The Fractured Landscape of Southern Ming Resistance

By 1650, China’s southern regions had become a patchwork of competing warlords and fading Ming loyalist forces following the Qing conquest of Beijing in 1644. The Western Army (大西军), remnants of Zhang Xianzhong’s rebel forces now led by Sun Kewang, found themselves in Yunnan—geographically isolated from direct confrontation with the advancing Qing banners. Between them lay the territories of Sichuan and Guizhou, controlled by opportunistic Southern Ming commanders like Pi Xiong and Wang Xiang who prioritized self-preservation over coordinated resistance.

This fragmentation mirrored the broader collapse of Ming authority. The Yongli Emperor’s court, while nominally recognized, exercised little practical control. Regional commanders operated as de facto sovereigns, often extorting local populations while avoiding direct engagement with the Qing. As recorded in the Guizhou General Chronicle, these warlords “knew only how to occupy territory, bringing calamity upon the people to enrich themselves.”

Sun Kewang’s Strategic Gambit

Sun Kewang recognized that meaningful resistance required consolidation. In 1649, he dispatched Bai Wenxuan with advance troops into Guizhou, testing regional reactions under the pretext of establishing friendly relations (Guizhou General Chronicle: “using friendly overtures as pretext, then withdrawing”). By April 1650, Bai secured Guiyang, followed by Li Dingguo’s arrival to negotiate alliances with Pi Xiong and Guizhou governor Fan Kuang.

When Pi Xiong attempted to stall through diplomatic maneuvers, Sun’s reply exposed the strategic imperative:

“Your Lordship commands mighty forces capable of crushing strongholds in battle and securing borders in defense. Yet corrupt officials, ignorant of the nation’s foundation, impose endless levies, impoverishing the people… How can we ignore Qing incursions while suspecting my intentions? Both Guizhou and Yunnan remain the court’s territory; garrisoning troops serves only to secure provisions. My sole desire is to maintain communication with the imperial court—there is no private agenda here.”

The Campaign to Unify the Southwest

### Breaking the Guizhou Blockade

By August 1650, Sun personally led his main force into Guiyang. Facing Pi Xiong’s obstruction, Sun ordered Feng Shuangli and Wang Ziqi to bypass defenses, capturing Pi at Pingyue. Simultaneously, Liu Wenxiu and Bai Wenxuan struck north toward Zunyi and Yongning. The Yibin County Annals describe Wang Xiang’s forces—a disorganized conglomerate of 36 garrisons—routed at the Wujiang River.

Sun’s consolidation was methodical:
1. Military Absorption: Incorporating defeated warlords’ troops to prevent banditry
2. Administrative Reform: Abolishing redundant Ming-era bureaucratic posts
3. Economic Revival: Implementing land surveys and encouraging commerce

As the Qianji records, by December 1650, Sun controlled eastern Guizhou up to Tongren, having transformed the province into a functional base.

### The Sichuan Campaign (1651)

Resistance proved stiffer in Sichuan, where memories of Zhang Xianzhong’s brutal occupation lingered. When Sun’s envoys proposed alliance, warlord Wu Dading’s reply dripped with historical resentment:

“Since entering Sichuan, we find roads choked with thorns, a thousand miles of smoke extinguished… The few survivors bear mutilations—severed ears, noses, feet—as if dwelling among demons. This was your father’s ‘blessing’ upon Sichuan… Should you insist on hunting in the Min Mountains, we await with folded hands and staring eyes.”

Sun responded with overwhelming force. Liu Wenxiu’s August 1651 victory at Lujiaoba annihilated Wu’s elite troops, while parallel advances secured Jiaqing and forced Li Zhanchun’s naval retreat to Hubei. The campaign achieved its objectives:
– Elimination of parasitic warlords
– Connection with remnant Shun forces in eastern Sichuan
– Creation of a stable rear area for anti-Qing operations

Governance and Legacy

Sun’s administration introduced radical reforms:
– Judicial Simplicity: Executing corrupt officials (sometimes via flaying) rather than complex sentencing
– Agricultural Recovery: Land surveys and refugee resettlement programs
– Infrastructure: Road networks and urban beautification (mandating household tree planting)

Contemporary observer Yang Hongji noted the transformation: “Though suffering persisted, people no longer lived like prey, fleeing east and west to cheat death.”

Historical Assessment

Sun’s campaigns, though violent, served a necessary strategic purpose. By dismantling the warlord system, he created the logistical foundation for Li Dingguo’s later victories against the Qing at Guilin and Hengyang. The Western Army’s governance—however harsh—provided temporary stability in a collapsing order, demonstrating that only through unity could Southern resistance hope to succeed. As the Qianji concludes, under Sun’s rule, “officials ceased corrupt practices, and people no longer feared banditry—for a time, this seemed progress.”

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