The declaration of independence in 1991 marked Ukraine’s dramatic exit from the Soviet Union, launching the nation on a complex journey to shed seven decades of Soviet influence and construct a sovereign, democratic state. This transition unfolded against a backdrop of immense challenges: building state institutions from scratch, navigating economic collapse, managing regional divisions, and establishing Ukraine’s place in the post-Cold War world. The presidency of Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) and his successor Leonid Kuchma (1994-2004) would define this formative period, characterized by both nation-building achievements and profound democratic setbacks.

Forging a Nation from Soviet Ashes

Ukraine emerged as an independent state without the traditional foundations of nationhood—no unified political community distinct from its neighbors and no modern national consciousness shared by all its citizens. The Ukrainian political elite faced the monumental task of constructing a sovereign state on territory that had never existed as an independent modern nation. Ukraine inherited the Soviet Union’s bureaucratic apparatus, legal framework, and military assets stationed within its borders, but transforming these remnants into genuinely Ukrainian institutions presented enormous practical and symbolic challenges.

State-building required both pragmatic and symbolic elements. On the practical side, Ukraine needed to secure its borders, establish military control, and create a new constitution. The symbolic dimension involved reconstructing national identity through flags, emblems, anthems, and historical narratives. Remarkably, across the political spectrum—from former communist Kravchuk to Rukh’s national democrats—there was consensus in the early 1990s on the need for strong state institutions.

The military transition proceeded with notable success. Ukraine negotiated with Russia and other post-Soviet states to divide Soviet military assets, insisting that the 800,000 Soviet troops stationed on Ukrainian territory swear allegiance to Ukraine. However, two significant disputes emerged with Russia: the disposition of nearly 200 nuclear missiles on Ukrainian territory, and the division of the Black Sea Fleet based in Crimea. Ukraine refused to simply transfer these assets to Russia, complicating relations with both Moscow and Western powers concerned about nuclear security. Ukraine sought economic compensation for the missiles and security guarantees from Russia and Western nations, threatening to retain sufficient weaponry for self-defense if such assurances weren’t provided.

Concurrently, Ukraine pursued international recognition to legitimize its independence. This meant establishing Ukraine as truly independent rather than merely part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which Russia promoted to maintain post-Soviet integration. Most countries, including the United States, Canada, Poland, and Germany, quickly recognized Ukrainian independence, as did Russian President Boris Yeltsin. However, elements within the Russian parliament refused to acknowledge Ukraine’s sovereignty, claiming that Crimea and other regions should remain part of Russia.

Domestically, Kravchuk pursued policies to strengthen national identity, most notably through promoting the Ukrainian language. Many emerging elites believed that making Ukraine more “Ukrainian” required emphasizing separation from Russia. While “Ukrainization” was intended as a gradual process, it faced resistance in Russified eastern and southern regions. Kravchuk also revived national symbols suppressed during Soviet times: the blue-and-yellow flag, the trident coat of arms dating to Kyivan Rus, and the national anthem “Ukraine Has Not Perished.” He supported the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) over the Russian Orthodox Church and encouraged schools and media to promote a distinct Ukrainian historical narrative that positioned Kyivan Rus as a proto-Ukrainian state and celebrated Cossacks as freedom-loving democrats.

Kravchuk underwent a remarkable political transformation from defender of the Soviet state to guardian of Ukrainian sovereignty, from unconditional supporter of the Soviet Union to its unconditional critic, from enemy of Ukrainian nationalism to its prominent representative. He adopted much of the national democrats’ program, converting many former dissidents into supporters. Former dissident Mykhaylo Horyn’s Republican Party, drawing lessons from history, argued that “underestimating the state and neglecting its development leads to the loss of statehood,” effectively endorsing Kravchuk as Ukraine’s George Washington.

The Illusion of Democratic Progress

While independence established Ukrainian statehood politically, the Soviet-era leadership remained largely intact. In the 1990 elections, national democrats operated mainly in western Ukraine and Kyiv, while communists dominated the legislature. Even after the Communist Party was banned in August 1991, the composition of parliament remained unchanged. Kravchuk paid lip service to democracy but concentrated power in the executive branch, circumventing parliament and suppressing opposition. He led no political party but critics accused him of creating a “party of power” that replaced communist slogans with nationalist rhetoric.

Even those enthusiastic about state-building often argued that democratization should follow rather than accompany nation-building. One writer in a liberal Ukrainian-language newspaper lamented that democracy “does not guide national consciousness, does not create it, and does not encourage people to unite in the new state of the de-nationalized era.” The solution, in this view, was for the state to disseminate national ideas and unify society. Kravchuk himself dismissed political parties with different platforms as “speculating on workers for their own selfish interests.”

By 1993, the country was clearly in political crisis. No new constitution had been adopted, and disputes between Kravchuk and parliament intensified. Political parties remained weak, state institutions lacked confidence in expressing political views, and economic deterioration sparked strikes, particularly by miners in eastern Ukraine who demanded not only economic improvements but new elections.

The 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections revealed the weakness of Ukraine’s democratic development. Many parliamentary candidates ran as independents, reflecting party weakness. Once formed, parliamentary factions quickly fragmented. National democratic parties like Rukh were overshadowed by forces connected to the former Communist Party. Low voter turnout reflected deepening political disillusionment, with only 338 of 450 parliamentary seats filled. Former dissident Levko Lukyanenko lamented the close connections between democratic parties and the “party of power,” which he believed had destroyed both democratic parties and the idea of democracy itself. One researcher noted that Kravchuk’s governance model followed Soviet patterns of “stagnation, corruption, and abuse of state power.”

The 1994 election ultimately pitted Kravchuk against Kuchma, a former Soviet missile factory director who had served as prime minister from 1992-1993. Kuchma spoke poor Ukrainian, drew support primarily from eastern and southern regions, and avoided most Ukrainization issues. Though some feared he would sell out sovereignty to Russia, Kuchma won the election, inheriting the task of completing nation-building.

Unlike Russia in 1993, Ukraine avoided political upheaval, and the 1996 constitution was hailed as a step forward. The document granted the president significant powers, including appointing and dismissing the prime minister and other officials. However, it also represented a compromise, giving national democrats space to promote “national ideas” like Ukrainian as the sole official language while providing for social welfare to reflect the state’s “social character.”

Hope that Kuchma would use his power for radical economic and political reform quickly faded. Instead, he developed a system of cronyism and crony capitalism where political elites used their positions to amass enormous wealth. Figures like Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko acquired vast fortunes through energy and transportation dealings. Other politically connected oligarchs included Viktor Pinchuk, who headed the Dnipropetrovsk “clan” and married Kuchma’s daughter, and Rinat Akhmetov, leader of the rival Donetsk clan who made billions in metallurgy, machinery, and transportation. These oligarchs and clans participated in Kuchma’s “party of power,” though tensions among them occasionally turned violent, as evidenced by the 1996 murder of Donetsk parliament member Yevhen Shcherban, allegedly ordered by Lazarenko.

Elections continued but offered little real competition. Control over state media and private media (owned by oligarchs) hindered democratic expression, while unenforced campaign spending limits benefited sponsored parties. Kuchma’s administration used “administrative resources”—threatening local officials, launching criminal investigations against opponents, pressuring state employees to vote for specific candidates, and distributing material benefits to voters—to produce favorable electoral outcomes.

The 1998 and 1999 elections proved particularly discouraging for democracy advocates. International observers considered the 1998 parliamentary elections relatively free and fair despite complaints about campaign preparation and irregularities on election day. The Communist Party emerged as the biggest winner with strong support in eastern and southern Ukraine, while national democratic parties like Rukh won only about 10% of seats. Power balance in parliament rested with independents (often wealthy businessmen) and small “centrist” parties created by presidential administration and oligarchic clans.

The 1999 presidential election was even more problematic. Kuchma’s unpopularity due to economic collapse made his reelection seem unlikely, but several factors worked in his favor. First, Rukh leader Vyacheslav Chornovil, Kuchma’s strongest potential opponent, died in a suspicious car crash in March 1999. Second, presidential administration used extensive “administrative resources” to encourage votes for Kuchma, shut down opposition media, and attack his main opponent, Socialist Party leader Oleksandr Moroz. Third, despite calls for unity, the center-left opposition remained divided. Authorities strategically supported marginal candidates like Natalia Vitrenko to split opposition votes. Kuchma ultimately faced the uncharismatic and dogmatic Communist candidate Petro Symonenko, who lacked Kuchma’s political resources. Despite documented democratic violations, media control, vote-rigging, voter harassment, and falsified vote counts, Kuchma was reelected.

By the late 1990s, Ukraine could no longer be considered a democracy. Political opposition was weak, with power concentrated in the presidency and oligarchic clans. In a 1999 survey, only 17% of Ukrainians considered their country democratic, while nearly 90% ranked corruption as a serious problem. In another survey that year, respondents believed the communist system was better than Ukraine’s current system, with 76% dissatisfied with Ukraine’s democratic development and nearly half (47.2%) supporting a strong leader unchecked by parliament and elections. Compared to Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, or Romanians, Ukrainians were more dissatisfied with their political system, though they supported democracy more than Russians did. Overall, public opinion surveys revealed high levels of disillusionment, apathy, and frustration.

Economic Catastrophe and Halting Reforms

Ukraine’s economic problems in the 1990s were even more severe than its political challenges, and undoubtedly contributed to them. The economic data revealed a story of hyperinflation, negative growth, unemployment, and lack of foreign investment resulting from aging Soviet infrastructure, the shock of Soviet dissolution, and the Kravchuk government’s hesitation on economic reforms. The government continued printing money and subsidizing struggling enterprises, many of which went bankrupt or accumulated such debt they couldn’t pay workers, who instead received payment in kind—products like sausage, clothing, or toilet paper that they could barter or sell. This forced many Ukrainians into “suitcase trade,” carrying goods to Poland, Russia, or Romania to earn small profits. Thousands of Ukrainian women sought work in Western Europe, only to be tricked into prostitution. For most Ukrainians, manufacturing collapse meant shortages of basic necessities, while hyperinflation made available goods unaffordable.

In fall 1994, Kuchma launched a package of “radical” reforms aimed at cutting state subsidies, privatizing industry, and creating a more business-friendly legal environment. Some progress followed: inflation dropped significantly, allowing introduction of the permanent currency, the hryvnia, in 1996; manufacturing decline slowed, though true growth didn’t resume until 2000. Still, Ukraine’s GDP fell by 54% during the 1990s—worse than Russia’s 40% decline and twice as severe as the American Great Depression.

Under Kuchma, Ukraine’s economy became increasingly privatized, but the privatization process was plagued by corruption. Politically connected individuals acquired company shares at enormous discounts, becoming oligarchs who often looted enterprises, selling assets, taking profits, dismantling companies, and leaving workers unemployed. Despite Kuchma’s “radical reform” rhetoric, he failed to follow through comprehensively, facing political resistance particularly in eastern Ukraine, where aging state industries survived only with state support.

Reform also lacked popular consensus. A 1995 survey found less than one-third (31.4%) of Ukrainians believed they would benefit from privatization, even fewer (23.8%) thought free prices were beneficial, and most (54%) believed the state should provide basic necessities. With both Kuchma and society half-hearted about reform, and “individual clans concerned only with their private interests, the reform project gradually lost momentum,” resulting in chaotic and poor policies. A 90% tax on sales revenue forced economic activity into the illegal or “black market.” Promised benefits of privatization—increased efficiency and broader share ownership among Ukrainians—failed to materialize as management used financial resources and influence to strip employees of their shares.

Ukraine’s private sector development lagged behind all Central European countries and Russia. The World Bank’s structural reform index showed Ukraine trailing many post-Soviet states, including Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. Foreign investment remained minimal—$14.86 per capita in 1998 compared to $128 in Poland, $256 in the Czech Republic, and $397 in Estonia.

The economic collapse carried profound political and human costs. Ukrainians grew increasingly disillusioned with government, “democracy,” and even independence itself. Early 1990s surveys showed about 90% of Ukrainians believed the country was headed in the wrong direction. Even as the economy improved slightly in the late 1990s, a 1999 survey still found 94% dissatisfied with the country’s situation, primarily due to economic concerns. Meanwhile, no consensus emerged on a viable way forward: 27% supported a market economy, 30% favored central planning, and 25% wanted some combination. Most disturbingly, some 1990s surveys showed declining support for independence itself, with a 1996 survey finding 56% of respondents believing Ukraine should reunite with Russia.

Navigating Regional Division

Building a strong, functional state and economy required constructing a shared national identity, complicated by Ukraine’s regional diversity with different historical experiences, interests, and demands. One writer captured the challenge perfectly: “One Ukraine or many?” Creating common identity and overcoming regional分裂 seemed essential to maintaining independence and pursuing political-economic reform.

The basic contours of Ukrainian regionalism followed historical patterns. Western Ukraine, under Polish and Habsburg rule, developed stronger Ukrainian national consciousness, with predominantly ethnic Ukrainian, Ukrainian-speaking populations. Eastern and southern Ukraine, previously part of the Russian Empire, contained more Russian speakers and ethnic Russians, were more industrialized, and had closer economic ties to Russia. Western Ukraine joined the Soviet Union only after World War II, while Crimea—with its Russian majority—was transferred from Russia to Ukraine only in 1954. Though most citizens in all regions voted for independence in 1991, western Ukrainians and Kyiv intellectuals were the movement’s driving force.

Crimea presented the most serious regional challenge. Only 54% of Crimeans voted for independence—barely a majority. As Ukraine’s only region with an ethnic Russian majority (67%) and no Ukrainian-language schools, Crimea had been part of Ukraine only since Khrushchev’s 1954 administrative transfer. Its long connection to Russia dating to Catherine the Great, and its hosting of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet with many active or retired Soviet military personnel, fueled separatist sentiments.

Crimean separatism began as early as 1989. Ukraine granted Crimea autonomous status in February 1991, but after Ukrainian independence, separatist calls to rejoin Russia grew louder. In May 1992, the Crimean parliament declared independence and proposed a referendum, supported by many Russian politicians who considered Khrushchev’s 1954 decision illegitimate.

Kyiv declared Crimean separatism illegal while granting significant political, economic, and cultural autonomy and promising economic assistance. This proved a temporary solution. In 1994, pro-Russian candidate Yuri Meshkov was elected Crimea’s first president and began consolidating power. However, Crimean separatism ultimately failed. In March 1995, the Ukrainian parliament revoked the Crimean constitution, abolished the presidency, and brought the Crimean government under central control. Crimea had no military forces, and Russia—despite tough rhetoric from some politicians—had no intention of military intervention. Crimeans grew disillusioned with Meshkov, and public opinion remained contradictory and hesitant. Many Crimeans wanted to join Russia but not separate from Ukraine. When rejoining Russia proved impossible, most Crimeans accepted this outcome with little organized protest. Notably, Crimean separatism found little support elsewhere in Ukraine, with surveys showing both ethnic Ukrainians and Russians supported maintaining Ukraine’s Soviet-era borders.

The east-west divide across the Dnipro River represented another significant regional分裂, though not an absolute one. Ukrainization found more support in western Ukraine, while eastern Ukraine—with one-third ethnic Russian population and Russian as the primary public language—preferred maintaining close ties with Russia. Eastern Ukrainians generally viewed market reforms more skeptically, preferring state control and support for aging Soviet industries concentrated in their region.

These regional differences manifested clearly in voting patterns. Western Ukrainians supported parties and candidates favoring economic reform, Western orientation, and Ukrainian statehood, while easterners backed parties like the Communists who favored closer ties with Russia and preserving elements of the Soviet economic system. The 1994 presidential election revealed extreme polarization: Kravchuk won 70.3% of votes west of the Dnipro, while Kuchma won 75.2% east of the river. In some regions, the gap was even more extreme: Kravchuk won over 90% in Galicia, the national democrats’ base, while Kuchma won nearly 90% in highly industrialized and Russified Donetsk Oblast. The 1998 parliamentary elections showed left-wing parties gaining 44.6% support in the east versus 9.6% in the west, while Rukh and other nationalist or national democratic parties drew 65.5% of their votes from the west and only 9.2% from the east.

Despite these divisions, the state held together. Western Ukrainians welcomed Ukrainian statehood and gradual Ukrainization, and surprisingly came to view both Kravchuk and Kuchma as state-builders. Radical nationalist groups existed in western Ukraine but were politically marginalized. The government never pursued forced or radical Ukrainization, respecting Russian speakers’ rights. Though economic reforms proceeded, the government didn’t abandon eastern Ukraine’s struggling industries entirely. Donetsk and other eastern regions remained among Ukraine’s wealthiest in per capita income, far wealthier than Galicia. Eastern Ukrainian political elites integrated comfortably into independent Ukraine, leading powerful economic clans. As Donetsk Oblast Council Chairman Vladimir Shcherban noted: “History has no ‘if only.’ We have what we have. We should proceed from reality rather than indulge in conjecture. Donbas is an inseparable part of Ukraine.”

Between East and West: Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Balancing Act

Given Ukraine’s nation-building challenges and regional divisions, the country’s