The Fractured Steppe: Post-Esen’s Mongolia and Ming Border Tensions

The death of Esen Tayishi in 1454 marked not an end, but a transformation in Ming-Mongol relations. As the Oirat Confederacy fractured, the Eastern Mongols descended into internecine warfare, with rival chieftains like Bolai and Molihai vying for dominance under the nominal authority of the “Little Prince” (Manduul Khan). This political vacuum created a perfect storm along the northern frontiers, particularly in the Ordos region—the fertile loop of the Yellow River that had become a contested zone after the Ming abandoned the Dong Sheng garrison in 1438.

Unlike the Oirats who had maintained tributary trade, these Mongol groups relied increasingly on raids into Ming territory. As Li Xian, the Ming Minister of Personnel observed: “The barbarians trouble China merely to seize clothing and food… When our annual gifts provided their needs, they did not raid. Now deprived, they grow desperate.” This economic desperation, combined with the Ordos’ strategic position as a staging ground, turned Shaanxi’s three defense zones—Gansu, Ningxia, and Yansui—into constant battlegrounds.

Indigenous Tipping Point: The Origins of the Tuda Rebellion

The term “Tuda” (土著鞑人) referred to Mongol communities settled within Ming borders since the Yuan collapse. Hongwu Emperor’s pragmatic 1371 policy had allowed these “surrendered barbarians” to remain in frontier zones like Guyuan, recognizing that forced relocation would breed resentment. By the mid-15th century, Tuda auxiliaries had become integral to Ming border defenses, their mounted archers praised in military reports as “excellent shots and daring warriors.”

Yet this coexistence was fragile. As early as Yongle’s reign (1411), Tuda had rebelled under Mongol instigation. The Tumu Crisis (1449) exacerbated tensions—scattered defections presaged larger unrest. The catalyst came in 1468 when Man Si, a Tuda leader of the Barkan clan, faced arrest for sheltering bandits. When his nephew Man Shu arrived with a small arrest party, Man Si’s followers killed most escorts and took hostages. Declaring himself “King Who Summons the Worthy,” Man Si united 4,000 Tuda warriors within weeks, exploiting Ming military decline—Guyuan’s garrison had dwindled to 8,000 troops, mostly elderly or infirm.

Fortress of Rebellion: The Stone City Campaign

Man Si’s forces occupied a natural fortress—the Stone City, built atop Tang-era Tibetan foundations. As described by commander Ma Wensheng:

“Stone City stands between eastern and western mountains. The left cliff rises sheer for hundreds of feet, climbable only by rope. Western plateaus hold thousands. Inside are stone cisterns; outside, precarious walkways guarded by outworks. The terrain chills the soul.”

Initial Ming assaults failed disastrously. In May 1468, overconfident commanders fell for a feigned surrender—Tuda herds stampeded into Ming ranks as hidden archers attacked. The Ming lost 500 men, including precious artillery. By August, the rebellion threatened to spill into Shaanxi proper.

The Siege Master: Ma Wensheng’s Campaign

Appointed Supreme Commander, Ma Wensheng implemented methodical siege tactics:

1. Resource Denial: Burning grasslands to starve Tuda horses
2. Psychological Warfare: Using surrendered Tuda to spread defections
3. Engineering Solutions: Constructing mobile “sky bridges” to cross defensive trenches

The turning point came through subterfuge. Ma turned Man Si’s advisor Yang Huli, who lured the rebel leader into an ambush at East Mountain Pass. On November 16, 1468, Ming forces annihilated the Tuda field army, capturing Man Si. The Stone City’s defenders, now leaderless, dispersed by month’s end.

Strategic Reckoning: The “Search the Ordos” Debates

The rebellion exposed deeper Ming vulnerabilities. Since the 1450s, officials like Li Xian advocated “Search the Ordos” (搜套)—preemptive strikes to deny Mongols grazing lands. But logistical realities hampered these ambitions:

– A 50-day campaign required 45,000 shi of grain—two-thirds of Yansui’s reserves
– 60,000 troops needed 276,250 taels of silver—an unsustainable cost

When Wang Yue finally achieved a decisive victory at Red Salt Lake (1473), it came through mobility—4,600 cavalry exploiting Mongol divisions to destroy their base camps. Though not permanently reclaiming the Ordos, this “butterfly defense” (边墙) system stabilized the frontier for a generation.

Legacy of the Frontier Wars

The Tuda Rebellion revealed the contradictions of Ming frontier policy. As historian Gao Dai noted:

“Though not our race, their hearts differ… Placing wolves near sheep pens invites disaster. Had northern horsemen come during Man Si’s revolt, chaos would have spread beyond Guyuan.”

Ultimately, the Ming adapted through layered defense:

1. Military Agriculture: Self-sufficient garrison colonies
2. Elite Cavalry: Mongol-style mounted archers like the Tuda
3. Defense-in-Depth: Multi-layered beacon and fort systems

These innovations allowed the Ming to endure another century of steppe pressure, until new challenges from the Manchus emerged. The Ordos frontier remained contested, but the lessons of 1468-1473 proved that flexibility, not just walls, defined imperial survival.