A Kingdom Divided: The Aftermath of Jin Withdrawal

When the Jin armies withdrew from Kaifeng in early 1127, they left Emperor Qinzong of Song with three gaping wounds in his empire—two concerning people, one concerning land. This trifecta of problems would test the young emperor’s leadership and ultimately contribute to the collapse of Northern Song China.

The human problems centered around two royal figures—Prince Su Zhao Shu, held hostage by the Jin, and Emperor Huizong, Qinzong’s father who had fled south during the invasion. The territorial issue involved the strategic Three Prefectures (Taiyuan, Zhongshan, and Hejian) promised to the Jin in the humiliating peace treaty.

The Prince Who Never Returned

Prince Su’s fate became emblematic of Song’s humiliation. Originally sent as a replacement hostage for Prince Kang (the future Emperor Gaozong), Prince Su found himself abandoned when the Jin refused to honor their agreement to release him after withdrawal. Emperor Qinzong’s desperate attempts to retrieve his uncle through diplomacy failed spectacularly.

Historical records paint a tragic picture of Prince Su’s final years. Initially confined at the Minzhong Temple in Yanjing (modern Beijing), he was later moved to Wuguocheng where he died in 1130. His captivity created an unexpected beneficiary—Prince Kang, whose narrow escape from hostage status paved his path to becoming Southern Song’s founding emperor.

The Problem of Two Emperors

While Prince Su’s absence created a diplomatic headache, Emperor Huizong’s continued absence from the capital threatened to split the empire. The retired emperor’s court in Yangzhou had effectively created a parallel government, intercepting taxes and preventing southeastern troops from reinforcing the capital.

This situation mirrored dangerous historical precedents. From Northern Wei’s Emperor Xianwen to Tang’s Emperor Xuanzong, retired emperors often became destabilizing forces. Huizong faced an impossible choice—return to likely humiliation in Kaifeng or remain in the south and risk dividing the empire.

Reunification Through Diplomacy

The solution came from an unlikely figure—Li Gang, the hawkish minister who had advocated strongest for military resistance against the Jin. Surprisingly, it was Li who engineered Huizong’s peaceful return through careful diplomacy rather than force.

Li’s approach combined symbolic gestures with practical concessions. He persuaded Qinzong to convert the imperial garden into a retirement palace (Ningde Palace) for his father while maintaining proper ceremonial respect. This delicate balance allowed Huizong to return with dignity in March 1127, temporarily preserving imperial unity.

Purge of the Old Guard

Huizong’s return triggered a final reckoning with his discredited advisors. The purge targeted two groups: those who enabled Huizong’s extravagance (like Cai Jing and Zhu Mian) and those who advocated the disastrous alliance with Jin against Liao (like Tong Guan).

The most tragic figure was Zhao Liangshi, architect of the Jin-Song alliance against Liao. Executed in March 1127 and later vilified in the Song Shi, Zhao became a scapegoat for policies that failed due to Song’s military weakness rather than flawed strategy.

The Three Prefectures Dilemma

The territorial issue proved most intractable. The Three Prefectures formed Song’s northern defensive bulwark—Taiyuan guarded Shanxi’s approaches, Zhongshan connected Hebei and Shanxi, while Hejian protected the eastern flank. Their loss would leave the Central Plains defenseless against future Jin incursions.

Despite treaty obligations, local resistance made the prefectures impossible to surrender. When Jin envoys arrived to take possession, they were met with arrows and stones rather than submission. This grassroots defiance forced Qinzong into an impossible position—honor the humiliating treaty or embrace certain war.

Diplomatic Gambits and Military Preparations

Facing this dilemma, Song pursued contradictory policies. Diplomatically, they proposed substituting increased tribute for territorial concessions while seeking to exploit Jin’s internal divisions. The disastrous attempt to recruit Khitan defector Yelü Yudu through envoy Xiao Zhonggong backfired spectacularly when the plot was revealed to Jin authorities.

Militarily, Li Gang proposed an eight-point reform program in April 1127 focusing on border defenses, militia organization, cavalry rebuilding, and economic recovery. However, bureaucratic inertia prevented meaningful implementation.

The Collapse of Northern Defenses

The military situation deteriorated rapidly after veteran generals Zhong Shidao retired and Zhong Shizhong died in a disastrous May 1127 offensive to relieve Taiyuan. Poor coordination between Song armies and inadequate supplies doomed the campaign. By August, the entire northern defense system had collapsed, with refugees flooding south across the Yellow River.

The Fall of Li Gang

As military failures mounted, the hawks lost influence. Li Gang, appointed to lead northern defenses despite his civilian background, became a scapegoat. His innovative but untested war chariot program drew imperial ire, and by August 1127 he was dismissed, beginning his long exile.

The recall of aged general Zhong Shidao came too late. His death in October 1127 removed the last experienced commander as the Jin prepared their final assault. His final warning—to move the court to the more defensible Chang’an—went unheeded.

Legacy of a Failed Peace

The brief interlude between Jin withdrawals witnessed a tragic failure of leadership. Emperor Qinzong vacillated between resistance and appeasement, while the court remained divided. The mishandling of Huizong’s return, the Three Prefectures issue, and military preparations all contributed to the catastrophe of 1127-1128 when the Jin returned to conquer northern China permanently.

This period offers enduring lessons about the perils of diplomatic overreach, the importance of clear strategic vision, and the dangers of civil-military discord—themes that resonate throughout Chinese history and beyond.