The year 1868 stands out as a historic milestone not only for Japan, which launched its Meiji Restoration, but also for the Qing Dynasty of China. While Japan embarked on a path to modernization by embracing global knowledge and reforming its political system, the Qing Empire faced a crucial moment to adapt to a rapidly changing world order. This pivotal year marked the Qing court’s first concerted effort to engage with Western powers through formal diplomacy and treaty revision, signaling the empire’s tentative steps toward modern international relations and internal reforms.

Japan’s Meiji Restoration: Opening the Door to the World

To fully appreciate the significance of 1868 for Qing China, it is important to set the stage by considering Japan’s parallel transformation. In 1868, the Meiji Emperor issued an edict declaring Japan’s determination to govern by public consensus and to open its doors widely to learn from the world. The Meiji Restoration was not merely a political coup but a profound revolution aimed at rapidly modernizing Japan’s economy, military, and institutions to compete with Western powers.

This reformist zeal in Japan sent ripples across East Asia, signaling the urgency for China to reconsider its long-standing traditions and diplomatic posture. While Japan sought knowledge and reform with enthusiasm, the Qing Empire was grappling with the challenge of navigating international diplomacy while preserving its imperial dignity.

The Qing Empire’s Diplomatic Awakening: The First Modern Mission to the West

Guided by the American diplomat Anson Burlingame’s encouragement, the Qing court took a monumental step by organizing its first official diplomatic mission to Europe and America in 1868. This mission was groundbreaking: it represented China’s initial move toward engaging with the international community on equal footing, breaking away from the centuries-old Sinocentric worldview that regarded China as the “Middle Kingdom” superior to all others.

This new diplomatic outreach was driven by practical necessity. The Qing government was under pressure to revise the so-called “unequal treaties” imposed by Western powers after military defeats, such as the Treaty of Tianjin signed in 1858 during the Second Opium War. The revision of these treaties was scheduled for 1868 and demanded a more modern, treaty-based diplomatic framework that China had never fully embraced before.

The Challenge of Treaty Revision and Collective Decision-Making

The upcoming treaty revision compelled the Qing court to rethink its foreign policy approach. Traditionally, China’s relations with foreign “barbarians” were managed through the tributary system and informal, ritualistic diplomacy, not through equal treaties. The concept of sovereignty and reciprocity embedded in Western treaties was alien to Qing officials.

In preparation for the 1868 treaty talks, the Qing government convened two major policy discussions involving high-ranking provincial governors and officials. The first discussion in 1864 revealed a lack of concrete ideas; most officials believed that if China could strengthen itself internally, Western powers would be deterred from aggression. However, this was a vague hope rather than a strategy.

Notably, Western diplomats such as Sir Thomas Francis Wade and British envoy Thomas Platt submitted memoranda urging the Qing court to abide by treaty obligations and modernize its diplomatic practices. Their proposals were partially accepted, marking a subtle but significant recognition by Qing officials of the need to engage with international norms.

The second policy debate in 1867 was more urgent, as the treaty revision date approached. The Zongli Yamen, the Qing’s foreign affairs office, solicited opinions from provincial governors and generals. Prince Yixin was increasingly ineffective, if the Western demands became excessive, China should not hesitate to reject them—even if that meant breaking off relations.

However, Yixin emphasized pragmatism: China was not yet prepared for outright confrontation. Therefore, it was preferable to temporarily accept new treaties while quietly preparing to strengthen the nation for a future where China could assert itself more forcefully. This collective approach to decision-making reflected a desire to share responsibility for these momentous choices and avoid unilateral blame.

Divided Opinions: Radical Resistance vs. Pragmatic Reform

The responses to the treaty revision debate divided into two main camps, reflecting fundamentally different visions for China’s future.

### Advocates of Active Resistance

Represented by imperial princes like Yixuan and Yikuang, this faction accepted that China could not militarily defeat Western powers at present but believed that conflict was inevitable. They proposed a covert strategy to encourage popular anti-foreign uprisings. Their plan involved mobilizing patriotic citizens to attack foreign missionaries, merchants, and naval vessels, thereby driving Westerners out indirectly.

This approach relied on stirring nationalist sentiments among the populace and using local officials to tacitly support such actions while officially maintaining plausible deniability. The idea was to delay treaty enforcement through bureaucratic foot-dragging and to use popular resistance as a form of asymmetric warfare against foreign encroachment.

### Advocates of Reform and Peaceful Engagement

The other camp, led by influential regional leaders such as Li Hongzhang, Zuo Zongtang, and Shen Baozhen, argued for a pragmatic policy of treaty compliance and internal strengthening. They insisted that China’s immediate priority was to maintain peace with Western powers through treaties while focusing on self-strengthening reforms.

Li Hongzhang was particularly outspoken against reliance on popular uprisings, emphasizing the unreliability of “popular sentiment” and the necessity of modern military strength. He pointed out that even suppressing domestic rebellions like the Nian Rebellion required considerable effort, so waging war against foreign powers without modern armies was unrealistic.

His candid assessments underscored the limits of Qing military power and the pressing need for modernization. He foresaw that only through reforming the military, industry, and governance could China hope to regain sovereignty and respect in the international arena.

The Qing Court’s Balanced Verdict: Diplomacy and Defense

After synthesizing all reports and opinions, the Zongli Yamen concluded that neither exclusive reliance on diplomacy nor on military confrontation was viable. Instead, a dual approach was necessary: uphold treaties to maintain peace and order, but simultaneously invest in strengthening China’s defenses and internal capacity.

This balanced policy reflected the Qing court’s cautious realism amid an international environment characterized by imperial competition and Western technological superiority. It acknowledged that China was not yet ready to reject Western demands outright but also that blind submission was untenable.

Historical Context: The Decline of Qing and the Pressure of Western Imperialism

The Qing Dynasty in the mid-19th century was beset by internal and external crises. Internally, the empire was destabilized by major rebellions such as the Taiping and Nian uprisings, which drained military and fiscal resources. Externally, Western powers, backed by superior military technology, had forced China into a series of humiliating treaties that eroded sovereignty and opened Chinese ports to foreign trade and missionary activity.

The “unequal treaties” institutionalized extraterritorial rights for foreigners and fixed low tariffs, limiting China’s ability to control its own economy. These pressures challenged the traditional Confucian worldview and governance model, which had long dominated Chinese statecraft.

In this era, the Qing court’s efforts to engage diplomatically with Western powers and revise treaties were part of a broader “Self-Strengthening Movement” that sought to adopt Western technology and knowledge without undermining Confucian values.

The Legacy of 1868: Foundations for China’s Modern Diplomacy

The diplomatic mission to the West and the internal debates over treaty revision in 1868 laid important groundwork for China’s gradual embrace of modern diplomacy. The establishment of the Zongli Yamen as a foreign affairs office represented a key institutional innovation, replacing ad hoc and ritual-based foreign relations with structured, treaty-based diplomacy.

Although the Qing Empire continued to struggle throughout the late 19th century, including suffering further defeats in wars such as the Sino-Japanese War , the events of 1868 marked a turning point. They exposed the necessity of reform and engagement with the global system.

Furthermore, the debates between radical resistance and pragmatic reform foreshadowed the complex dynamics of Chinese nationalism and modernization that would shape China’s path well into the 20th century.

Conclusion: 1868 as a Crossroads in East Asian History

The year 1868 was a watershed moment in East Asian history. While Japan’s Meiji Restoration propelled it swiftly onto the world stage as a modern nation-state, China’s Qing Dynasty faced the daunting task of reconciling centuries-old traditions with the demands of a new global order.

By sending its first formal diplomatic mission to the West and engaging in collective decision-making over treaty revisions, China took tentative but significant steps toward modernization. The tensions between resistance and reform, between preserving sovereignty and adapting to international norms, encapsulated the challenges of this transformative era.

Understanding the dynamics of 1868 provides valuable insight into the complex processes that shaped modern China’s diplomatic and political evolution, as well as the broader currents of East Asian history during the age of imperialism and modernization.