin in 1187. Historically, this period illustrates the interplay between internal fragmentation and external ambition—a dynamic relevant to modern geopolitics. The strategic importance of Egypt as a gateway between Africa and Asia endures, and the region’s history of conflict over resources and influence remains a lesson in the enduring complexities of power. The figure of Saladin, emerging from these struggles, continues to symbolize leadership, piety, and military prowess in both Eastern and Western narratives, reflecting the lasting legacy of this tumultuous era.