The Fragile State of the Southern Ming Resistance
By 1654, the Southern Ming dynasty—a remnant of the fallen Ming Empire—was clinging to survival. The Qing forces had already captured Beijing in 1644, but loyalists continued resistance under the banners of the Yongli Emperor in the southwest and the Lu Prince in the southeast. Among these resistance efforts, one of the most daring yet least understood was the Three Yangtze Campaigns led by Zhang Mingzhen, a commander under the Lu Prince’s court.
This series of naval incursions into the Yangtze River, reaching as far as Nanjing, was not merely a show of defiance. It was part of a coordinated strategy to unite anti-Qing forces across southern China. Yet, despite their boldness, these campaigns remain overshadowed by later events like Koxinga’s campaigns. Why did Zhang Mingzhen’s forces enter the Yangtze three times without engaging in major battles? What was the true objective behind these maneuvers?
The Strategic Vision: Uniting East and West
The campaigns were not isolated acts of desperation but part of a grander scheme orchestrated by key Ming loyalists, most notably the scholar-official Qian Qianyi. A former Ming minister who had reluctantly surrendered to the Qing, Qian secretly worked to revive the Ming cause. His vision was clear: if Ming forces in the southwest (led by the Yongli Emperor) and the southeast (led by the Lu Prince) could converge in the Yangtze region, they might reclaim China’s most prosperous territories.
Qian’s strategy, which he called the “Three Moves on the Chessboard,” hinged on exploiting Qing weaknesses. The Qing, still consolidating power, lacked a strong navy and had thinly spread garrisons along the Yangtze. If Ming forces could seize key cities like Nanjing, they could disrupt Qing supply lines and rally popular support.
The Three Campaigns: A Dance of Deception
Between 1654 and 1655, Zhang Mingzhen and his deputy Zhang Huangyan led three major naval expeditions into the Yangtze:
1. The First Incursion (Early 1654) – Reaching Zhenjiang and Guazhou, the Ming fleet demonstrated its ability to penetrate deep into Qing territory.
2. The Second Push (Mid-1654) – Advancing to Yizheng, the fleet further tested Qing defenses.
3. The Third and Deepest Strike (Late 1654) – Sailing to the gates of Nanjing, the Ming forces even landed troops on Jin Mountain, where Zhang Mingzhen famously inscribed a defiant poem.
Yet, despite these bold moves, the Ming fleet never engaged in large-scale battles. Qing records express bewilderment: Why did the Ming forces not attack cities? Why did they withdraw each time? The answer lies in their true objective: they were waiting for a larger Ming army from the west to arrive.
The Hidden Network: Spies, Scholars, and Secret Alliances
Behind the scenes, a vast underground network supported these campaigns. Key figures included:
– Yao Zhizhuo – A Ming loyalist who traveled between the Yongli and Lu courts, coordinating strategy.
– He Wangsheng & Sui Ben – Operatives who gathered intelligence and relayed messages, later captured and executed by the Qing.
– “Taoist Zhang Chongfu” – Actually a Ming military officer in disguise, acting as a liaison between coastal and inland forces.
Qian Qianyi and his wife, Liu Rushi, even financed the recruitment of soldiers, demonstrating their deep commitment. Yet, despite meticulous planning, the western Ming army never arrived.
Why Did the Plan Fail?
Several factors doomed the campaign:
1. Betrayal and Arrests – The Qing uncovered parts of the conspiracy, executing key operatives like He Wangsheng.
2. Delayed Reinforcements – The western Ming forces, led by Sun Kewang, were delayed by internal disputes and logistical challenges.
3. Qing Countermeasures – Though initially unprepared, the Qing reinforced the Yangtze defenses after the first incursion.
By 1655, the window of opportunity had closed. The Ming fleet withdrew, and the grand strategy collapsed.
Legacy: A Lost Opportunity in Ming Resistance History
The Three Yangtze Campaigns were more than a footnote in Ming-Qing history. They represented one of the last coordinated efforts to reverse the Qing conquest. Had the western Ming forces arrived in time, the rebellion might have reignited a larger uprising.
Yet, the campaigns also revealed the Ming resistance’s fatal flaws: disunity, poor communication, and the difficulty of sustaining long-distance coordination. Within a few years, the Yongli court would flee to Burma, and the Lu Prince’s forces would dissolve.
Today, the Three Yangtze Campaigns remain a tantalizing “what if” of Chinese history—a moment when the Ming resistance came close to changing the course of events but ultimately fell short.
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