An Uneasy Peace in Nanjing
In the summer of 1842, as the dust settled on the Treaty of Nanjing negotiations, three Qing officials gathered in the Viceroy’s residence. Qiying, the imperial commissioner, turned to his colleagues Ilibu and Niu Jian with cautious relief. “The stone has finally landed,” he remarked, “but we cannot assume everything is settled. We must monitor public sentiment closely.” His words reflected the precarious nature of the peace agreement that had just been concluded aboard the British warship HMS Cornwallis.
Niu Jian, as the local authority governing the Liangjiang region, received specific instructions to dispatch observers throughout Nanjing to gauge public reaction. Particular attention was to be paid to prominent local scholars, especially Bao Shichen, known by his courtesy name Chengbo, whose opinions carried significant weight among the educated elite. This surveillance of intellectual sentiment revealed the government’s anxiety about how the controversial treaty would be received by those whose opinions shaped public discourse.
The scene unfolding in Nanjing represented a critical moment in China’s encounter with Western imperial powers. The First Opium War had exposed the technological and military gap between the Qing Empire and Britain, culminating in this humiliating peace agreement that would shape China’s foreign relations for decades to come.
The Officials and Their Dilemma
Qiying, as the senior imperial commissioner, bore the heavy responsibility of negotiating with the British while maintaining domestic stability. His career had prepared him for traditional diplomacy within the tributary system, not for dealing with European powers whose military technology and diplomatic practices challenged centuries of Chinese foreign policy traditions. The very concept of equal nation-state relations contradicted the Sinocentric worldview that had governed China’s external relations for millennia.
Niu Jian represented the typical scholar-official caught between duty and personal inclination. His character leaned toward avoidance of conflict, preferring administrative solutions to forceful measures. When Qiying suggested making examples of rumormongers, Niu Jian demurred, offering reassuring but potentially incomplete reports about public calm. This tension between different approaches to governance highlighted the internal conflicts within the Qing bureaucracy as it faced unprecedented challenges.
Ilibu, the other key official in these discussions, brought his own experiences from previous interactions with Western powers. Having participated in earlier negotiations, he understood the difficult position the Qing government found itself in—forced to make concessions while trying to preserve imperial dignity and domestic stability.
The Scholar in Self-Imposed Exile
Bao Shichen, the respected scholar known to his contemporaries as Chengbo, presented a fascinating case of intellectual resistance through withdrawal. At over seventy years of age, he had returned to Nanjing from Jiangxi half a year earlier and retreated to a small courtyard, dedicating himself to writing. His voluntary isolation spoke volumes about his stance toward the current situation.
When local gentry attempted to recruit him for Nanjing’s “Defense Bureau,” Bao Shichen refused to participate. His refusal stemmed from principled opposition to what he perceived as corrupt practices within such organizations. The various fundraising bureaus established during the crisis had become vehicles for embezzlement and self-enrichment under the guise of public service. More fundamentally, he objected to the very concept of gathering funds to pay ransom for the city—what he scornfully described as “collecting gold and silver to buy peace.”
His withdrawal represented a form of intellectual protest, though the officials interpreting his silence drew their own conclusions. To Qiying, Bao’s refusal to engage indicated that even brilliant minds had no solutions to offer beyond pursuing peace negotiations. This interpretation conveniently supported the course the officials had already chosen.
Unwritten Critiques and Alternative Visions
Unknown to the officials monitoring him, Bao Shichen was far from silent in his seclusion. While Qiying and his colleagues signed the treaty aboard the British warship, Bao was composing his “On Exterminating the Barbarians,” a work that would soon circulate widely among intellectual circles. His approach differed fundamentally from the official position, placing hope in mobilizing the common people rather than relying solely on government forces.
Bao analyzed the war’s failures with remarkable insight, noting that previous defeats occurred because defenders presented “empty cities to the enemy.” More significantly, he observed that many destructive acts—burning camps, plundering supply depots, destroying government offices, and robbing travelers—were committed not by foreign forces but by Chinese civilians. This breakdown of social order concerned him more than the foreign threat itself.
His assessment of popular sentiment during the conflict revealed troubling realities. Unlike the celebrated Sanyuanli incident, where villagers had resisted British troops, most areas saw widespread collaboration with the enemy. The term “hanjian” emerged during this period to describe those who assisted foreign powers, indicating the complex social dynamics beneath the surface of nationalist resistance narratives.
A Scholar’s Prescription for National Recovery
Bao Shichen’s writings offered a comprehensive critique of Qing governance alongside practical solutions. He argued that the fundamental problem lay in the alienation between the government and the people. Without popular support, no defense against foreign powers could succeed. His prescription focused on two key areas: winning back public confidence and identifying capable personnel.
To address the first issue, he advocated for measures to relieve popular hardship and secure民心 . This involved reducing taxes, easing legal penalties, and ensuring that both poor and wealthy citizens could survive and thrive. Only when people felt invested in the existing system would they defend it against external threats.
His second emphasis on identifying talent reflected concerns about the quality of Qing officialdom. He proposed seeking out capable individuals at all levels of society while supporting those already in positions of authority. This dual approach aimed to strengthen the administrative system from both within and without.
These recommendations, while thoughtful, arrived too late to influence the immediate post-treaty situation. Their subsequent circulation, however, would contribute to ongoing debates about China’s response to foreign challenges in the coming decades.
Provincial Concerns and Official Reactions
The arrival of Liu Yunke’s “Ten Questions” from Zhejiang province added another layer to the complex political landscape. As the provincial governor, Liu had previously advocated strong resistance against the British. His dramatic shift to questioning the treaty’s implementation reflected broader anxieties within the Qing administration about the long-term consequences of the agreement.
Liu’s questions touched on crucial issues that would indeed plague Qing foreign relations for years. His concern about other nations following Britain’s example proved prescient, as the “most-favored-nation” clause in subsequent treaties would extend privileges to multiple foreign powers. Similarly, his worry about legal jurisdiction in cases involving Chinese and foreigners anticipated ongoing conflicts over extraterritoriality.
Qiying’s dismissive response to these legitimate concerns revealed both personal friction and strategic calculation. Having committed to the treaty, he could ill afford doubts about its wisdom. His criticism of Liu’s change from hawkish rhetoric to cautious questioning reflected the difficult position of officials who had to implement unpopular policies while maintaining bureaucratic unity.
The Social Landscape After the Treaty
Niu Jian’s reports depicted a city quickly returning to normalcy. The relief among Nanjing’s residents was palpable—the immediate threat of attack had receded. Merchants particularly welcomed the renewed stability, with commercial activity resuming along the Qinhuai River. The famous pleasure boats reappeared on the waterway, signaling a resumption of daily life despite the political uncertainties.
This surface calm, however, masked underlying tensions. While Niu Jian emphasized the peaceful atmosphere to his superiors, he privately knew that criticism of the officials and the treaty circulated widely. His decision to withhold this information reflected both his personal distaste for confrontation and his assessment of what his superiors wanted to hear.
The disparity between reported and actual public opinion highlighted the communication problems within the Qing bureaucracy. Officials at different levels filtered information according to their interests and inclinations, creating a distorted picture of the real situation. This information management would have significant consequences for future policy decisions.
Historical Context and Lasting Significance
The events surrounding the Treaty of Nanjing represented a watershed in Chinese history. The agreement itself contained provisions that would shape China’s development for the next century, including the cession of Hong Kong, opening of five treaty ports, fixed tariffs, and extraterritoriality for British subjects. These terms established patterns of interaction between China and foreign powers that would persist until the mid-twentieth century.
The reactions of different segments of Chinese society—officials, scholars, merchants, and common people—revealed the complex responses to foreign pressure. No uniform “Chinese” position existed; instead, various groups pursued different strategies based on their circumstances and principles.
Bao Shichen’s writings, though not immediately influential in policy circles, represented an important intellectual response to China’s crisis. His emphasis on popular mobilization and administrative reform anticipated elements of both the Self-Strengthening Movement and later revolutionary movements. While his immediate recommendations went unheeded, his analysis contributed to ongoing debates about how China should respond to external challenges.
Legacy of the 1842 Settlement
The Treaty of Nanjing established a template for China’s relations with foreign powers that would be replicated and expanded in subsequent agreements. The “unequal treaty” system created structural disadvantages for China while fueling resentment that would influence Chinese nationalism for generations.
The different approaches represented by Qiying, Niu Jian, Bao Shichen, and Liu Yunke reflected enduring tensions in Chinese foreign policy between accommodation and resistance, between central control and local initiative, between popular mobilization and elite diplomacy. These tensions would continue to shape China’s response to foreign challenges throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The surveillance of intellectuals like Bao Shichen established patterns of state-scholar relations that persisted through subsequent dynastic transitions. The government’s concern about public opinion, particularly that of influential scholars, revealed the importance of ideological control in maintaining political stability, a concern that would remain central to Chinese governance.
In the final analysis, the days following the Treaty of Nanjing captured a moment of transition when China’s centuries-old confidence in its cultural and political superiority faced unprecedented challenges. The responses of officials, scholars, and common people to this crisis revealed both the strengths and limitations of the Qing system as it confronted a changing world.
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