The Foundations of Tang Military Power

The Tang Dynasty (618–907) inherited and refined the fubing (府兵) military system from its predecessors, a militia structure where soldiers farmed during peacetime and mobilized for war when summoned. Emperor Taizong (r. 626–649) formalized this system in 636 CE, establishing 634 zhechongfu (折冲府) garrisons across the empire, with 261 concentrated in the Guanzhong region near the capital. This “strong trunk, weak branches” (强干弱枝) strategy ensured central control by stationing the bulk of military forces near Chang’an, minimizing regional warlord threats.

Soldiers rotated between farming and service, with local dudu (都督, regional commanders) handling training but lacking authority to deploy troops independently. Campaigns were led by centrally appointed xingjun da zongguan (行军大总管, expeditionary commanders), ensuring that generals never developed personal loyalty from their troops—a precaution against rebellion.

The Decline of the Fubing System

By Empress Wu Zetian’s reign (690–705), the fubing system faltered. Extended campaigns strained soldiers, who faced land confiscation and dwindling rewards. The once-prestigious militia became a burden:
– Land Issues: Prolonged deployments led to abandoned farms, impoverishing soldier families.
– Recruitment Crisis: Forced conscription replaced voluntary service, eroding morale.
– Centralization Costs: The rigid separation of training and command weakened battlefield cohesion.

Wu’s distrust of generals—stemming from her usurpation—exacerbated military stagnation. Border defenses crumbled under Turkic and Khitan incursions, exposing the system’s fragility.

Emperor Xuanzong’s Reforms

Facing collapse, Emperor Xuanzong (r. 712–756) initiated sweeping changes:

### 1. The Rise of Jiedushi (节度使)
Between 710–721, nine permanent frontier commands emerged, merging military and administrative authority. These jiedushi (regional military governors) replaced ad-hoc expeditionary generals, enabling:
– Local Expertise: Commanders familiar with terrain and threats.
– Professional Soldiers: Transition from part-time militias to full-time, locally recruited troops.
– Streamlined Logistics: Unified control over training, supplies, and operations.

### 2. The Shift to Mercenary Armies
In 737, Xuanzong’s Recruitment Edict formalized standing armies funded by the state. Soldiers received land and tax exemptions, boosting retention. Chancellor Zhang Yue’s reforms (723 CE) cut 200,000 superfluous troops, redirecting resources to elite units.

### 3. Early Successes
The new model delivered victories:
– 732–733: General Zhang Shougui crushed Khitan rebellions, stabilizing the northeast.
– Border Security: Professional garrisons reversed decades of losses, curbing nomadic raids.

Unintended Consequences

While effective short-term, the reforms planted seeds of crisis:
1. Warlordism: Jiedushi accumulated unchecked power, blending military, fiscal, and civil authority.
2. Central Vulnerability: The disbandment of fubing left the interior defenseless against regional armies.
3. Financial Strain: Military costs ballooned from 2 million to 12 million strings of cash annually by 742, driving oppressive taxation.

Legacy and Downfall

Xuanzong’s fixes revived Tang dominance but at a cost. The An Lushan Rebellion (755–763)—led by a jiedushi—exposed the system’s flaws, toppling the dynasty’s golden age. Yet, the jiedushi framework endured, shaping later Chinese military governance and foreshadowing the decentralized power of the Song and Ming eras.

The Tang’s experiment underscores a timeless dilemma: balancing security against autonomy, and innovation against tradition. In solving one crisis, Xuanzong unwittingly sparked another—a cautionary tale of reform’s double-edged sword.