The Road to Borodino
As Napoleon’s Grande Armée pushed deeper into Russian territory in the summer of 1812, Tsar Alexander I and his commanders faced a critical decision. Field Marshal Mikhail Kutuzov, newly appointed as commander-in-chief, prepared for the pivotal Battle of Borodino while simultaneously developing plans for a counteroffensive to expel the invaders.
Kutuzov’s initial report to Alexander after Borodino contained a telling phrase: “Despite the enemy’s numerical superiority, they failed to gain even a single step of our land.” This carefully crafted statement, blending defiance with strategic ambiguity, set the stage for Russia’s next moves. Alexander responded by dispatching his trusted aide, Colonel Alexander Chernyshev, to Kutuzov’s headquarters with detailed plans for a coordinated counterattack.
The Grand Design: Alexander’s Strategic Vision
The tsar’s master plan envisioned a pincer movement against Napoleon’s vulnerable rear areas in Belarus. From the north, General Wittgenstein and Count Steinheil would advance southward to capture Polotsk. From the south, Admiral Chichagov’s Army of the Danube would push northward after driving Austrian and Saxon forces back into the Duchy of Warsaw.
Alexander’s letter to Kutuzov emphasized: “As you will see from this plan, the main military operations will be carried out by Admiral Chichagov’s corps.” This southern thrust would be reinforced by General Tormasov’s Third Army and Friedrich Ertel’s smaller detachment guarding supply depots at Mozyr. The coordinated movements aimed to control the entire region through which Napoleon’s retreating forces would have to pass.
Challenges of Execution
The ambitious plan faced significant obstacles. Coordinating armies separated by hundreds of kilometers proved extraordinarily difficult in the Russian autumn. Communication between Wittgenstein and Chichagov had to pass through territory occupied by at least five French corps. Meanwhile, 36,000 French reinforcements under Marshal Victor entered Belarus from the west on September 15, reaching Smolensk twelve days later.
Alexander’s expectations required his outnumbered forces to defeat all enemy units in Belarus despite numerical disadvantages. Winter marches would inevitably cause heavy losses from disease and exhaustion. The plan ultimately achieved about two-thirds of its objectives—a remarkable accomplishment given the circumstances.
The People’s War and Partisan Tactics
As Chernyshev shuttled between headquarters delivering Alexander’s plans, a brutal “people’s war” erupted around Moscow, reminiscent of the Spanish guerrilla struggle. Russian peasants, normally hospitable, transformed into fierce resisters against French foraging parties. Contemporaries reported horrific reprisals against captured soldiers, including torture and live burials.
Militarily, this popular resistance severely hampered French logistics. Napoleon’s cavalry, already decimated at Borodino, faced near-total collapse during the Moscow occupation as forage became increasingly scarce. Partisan leaders like Denis Davydov and Alexander Figner became legendary figures, their irregular forces harassing French supply lines and gathering intelligence.
The Turning Point: Napoleon’s Retreat
Napoleon’s fatal miscalculation—remaining in Moscow for six weeks—allowed Kutuzov to rebuild his forces while winter approached. When the French finally retreated in October, they faced a nightmare scenario: a starving, freezing march through hostile territory pursued by relentless Cossacks.
Key engagements at Maloyaroslavets and Vyazma demonstrated the deteriorating French combat effectiveness. By mid-November, Napoleon’s once-mighty army had disintegrated into a desperate mob. The crossing of the Berezina River in late November became the campaign’s tragic climax, where thousands perished despite Napoleon’s personal escape.
Legacy and Historical Significance
The 1812 campaign marked a watershed in European history. Russia’s strategic depth, harsh climate, and innovative use of partisan warfare defeated what had been considered Europe’s finest military machine. Kutuzov’s cautious approach—prioritizing the preservation of his army over total victory—proved strategically sound despite contemporary criticism.
The campaign’s aftermath reshaped European geopolitics. As Kutuzov reportedly told a British observer: “The complete destruction of Napoleon and his army would not benefit the world… The inheritance would fall not to Russia or any continental power, but to that power which already rules the seas.” This foreshadowed the complex diplomatic landscape of the post-Napoleonic era.
Russia’s victory came at tremendous cost but established its position as a European great power. The campaign’s lessons about logistics, popular resistance, and the limits of military conquest remain relevant to strategists today. The “Patriotic War” entered Russian national mythology, immortalized in Tolstoy’s “War and Peace” and commemorated to this day as a defining moment in the nation’s history.