The Weakening of Ancient States and Shifting Alliances

The early 4th century BCE witnessed the continued decline of once-powerful states amid the chaotic Warring States period. The State of Wei, caught between the expanding powers of Qin and Wei, saw its ruler demote his title from Duke to Marquis, and then further to Lord—a symbolic reflection of its diminishing status. This strategic vulnerability became increasingly common as smaller states struggled to maintain autonomy against growing hegemonic powers.

Meanwhile, military conflicts escalated dramatically. In 319 BCE, Qin forces attacked Han, capturing the city of Yan. This marked the beginning of Qin’s aggressive expansion policy that would eventually lead to China’s unification. The same year saw the death of King Hui of Wei and the ascension of his son, King Xiang. The philosopher Mencius famously visited the new ruler, offering his vision of benevolent governance, though his advice would go unheeded in an era dominated by military conquest.

Mencius and the Unheeded Philosophy of Benevolent Rule

Mencius’s encounter with King Xiang of Wei revealed the stark contrast between philosophical ideals and political realities. Observing the new ruler’s lack of royal demeanor, Mencius articulated his core belief: “Unity brings stability to the world.” He employed agricultural metaphors, comparing good governance to timely rain reviving parched seedlings, suggesting that a ruler who avoided bloodshed could naturally attract followers.

The philosopher’s advocacy for benevolent governance (wangdao) drew from historical examples like Kings Tang of Shang and Wen of Zhou, who achieved unification through moral leadership rather than military might. Mencius argued that practicing humane policies would make a state so attractive that people would willingly migrate there, while oppressive rulers would face rebellion. Ironically, as Mencius correctly predicted, the Qin state’s reliance on violence led to its rapid collapse after unification, while the Han dynasty’s relatively moderate approach established lasting rule.

The Failure of Vertical Alliances and Zhang Yi’s Horizontal Strategy

The years 318-317 BCE saw significant military developments. A coalition of five states—Chu, Zhao, Wei, Han, and Yan—attacked Qin but suffered defeat. Meanwhile, Qin achieved major victories against Han at Xiuyu, killing 80,000 soldiers and capturing generals Qiu and Shencha, shocking other states.

The period also witnessed the dramatic failure of the vertical alliance (hezong) strategy promoted by Su Qin. After Su Qin’s assassination by political rivals in Qi, his brothers Su Dai and Su Li continued his diplomatic work. Zhang Yi emerged as the primary advocate for the horizontal alliance (lianheng) strategy, persuading states to align with Qin rather than resist it.

Zhang Yi’s persuasive skills were particularly evident in his dealings with King Xiang of Wei. He argued that Wei’s vulnerable geographic position made resistance futile, warning that Qin could easily cut off Wei’s connections to other states. Convinced by this reasoning, King Xiang abandoned the vertical alliance and sought peace with Qin through Zhang Yi’s mediation.

The Strategic Annexation of Shu and Philosophical Debates

One of the most significant expansions occurred in 316 BCE when Qin conquered the states of Ba and Shu in modern Sichuan. The decision followed intense debate between strategist Sima Cuo and Zhang Yi. While Zhang Yi advocated attacking Han to control the strategic Central Plains, Sima Cuo successfully argued that conquering Shu would be easier and more profitable, providing Qin with rich agricultural lands without provoking other major states.

This period also saw philosophical debates about governance approaches. The contrast between Mencius’s benevolent rule and the realpolitik of strategists like Zhang Yi and Su Qin became increasingly stark. As Yang Xiong later noted in Fayan, while Confucian scholars like Mencius sought to implement moral governance, strategists often pursued personal fame and wealth through cunning diplomacy.

The Yan Crisis and Its Aftermath

Yan experienced dramatic turmoil from 316 BCE when Prime Minister Zi Zhi, allied with Su Dai, manipulated the aging King Kuai into relinquishing power. The king’s gradual transfer of authority to Zi Zhi—first making him regent, then allowing him to rule as king—created political chaos. By 314 BCE, this led to civil war between Zi Zhi’s forces and those of Crown Prince Ping, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths.

Qi seized this opportunity to invade Yan, exploiting the internal disorder to kill both Zi Zhi and King Kuai. When King Xuan of Qi consulted Mencius about annexing Yan, the philosopher emphasized considering the Yan people’s wishes. He warned that oppressive rule would lead to rebellion, advice the Qi ruler ignored. True to Mencius’s prediction, Yan soon revolted against Qi’s harsh occupation, forcing Qi’s withdrawal.

The Rise of King Zhao of Yan and the “Thousand Gold for Horse Bones” Strategy

Following these events, Crown Prince Ping ascended as King Zhao of Yan (311 BCE), determined to rebuild his devastated state. His famous recruitment strategy—symbolized by the “thousand gold for horse bones” story—demonstrated the Confucian principle of “pleasing those nearby to attract those afar.” By honoring advisor Guo Kui lavishly, King Zhao signaled his commitment to valuing talent, attracting brilliant strategists like Yue Yi and Ju Xin from across China.

This approach proved remarkably successful. Within years, Yan transformed from a war-torn state into a formidable power, setting the stage for its future revenge against Qi under Yue Yi’s leadership. The episode illustrated how genuine respect for talent could achieve more than aggressive expansionism.

Zhang Yi’s Diplomatic Maneuvers and Decline

Zhang Yi continued his diplomatic campaigns between 311-310 BCE, persuading multiple states to abandon anti-Qin alliances. His methods combined threats—warning of Qin’s military might—with promises of protection. However, his influence waned after King Wu of Qin ascended in 310 BCE. Disliked by the new ruler, Zhang Yi left Qin for Wei, where he died the following year.

The era’s intellectual climate became increasingly dominated by debating scholars like Zhang Yi, Su Qin, and Gongsun Yan. While some admired their ability to influence states through rhetoric, Mencius dismissed them, arguing true greatness came from moral character rather than persuasive skills. This philosophical divide—between pragmatic statecraft and idealistic governance—would continue throughout Chinese history.

Military Reforms and Power Shifts (307-298 BCE)

Several key developments marked these years:

1. Zhao’s Military Reforms: King Wuling of Zhao introduced “barbarian” cavalry tactics and clothing (307 BCE), overcoming conservative opposition to strengthen his military against northern nomads and rival states.

2. Qin’s Expansion: Under generals like Gan Mao, Qin achieved significant victories, including the capture of Yiyang from Han after prolonged siege (307 BCE). However, Qin suffered setbacks too—King Wu died foolishly attempting to lift a massive cauldron (307 BCE).

3. Rise of the Wei Ran Faction: In Qin, Queen Dowager Xuan and her half-brother Wei Ran consolidated power, eliminating political rivals (305 BCE). Wei Ran’s dominance would shape Qin politics for decades.

4. Chu’s Troubles: After King Huai of Chu was tricked and captured by Qin (299 BCE), Chu faced invasions but managed to install a new ruler, King Qingxiang, maintaining independence despite territorial losses.

5. The “Crowing Cock and Snatching Dog” Incident: Lord Mengchang of Qi’s dramatic escape from Qin (298 BCE), aided by petty thieves mimicking animal sounds, became legendary, illustrating the value of diverse talents in the period’s aristocratic courts.

Conclusion: The Clash of Philosophies and Power

This turbulent quarter-century revealed the Warring States period’s essential dynamics: small states declining amid great power competition; philosophical ideals competing with military realities; and constant diplomatic realignments. While strategists like Zhang Yi achieved short-term successes through cunning, the longer-term pattern—seen in Qin’s eventual unification and rapid collapse—suggested the enduring relevance of Mencius’s emphasis on benevolent governance. The era’s legacy includes both pragmatic statecraft traditions and enduring philosophical debates about the proper foundations of political power.